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Visions of Habeas 
David McCord* 
In an old fable, several sightless persons who do not know 
what an elephant is like are asked to examine one and describe 
it. The first person grasps the beast's trunk and opines, "Ah, an 
elephant is like a fat snake!" A second feels the elephant's ear 
and concludes, "Clearly, this creature is like a palm frond." 
Another grabs hold of the critter's leg and chides, 'You're all 
wrong: an elephant is like a tree trunk!" Yet another feels the 
elephant's side and proclaims, "No, an elephant is like a wall!" 
The fmal candidate seizes the elephant's tail and announces, 
"Fools! An elephant is like a rope!" The fable is, of course, a 
cautionary tale about the dangers of reasoning to  a conclusion 
based on incomplete information. 
There are striking parallels between this fable and 
attempts t o  develop a vision concerning the proper role of 
federal habeas corpus for state prisoners:' both the elephant 
and the writ have dissimilar components, and one's vision of 
what the beasts look like is highly dependent upon which 
component one is grasping. But there is also one striking 
difference between the elephant in the fable and the writ in the 
real world. Almost everyone is familiar with an elephant, and 
thus few are likely to be misled by incomplete or inaccurate 
descriptions of the beast. But hardly anyone is familiar with 
the writ, and thus many may be vulnerable to  faulty visions 
based on partial or inaccurate information. This vulnerability is 
particularly intense when those "in the know" concerning the 
* Richard and Anita Calkins Distinguished Professor of Law, Drake Law 
School; B.A. Illinois Wesleyan University; J.D., Harvard Law School. The author 
extends thanks to his secretary, Karla Westberg, for her tireless efforts in 
preparation of this manuscript. The research and writing of this Article was 
supported by a stipend from the Drake Law School Endowment Trust, for which 
the author is deeply grateful. 
1. Federal habeas corpus actions by state prisoners are authorized by 28 
U.S.C. $8 2241, 2254(a) (1988). This Article does not deal with post-conviction 
petitions by federal prisoners, as  to which habeas corpus has been supplanted by a 
statutory remedy found in 28 U.S.C. 8 2255. 
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writ-primarily Justices of the United States Supreme Court 
and selected academic commentators-so often choose (with 
their eyes wide open) the components of the writ that they 
wish to grasp and then attempt to convince the uninitiated that 
those components fairly reflect the whole beast. 
This Article is written to enable interested non-ideologues 
(or ideologues willing temporarily to  set their proclivities aside) 
to  get a grip on the elusive body of doctrine that constitutes 
Supreme Court habeas law. In order to  attempt to accomplish 
this formidable task, this Article is divided into three Parts. In 
Part I, I set forth the theoretical and practical issues that 
underlie the habeas debate. Part I1 explains eight visions of 
habeas, and examines how each vision deals with the issues set 
forth in Part I. In Part 111, I examine how the eight visions 
play out in the ten contexts that make up the heart of habeas 
litigation, then in Part IV I will present my conclusion 
concerning the relative strengths of the eight visions in 
contemporary habeas jurisdiction. I hope that a reader who 
persists with this Article to that point will be in a position to  
understand current habeas doctrine, to assess its validity, and 
to be able to reach some tentative ideas about which visionts) 
the reader believes to  be the superior one(s). 
One of the great difEculties in understanding habeas is 
recognizing and keeping track of all the different issues. This is 
wcult because the varied contexts in which the issues arise 
can obscure the underlying commonalities and sometimes in 
Supreme Court habeas opinions the real issues swim about 
beneath the facts and the doctrine, surfacing only occasionally 
like whales coming up for air. The purpose of this Part of this 
Article is to identify those important issues. 
A. Three Issues of Constitutional Interpretation Not Specifi 
to Habeas, but Important for Habeas Jurisprudence 
It is important to keep in mind that habeas is a procedural 
device for litigating constitutional claims: habeas does not de- 
fine the substance of criminal defendants' rights. That job is 
performed by constitutional criminal procedure doctrine, which 
can be promulgated either in direct review cases or in habeas. 
This Article cannot begin to set forth the law of constitutional 
criminal procedure or to list all the considerations of constitu- 
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tional theory that are significant in determining the content of 
that doctrine. There are three broad issues of constitutional 
interpretation, though, that while not peculiar to habeas, recur 
so prominently in habeas jurisprudence that they need to be 
set forth at the outset: the expansiveness of rights, their 
balanceability, and their equality. 
The issue of expansiveness deals with the all-important 
questions of how many constitutional criminal procedure rights 
should be recognized, and how broadly the recognized rights 
should be interpreted. For example, the liberal members of the 
Warren Court could be classified as rights-expansionists, while 
the conservative members of the Rehnquist Court could be 
called rights-non-expansionists (or, in some instances, 
rights-contractionists). 
As to the issue of balanceability of rights, the opposing 
viewpoints can be defined by imagining a rights-absolutist and 
a rights-preferrer. A rights-absolutist contends that rights have 
many attributes that are traditionally ascribed to  God: they are 
all-good, all-powerful, and their power does not diminish over 
time. Described by a more earthbound analogy, in the card 
game of the criminal justice system rights are  trump^.^ This 
means that rights are non-balanceable: if a constitutional viola- 
tion is proven-even decades after it occurred-the habeas 
court should issue the writ, turning a deaf ear to  any howls 
from the prosecuting authorities that the state has some impor- 
tant interests on its side. To a rights-preferrer, this is too 'sim- 
plistic. While not denying that rights are valuable, a 
rights-preferrer does not view them as either all-good (they 
sometimes prevent convictions of lawbreakers), all-powerful 
(the state has legitimate interests that should sometimes over- 
ride them), or as not diminishing in power over time (their 
power wanes as the ability of the state to retry the claimant 
diminishes). In short, to a rights-preferrer, rights are not al- 
ways trumps-they must give way when a sufficiently powerful 
set of interests is balanced against them. 
Concerning the equality of constitutional rights, we can 
imagine a rights-equalist and rights-unequalist. A 
2. The notion of rights as trumps has been advocated by philosopher Ronald 
Dworkin. Ronald Dworkin, Is There a Right to Pornography?, 1 OXFORD J .  LEG. 
STUD. 177, 200 (1981) ("Rights . . . are best understood as trumps over some back- 
ground justification for political decisions that states a goal for the community as a 
whole.?, 
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rights-equalist believes that all constitutional rights are of 
equal value and thus are equally entitled to vindication when- 
ever a violation is proven. By contrast, a rights-unequalist 
believes that some rights are more valuable than others and 
that the favored rights are more entitled t o  vindication in some 
contexts. 
On one end of the ideological spectrum, an arch-liberal 
with respect to constitutional criminal procedure doctrine will 
be an expansionist, a rights-absolutist, and a rights-equalist. At 
the other end of the spectrum, an arch-conservative will be a 
non-expansionist (or even a contractionist), a rights-balancer, 
and a rights-unequalist. Less doctrinaire positions will be com- 
posed of less absolute positions on these three interpretational 
issues. The importance of this, for purposes of this Article, is 
that one's vision of the procedural mechanism of habeas is 
inevitably colored by one's attitude toward the substantive 
rights that are the subject of habeas litigation. Thus, while it is 
possible to imagine an arch-liberal who construes habeas nar- 
rowly, or  an arch-conservative who views it expansively, such 
persons do not exist in real life (or if they do, they don't adver- 
tise it). Accordingly, toward the outset of the explanation of 
each of the visions of habeas, I will attempt to  illuminate the 
positions on these three interpretational issues that are held by 
the proponents of the vision. 
B. A Cluster of Theoretical Issues Specific to Habeas: 
Function, History, Federalism, and Congressional 
Versus Supreme Court Authority 
I denominate these theoretical issues as a "cluster" to indi- 
cate that while they can be separately identified, they are ulti- 
mately inseparably intertwined. The first and most important 
theoretical issue is, quite simply, what finction(s) is the writ 
supposed to  serve? The issue of function is the ultimate 
one-the other three issues in this cluster are significant be- 
cause they may provide some enlightenment concerning the 
issue of function. The second theoretical issue is, what does the 
history of the writ tell us about its proper function(s)? In habe- 
as law, function and history are like Mary and her little 
lambwherever one goes, the other is sure to follow. The writ's 
history is fascinating because it clearly illustrates the fable 
with which this Article began-depending upon which piece of 
history one grasps, the writ takes on an entirely different char- 
acter. The third theoretical issue involves an important aspect 
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of federalism: exactly what does the existence of the writ indi- 
cate concerning the proper relation between the state criminal 
justice systems and the federal courts? Indisputably, the exis- 
tence of the writ says something about the relationship, inas- 
much as it empowers a federal court to  release a prisoner who 
is in custody pursuant to  a state court judgment. The issue of 
federalism is closely bound up with the issues of the writ's 
function and history because one basic point on which persons 
of every visionary stripe can agree is that the Reconstruction 
Congress, which enacted the basic statute that governs habeas 
to this day: authorized federal courts t o  issue writs of habeas 
corpus on behalf of state prisoners because of distrust of state 
criminal justice systems.' The fourth theoretical issue is Con- 
gressional versus Supreme Court authority concerning the habe- 
as statutes. A point of agreement among all visions is that 
federal habeas for state prisoners is a creature of federal stat- 
ute and that the primary lawmaking authority belongs t o  Con- 
g r e ~ s . ~  The habeas statutes are, however, rather 
3. 28 U.S.C. 5 2241 (1988). 
4. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., Federal Habeas Corpus and State Pris- 
oners: An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REV. 423, 426 (1961) ("In 1867, Con- 
gress was anticipating Southern resistance to Reconstruction and to the implemen- 
tation of the post-war constitutional Amendments."); Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking 
About Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 748, 752 (1987) ("After the Civil 
War, Congress feared that southern states would persecute and even literally im- 
prison former slaves."); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Habeas Corpus: The Supreme Court 
and the Congress, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 367, 375 (1983) ("These contemporaneous stat- 
utes indicate that the 1867 habeas corpus Statute was written a t  a time when 
Congress distrusted state officers and enacted legislation to secure federal rights, 
state law notwithstanding."). 
5. See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at  780-81 ("[Ilt might be argued that . . . 
the question of parity [between state and federal courts] is one for Congress to re- 
solve."); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Proce- 
dural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 709 (1990) (sug- 
gesting that the tradition of judicial innovations with confirmatory statutory 
amendment "should be presumed to continue unless and until Congress indicates 
its dissatisfactionn); James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic 
Attack on Habeas CorpuslDirect Review Parity, 92 COLUM. fr. REV. 1997, 2091 
(1992) (stressing Congress's purposehlness in amending the habeas corpus stat- 
utes); Saltzburg, supra note 4, a t  384 ("Assuming that limits may be placed on 
habeas corpus review without violating the Constitution, this judgment is not the 
Court's to make. Congress makes this judgment when it enacts a habeas corpus 
statute."). 
There is an interesting question of constitutional law whether Congress is 
obliged to provide federal habeas corpus to state prisoners or could choose to com- 
pletely abolish such jurisdiction. For a discussion of this issue that comes to the 
non-traditional answer that Congress could not abolish habeas jurisdiction, see 
Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional 
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bare-boned-they do not address (or address only tangentially 
or by inference) many of the key questions that arise in habeas 
litigation. The crux of the CongressionaVSupreme Court issue 
is how far the Supreme Court can go in creating habeas doc- 
trine without crossing the line into illegitimate judicial amend- 
ment of the statutes. 
C. The Practical Issue: The Effects of Habeas Litigation 
The practical issue of the real-world effects of habeas liti- 
gation surfaces less often than do the theoretical issues, but the 
effects of habeas litigation constitute a very real subtext for the 
doctrinal issues with which the court ~ re s t l e s .~  To obtain an 
Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 862 (1994). 
6. Data concerning the number of habeas corpus filings is compiled annually 
and published by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts in the 
Annual Report of the Director, which are reprinted in REPORTS OF THE PRO- 
CEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS. The indi- 
vidual Annual Reports will be cited as 19x11 ANN. REP. For several reasons these 
reports are not totally exact, see Charles D. Weisselberg, Evidentiay Hearings in 
Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 131, 161 11.165 (setting forth 
four reasons why the reports are not totally accurate), but the reports still provide 
the best available picture of habeas corpus activity. The number of habeas corpus 
filings in 1986 was 10,724. 1990 ANN. REP. 140. For 1987, the number was 11,368. 
1991 ANN. REP. 193. For 1988, the figure was 12,059; for 1989, 12,404; for 1990, 
13,068; for 1991, 12,019; and for 1992, 12,806. 1992 ANN. REP. 182. While these 
are fairly large numbers of filings, only a relatively small percentage of them real- 
ly engages the federal district courts' attention. For example, a 1990 report found 
that district courts hold hearings in only 1.1 percent of all habeas corpus cases. 
Report of the Subcommittee on the Role of the Federal Courts (Richard A. Posner, 
Chair), in 1 Federal Courts Study Committee, Working Papers and Subcommittee 
Reports, 484 (July 1, 1990). 
Certainly over 10,000 filings per year is a significant number. Yet some other 
observations may help put this number in context. For example, according to Pro- 
fessor Daniel J. Meltzer: 
One can then estimate (based on numbers dating from the early 1980s to 
the present) that of every thousand persons convicted in state prosecu- 
tions and committed to custody in any given year, only three to four 
actually file habeas corpus petitions challenging their custody. Of those 
persons, the studies from the 1970s suggest that only 3.2 percent of peti- 
tions, or 7.3 percent of petitioners, actually obtained relief. So of every 
100,000 persons committed to state custody, no more than about 30 ob- 
tain federal habeas relief. 
Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction: The Limits of Models, 66 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 2507, 2524 (1993). Further, Professor Weisselberg demonstrated that %abeas 
corpus flings per state prisoner remained fairly constant from 1945 to 1962, rose 
dramatically until 1970, and have steadily declined since. In fiscal year 1945, there 
were 0.47 federal habeas corpus petitions filed per every hundred state prisoners; 
in 1961, 0.52; in 1970, 5.05; and 1.85 in 1988." Weisselberg, supra, at 162-63. 
Looking at  the figures above, habeas filings have held relatively steady for the 
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overview of these effects, we need to examine the costs and 
benefits of both unsuccessfil and successfil petitions. 
The costs of unsuccessful petitions can be divided into those 
costs that are certain and those that are speculatiue. It is cer- 
tain that unsuccessful petitions create costs to the prosecuting 
authorities in having to respond to them and to federal judges 
in having to dispose of them. As to speculative effects, i t  is 
possible that crime victims are somehow upset by the continu- 
ing litigation of their victimizer. State judges may chafe at the 
idea that their decisions continue to be grist for federal litiga- 
tion years after they were rendered7 and the relatively few 
petitioners with meritorious claims may have their claims bur- 
ied in an avalanche of unmeritorious petitions? One additional 
period 1989 through 1992, which was subsequent to Professor Weisselberg's calcula- 
tions. Given that prison populations have been increasing yearly during that peri- 
od, one assumes that the current rate of habeas filings per 100 state prisoners is 
less than what it was in 1988. These figures give Professor Meltzer pause to con- 
sider whether habeas is really a very useful means of ensuring adequate protection 
of federal constitutional rights in state criminal trials. Meltzer, supra, at 2526. 
Habeas corpus filings by death penalty petitioners are a different subject. As 
Professor Meltzer undoubtedly correctly intuits, the percentage of such cases in 
which petitions are filed is close to one hundred percent. Meltzer, supra, at 2525. 
Further, there is evidence that the success rate of capital petitioners is quite high. 
Donald P. Lay, The Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Complex Procedure for a Simple 
Process, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1044 n.166 (1993) (citing a collection of sources 
that put the success rate of capital habeas petitioners between 50 percent and 70 
percent). There is some room for skepticism about the validity of this reversal rate. 
Charles Fried, Impudence, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 155, 182 11.92 ("I am dubious about 
the validity of statistics that show a 40 to 60 percent reversal rate in death cases 
on habeas."). There is little room for doubt, however, that a significant percent of 
death penalty petitioners do have success in habeas. 
7 .  Compare John W. Winkel 111, Judges as lobbyists: Habeas corpus reform 
in the 1940s, 68 JUDICATURE 263, 266-72 (1985) (examining the lobbying efforts of 
state judges in the 1940s to curtail habeas jurisdiction) with Frank J. Remington, 
State Prisoner Access to Postconviction Relief-A Lessening Role for Federal Courts; 
An Increasingly Important Role for State Courts, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 287, 289 (1983) 
(arguing that by the 1970s criticism of habeas by state judges had subsided, proba- 
bly mostly because of increased state court willingness to  deal with important fed- 
eral constitutional questions). See also Frank J. Remington, Restricting Access to 
Federal Habeas Corpus: Justice Sacrif~ed on the &tars of Expdiency, Federalism 
and Deterrence, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 339, 347 (1987-1988) (reasoning 
that habeas constitutes a limited affront to state judicial autonomy because of the 
small percentage success rate and the declining percentage of habeas as a part of 
the federal docket); Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 170 (arguing that state court 
judges should not take offense at habeas jurisdiction since it is part of their duties 
to willingly submit their decisions to scrutiny by others and because judges are not 
infallible). 
8. As Justice Jackson once put it with respect to habeas, rh]e who must 
search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the nee- 
dle is not worth the search." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., 
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cost for death penalty proponents9 is quite prominent in habe- 
as jurisprudence: the delay in execution of death penalty peti- 
tioners because of their availing themselves of federal habeas 
petitions. lo 
There may be some benefits even to unsuccessful habeas 
litigation, but they fall into the realm of the speculative. First, 
if more constitutional litigation results in better constitutional 
jurisprudence, then even unsuccessful habeas petitions have 
some benefit. Second, the ability to bring a habeas petition, 
even if ultimately unsuccessful, may provide some psychological 
benefit to petitioners who feel that they have been aggrieved by 
the state. 
As t o  successful habeas petitions, the costs are all the 
same, but there is a much more certain benefit: a prisoner 
whose constitutional rights have been violated finally has them 
vindicated." This vindication occurs in the form of an order of 
release from custody or for resentencing. 
Having identified the three general issues of constitutional 
interpretation that bear on habeas jurisprudence, the four 
theoretical issues specific to  habeas corpus and the subtext of 
the practical effects of habeas corpus litigation, it is now time 
to examine the eight visions of habeas corpus that are reflected 
in current Supreme Court jurisprudence and academic com- 
mentary. 
concurring). 
9. For opponents of the death penalty, of course, delay in execution consti- 
tutes a benefit of habeas. 
10. I t  may be that the conservative Justices' discontent with habeas as a 
mechanism to delay executions has been the tail that has wagged the whole habe- 
as dog over the last decade or so. Most often this co~ec t ion  is seen by death 
penalty opponents. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, 45 VAND. L. 
REV. 797, 822 (1992) ("The current Court has expressed its impatience with these 
[habeas] costs, primarily in the context of death penalty cases."); Robert Weisberg, 
A Great Writ While It Lasted, 8 1  J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 9, 9 (1990) (specula- 
tively attributing some conservative Supreme Court cases regarding habeas to the 
f ad  that "the Court was simply frustrated with the inadequacy of the execution 
rate of America's death row inmatesn); Julia E. Boaz, Note, Summary Processes 
and the Rule of Law: Expediting Death Penalty Cases in Federal Courts, 95 YALE 
L.J. 349, 356 (1985) ("Members of the Court have repeatedly expressed impatience 
and irritation with execution delays, an attitude suggesting illegitimate manipula- 
tion of procedures on the part of death penalty lawyers.") (citation omitted). 
11. Among all the visions I will discuss, only proponents of the 
one-fair-chance vision would not see federal vindication of a right as a benefit. 
Those visionaries do not believe there is any ultimate standard of correctness and, 
thus, do not believe the federal decision vindicating a right is any better than a 
state decision to the contrary. See supra text accompanying note 112. 
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The eight visions set forth below are derived primarily 
from sifting through Supreme Court cases and, secondarily, 
from academic literature regarding habeas corpu~.'~ As far as 
I can tell, this listing of visions is exhaustive of current ideas of 
what habeas corpus should be. I have assigned each a descrip- 
tive name of my own devising. In this Part of the Article, I will 
explain each vision in relation t o  the issues raised in Part I. 
Three of the eight visions (Visions One, Two, and Five) have 
been explained in significant detail by their proponents. As to 
these, I will need to do little deductive reasoning concerning 
the visions' positions. The other five visions have not been fully 
explicated-as to those, I will have to extrapolate many of the 
visions' stances. This Part should provide the reader with a 
basic understanding of what the visions are, and thus prepare 
the reader for the plunge into the case law that will occur in 
Part 111. 
A. Vision One: The De Novo Litigation Vision 
De novo litigation visionaries believe that petitioners 
should have the opportunity to  litigate in federal court, virtual- 
ly from ground zero, any federal constitutional claim. The fed- 
eral court should not be bound by procedural straightjackets 
that may limit state courts, nor should the federal court be 
bound by state court findings of fact. In this vision habeas is, in 
one sense, an "extraordinary writ"'3 because it can look 
12. Others have made efforts a t  divining theories or models of habeas. See, 
e.g., Fried, supra note 6, a t  175-76 (arguing that the two dominant models are the 
"process" model and the "relitigation" model); Evan T. Lee, The Theories of Federal 
Habeas Corpus, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 151, 151-54 (1994) (arguing that the four theo- 
ries of habeas corpus are the process-only theory, the process-plus-innocence theory, 
the federal forum theory, and the deterrence theory); Jordan Steiker, Innocence and 
Federal Habeas, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 303, 308-9 (1993) (stating as the two familiar 
understandings of habeas, the full relitigation model, and the model that views 
habeas as a limited and extraordinary remedy to be available only where the state 
court lacked jurisdiction); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 
575, 577-78 & 11.14 (1993) (stating the two primary models of habeas are the "full 
review" and "institutional competence" models, and the important intermediate 
models include the "deterrence" model, the "innocence based" model, the "liberty 
based" model, the "rights based" model, and the "appellate" model). In this Article, 
I will argue that there are eight signif~cant "visions" or models of habeas that 
appear in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Thus, I think that all of the authorities 
just cited oversimplify the richness of available models. The models suggested by 
Professor Woolhandler come closest to encompassing the "visions" I will discuss. 
13. Habeas corpus, along with mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and cer- 
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through all procedural irregularities and cut straight to the 
heart of the merits of the constitutional issue. In another 
sense, in this vision habeas is not "extraordinary" at all: it is, 
in fact, a routine part of the state defendant's post-conviction 
remedy. The best exemplar of this vision on the Supreme Court 
bench was Justice Brennan.l4 In academia, this vision has 
several champions, the most prolific of whom is Professor Larry 
Yackle. l5 
I .  The three general issues of constitutional interpretation 
Advocates of this vision invariably are "liberals" with re- 
spect to these issues of constitutional interpretation: they view 
rights expansively, do not believe that rights should be bal- 
anced against other interests, and believe that all rights are 
equally weighty. 
2. The four theoretical issues specific to habeas 
a. Function. In this vision habeas performs at least six 
functions. The first function focuses on individual habeas peti- 
tioners: the writ vindicates the rights of individuals who have 
been constitutionally wronged.16 The remaining five functions 
- - - -ppppp 
tiorari constitute the "extraordinary" writs. CHESTER J. ANTIEAU, TKE PRACTICE OF 
EXTRAORDINARY EMEDIES: HABEAS CORP~JS AND THE OTHER COMMON LAW WRITS 
(1987). 
14. Justice Marshall would make an equally good exemplar except that Jus- 
tice B r e ~ a n  authored a greater number of significant habeas opinions. Significant 
majority opinions of Justice Breman include the following: Kimmelman v. Morri- 
son, 477 U.S. 365 (1986); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); and Fay v. 
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). His significant dissents include those in Butler v. 
McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); Murray v. 
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); and Stone 
v. Powell, 428 US.  465 (1976). 
15. See, e.g., Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 
233 1 (1993) [hereinafter Yackle, Hagioscope]; Larry W. Yackle, The Misadventures 
of State Postconviction Remedies, 16 N.Y.U. REV. LAW & SO(=. CHANGE 359 
(1987-88) [hereinafter Yackle, Misadventures]; Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas 
Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991 (1985) [hereinafter Yackle, Explaining]; Larry W. 
Yackle, The Exhaustion Doctrine in Federal Habeas Corpus: An Argument for a 
Return to First Principles, 44 OHIO STATE L J .  393 (1983). Professor Yackle has 
also written one of the major treatises concerning federal habeas corpus which con- 
tains less advocacy of his position than the afore-cited articles. See LARRY W. 
YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES (1981 & Supp. 1994) [hereinafter YACKLE, 
POSM=ONVICI'ION]. 
16. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 441 (1963) ("Surely no fair-minded 
person will contend that those who have been deprived of their liberty without due 
process of law ought nevertheless to languish in prison."); Price v. Johnston, 334 
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relate to the federal nature of the American court system: the 
threat of federal habeas relief deters states from construing the 
substance of federal rights too stingily," provides a means to 
force states to make their procedures fairer to criminal defen- 
dants," keeps federal district courts involved as to the whole 
range of issues by regularly providing them with opportunities 
to litigate constitutional issues that may not arise regularly in 
federal criminal cases,lg promotes statelfederal dialogue con- 
U.S. 266, 291 (1948) (''The primary purpose of a habeas corpus proceeding is to 
make certain that a man is not unjustly imprisoned."); Chemerinsky, supra note 4, 
at  773 ("[Tlhe Warren Court and defenders of broader habeas [corpus] review have 
emphasized the importance of collateral review as a method of error correction."); 
Graham Hughes, Sandbagging Constitutional Rights: Federal Habeas Corpus and 
the Procedural Default Principle, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 321, 321 
(1987-1988) ("According to one view, our greatest fear should be that there are 
those in prison who have been improperly convicted."). But see Yackle, Explaining, 
supm note 15, at 992, 1005-1009 (arguing that the physical liberty rationale is not 
the strongest one for supporting the existence of habeas jurisdiction). 
17. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 562-63 (1979) (stressing that the deterrent 
value of habeas corpus review of state actions is effective); Chemerinsky, supra 
note 4, at 770-71 (noting that the Warren Court believed that via habeas rights 
"are enforced as a way of deterring unlawfil police practices"); Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 
104 HARv. E. REV. 1733, 1787-813 (1991) (arguing generally that one purpose of 
remedies for constitutional violations is to "redress individual violations," while the 
second focuses on broader structural interests by establishing a judicial check to 
ensure that the political branches respect constitutional values); Yackle, Explaining, 
supm note 15, at 1039 (The task [of habeas] is to hold state authorities ac- 
countable and to insist that they fashion and enforce substantive criminal policies 
without denying fair process to individuals haled into court to answer charges."). 
18. Joseph L. Hoffmann, Starting h r n  Scratch: Rethinking Fedeml Habeas 
Review of Death Penalty Cases, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 133, 145 (1992) (arguing, 
even though H o f f m a ~  is not a de novo litigation visionary, that habeas review 
should be a mechanism for forcing state courts to improve capital trials); Curtis R. 
Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARV. L. 
REV. 1315, 1352 (1961) ("On the level of sound policy, one very desirable goal is to 
define the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction so as to serve as an incentive for 
improvement of state procedures."); Yackle, Misadventures, supra note 15, at 360-63 
(tracing the Court's efforts in the 1940s to force Illinois to create a viable 
postconviction remedy); Brennan, supra note 4, a t  442 (arguing for a rule permit- 
ting federal courts to ignore procedural defaults because "an awareness by state 
tribunals that the procedural barrier to state review would not be deemed neces- 
sarily a barrier to federal review, would provide an incentive for state courts to 
reach serious constitutional claims and vindicate them in proper cases." Of course, 
two years later Justice Breman mote an opinion empowering habeas courts to 
easily ignore state procedural defaults. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426-427 
(1963)). 
19. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 338-39 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that preserving the power of lower federal courts to hear claims for retro- 
active application of a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure "would not 
discourage their litigation on federal habeas corpus and thus not deprive ourselves 
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cerning rights," and promotes uniformity of interpretation of 
federal law.'' 
b. History. This vision begins its history by reaching far 
back into English law for proclamations about the "Great Writ" 
as the most powerful arrow in the quiver of libert~.~' Propo- 
nents of this vision point out that the writ was deemed such an 
important part of the rights of citizens by the Founders and 
that the Writ is ensconced, though in a backhanded manner, in 
the Suspension Clause of the Con~titution.~~ 
The de novo litigation vision has to  struggle with the fact 
that during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century the 
Supreme Court seemingly viewed the writ as primarily a reme- 
dy for legislative or executive detentions and believed that the 
only legitimate sphere of operation of the writ in the context of 
imprisonment pursuant to a judicial directive was if the sen- 
tencing court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter or the 
person of the defendant. The key case is Ex parte Watkins," 
and society of the benefit of decisions by the lower federal courts when we must 
resolve these issues ourselves*); Joseph L. Hoffmann, The Supreme Court's New 
Vision of Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 165, 191 
("[Mlost of the opportunities for the lower federal courts to declare . . . or to ex- 
pound . . . 'new rules' arise in federal habeas cases. This is because there are 
many more state criminal prosecutions than federal ones, and because state proce- 
dures vary more than do federal procedures, thus raising more interesting and 
difficult criminal procedure issues."). 
20. Robert-M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas 
Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1048-1053 (1977) (arguing that the War- 
ren Court wisely chose as a path for the continuing definition of constitutional 
rights a dialogue between the federal habeas courts and the sb te  courts rather 
than more intrusive controls involving liability rules and equity); see also Kathleen 
Patchel, The New Habeas, 42 HASITNCS L.J. 939, 1016 (1991) (examining the dia- 
lectical federalism concept). 
21. Yackle, Explaining, supra note 15, at 1022 ("[Tlhere is a national interest 
in the correct and uniform interpretation of federal law."). 
22. The classic homage to the writ was penned by Justice Brennan in the 
majority opinion in Fay v. Noia, 372 US. 391, 399-406 (1963). In the same opin- 
ion, Justice B r e ~ a n  took the de novo litigation visionaries' first bite at the histori- 
cal apple. Id. at 399-426. Justice Brennan's history was subjected to searching 
criticism by legal historians. See Lewis Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: 
The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 31 (1965), and Dallin 
H. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REV. 451 
(1966). A revised de moo litigation visionary history was put forth in Gary Peller, 
In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579 
(1982). 
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, $ 9, cl. 2 (The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public 
Safety may require it."). 
24. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830). 
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where the Court held: "An imprisonment under a judgment 
cannot be unlawful, unless that judgment be an absolute nulli- 
ty; and it is not a nullity if the court has general jurisdiction of 
the subject, although it should be erroneous.'725 De novo litiga- 
tion visionaries take two tacks in trying to downplay the 
Watkins principle. First, they argue that the Court narrowly 
construed its habeas jurisdiction so as to  not create a substi- 
tute for the appellate criminal jurisdiction that Congress chose 
not t o  confer.26 Second, de novo visionaries argue that it was 
not the scope of the writ that was restricted during that time 
period but rather the scope of due process27-the only compo- 
nent of due process cognizable in federal courts then was the 
right not to  be convicted by a tribunal lacking jurisdiction." 
Thus, all that was required for the expansion of habeas juris- 
diction was an expanding body of rights2' and an authorizing 
jurisdictional statute as to state prisoners. 
The statute came via the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, by 
which Congress, for the first time, empowered federal courts to 
issue writs of habeas corpus on behalf of any person held "in 
violation of the United States Constit~tion."~~ The basic man- 
date of this statute-that the writ shall extend to a prisoner 
who is "restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Con- 
stitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States7,--has not 
changed in substance from its enactment in 1867 to the present 
day.31 De novo litigation proponents point out that the lan- 
guage of the statute is as broad as it could possibly be in pro- 
tecting constitutional rightsS2 and note that the Supreme 
25. Id. at 203. This case involved a petition by a federal prisoner because, 
except for two limited statutes authorizing federal jurisdiction over a habeas peti- 
tion by prisoners in state custody, there was no general jurisdictional statute per- 
mitting federal courts to hear habeas petitions by state prisoners. Even though 
Watkins involved a federal petitioner, it was viewed at  the time as stating a gen- 
eral principle applicable to habeas. 
26. See Fay, 372 US. at 413. 
27. Id. at 409-11. 
28. Watkins, 28 U S  at 203. 
29. See Fay, 372 US. at 413-14. 
30. Judiciary Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 8 1, 14 Stat. 385, 386 (1867) (cur- 
rent version a t  28 U.S.C. $9 2241, 2254(a) (1988)). 
31. Id. The present governing statutes both provide that the writ shall extend 
to any prisoner who is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or trea- 
ties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. $8 2241(c)(3), 2254(a) (1988). 
32. See, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 503-6 (1976) ( B r e ~ a n ,  J., dissenting) 
(inferring that the "explicit language" of 28 U.S.C. 8 2254 extends habeas jurisdic- 
tion to encompass all constitutional claims). 
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Court recognized this breadth virtually immediately after the 
statute's enactment.33 
Proponents of the de novo litigation vision then must 
plunge into the murky waters of the period fkom 1867 to  1953, 
when Brown u. Allens4 (the consensus choice of visionaries of 
all stripes as the starting point for the modern era of habeas 
litigation) was handed down. As we will see in examining other 
visions, this period contains signals that point in different 
directions35 and thus can provide support for several conflict- 
ing visions. De novo litigation proponents view this as a transi- 
tional period during which two important things happened. 
First, the Supreme Court gradually freed itself of the idea that 
the only judicially-authorized incarceration that could be un- 
constitutional was one where the court lacked jurisdicti~n,~~ 
and worked toward fulfilling the intent of the 1867 Congress 
that all claims of constitutional violations were within the 
scope of the From this perspective, Brown is important 
because it finally laid to rest this Turisdictional" restriction. 
The second important process that de novo litigation visionaries 
believe occurred during this period was that the Court began to 
lay the foundations of the due process criminal procedure revo- 
lution that would be brought to fruition by the Warren Court in 
the 1 9 6 0 ~ . ~ ~  
33. Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325-26 (1867) (This legislation 
is of the most comprehensive character. I t  brings within the habeas corpus juris- 
diction of every court and of every judge every possible case of privation of liberty 
contrary to the National Constitution, treaties, or laws. I t  is impossible to widen 
this jurisdiction."). 
34. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). 
35. See infia notes 74-75, 108, and 126, and accompanying text. 
36. Brown v. Allen does not specifically recognize the expansion of the writ to 
allow claims of constitutional error previously adjudicated in state court. Brown is 
only understood as standing for this expansion in scope in light of previous cases. 
Barry Friedman, A Tale of !l'wo Habeas. 73 MINN. L. REV. 247, 252 & n.27 (1988). 
37. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 413-14 (1963) (stating that the "possibly 
grudging scope given [to habeas in some early Supreme Court cases] is overshad- 
owed by the numerous and varied allegations which this Court has deemed cog- 
nizable on habeas, not only in the last decades, but continuously since the fetters 
of the Watkins decision were thrown off in Ex Parte Lange [85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 
(1873)l"). 
38. Peller, supra note 22, a t  649. Professor Peller gives three examples of 
pre-Warren Court, expansive, constitutional criminal procedure cases: Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (holding that the due process clause required states 
to  provide counsel for accused persons in capital cases); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 
U.S. 103 (1935) (per curiam) (holding that the prosecution's knowing use of per- 
jured testimony denies due process); and House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945) (hold- 
ing that a coerced guilty plea violates due process). 
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The de novo litigation vision scored a virtually complete 
triumph when the Warren Court exploded its habeas trilogy 
bombshell in 1963. In Fay v. Noia,sg the Court held that pro- 
cedural default of a claim at the state level usually does not 
bar habeas litigation of that claim in federal court. In 
Townsend u. Sain:O the Court held that federal habeas courts 
have broad powers to relitigate factual issues that were already 
decided in state proceedings. And in Sanders u. United 
States:' the Court held that there was no substantial limita- 
tion on the ability of federal habeas courts to entertain subse- 
quent habeas petitions by the same petitioner. It is generally 
accepted that the Warren Court chose habeas as a key tool to 
implement its concomitant criminal procedure revolution 
against what it believed would be recalcitrant state authorities: 
while the Court's own docket was not large enough to permit 
regular policing of renegade state prosecutors and judiciaries, 
the dockets of the federal district courts provided an acceptable 
~urrogate.'~ De novo litigation buffs believe that the 1963 ha- 
beas trilogy got things exactly right. They deplore the demise of 
these principles that began with the advent of Warren Burger 
as Chief Justice in 1969, and that has steadily continued to the 
present as other visions have gained ascendancy. 
c. Federalism. The de novo litigation vision believes 
strongly that federal courts are the preferred forum for vindi- 
cating federal constitutional rights. Proponents have both an 
abstract and a concrete argument in support of this position. 
Abstractly, federal courts are superior as to federal law (once 
Congress has empowered the federal courts to hear those is- 
sues) simply because the Supremacy Cla~se '~  says so. Thus, 
even if federal courts were not qualitatively "better" a t  pro- 
pounding federal law, they would still be superior to state 
courts simply by virtue of the federal structure established by 
the Con~titution.~~ The second, and more concrete, argument 
39. 372 U.S. 391, 426 (1963). 
40. 372 U.S. 293, 311-12 (1963). 
41. 373 US. 1, 15 (1963). 
42. See Neil McFeeley, Habeas Corpus and Due Process: From Warren to 
Burger, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 533, 533-34 (1976). 
43. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."). 
44. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963) ("But conventional notions of finali- 
ty in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy 
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is that federal courts are in fact better at enforcing federal 
constitutional criminal procedure rights because federal judges 
have no vested interest in the state criminal justice system, 
and are thus not as susceptible as state court judges (many of 
whom have to stand for reelection) to sacrifice federal constitu- 
tional rights on the altar of law and order.45 De novo litigation 
visionaries stress that the whole idea of federal habeas for 
state prisoners arose directly out of Congress's distrust of state 
authorities. In response to the obvious proposition that states 
are not currently as untrustworthy in enforcing federal consti- 
tutional doctrine as were the Southern states in the Recon- 
struction era, proponents of the de novo litigation vision have 
two rejoinders: first, the 1867 Congress's intent carries down 
through the decades until some subsequent Congress signifi- 
cantly amends the statute;46 and, second, even if most state 
courts can currently be trusted to  enforce federal criminal pro- 
cedural rights, habeas corpus stands ready to correct the occa- 
sional instance in which state courts do not perform their 
watchdog fun~tion.~' 
that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the 
fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review."); Liebman, supra note 5, at  
2097 ("Federal law is supreme, as is federal adjudication of that law when mandat- 
ed by Congress. Throughout the nation's history, moreover, Congress has mandated 
final federal adjudication of important federal law whenever life or liberty has 
depended on the outcome."). 
45. See, e.g., Woolhandler, supra note 12, at 634 (citing authorities that argue 
state courts tend to favor enforcement of state substantive criminal law over feder- 
al constitutional criminal procedural rights and to be more amenable to political 
pressure than federal judges); Yackle, Explaining, supra note 15, a t  1031-32 ("The 
overriding responsibility of the state courts to carry out state law thus deprives 
them of the neutrality and dispassion demanded for contemporaneous enforcement 
of the Fourteenth Amendment."). See generally, Abraham Sofaer, Note, Federal 
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Isolation Principle, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 78 
(1964) (arguing that federal court offers a better forum for vindication of federal 
rights because i t  isolates them from other elements of the criminal process that 
are matters of state law). 
46. Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 781 ("Accordingly, if the Court is to follow 
congressional views as to parity, the Court should interpret habeas statutes based 
on the assumption that state courts are to be distrusted."). 
47. Patchel, supra note 20, at  1054. 
We all assume that the current criminal law system is not the one 
that the Warren Court confronted; indeed, this is so in large part because 
of the internalization of many of the Warren Court era reforms by the 
states and their officials. We also know, however, that the current crimi- 
nal justice process is not the utopia posited by doctrines such as proce- 
dural bar and the Rehnquist Court's retroactivity doctrine. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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d. Congressional versus Supreme Court authority. Again, 
de novo litigation proponents argue that the intent of Congress 
in 1867 still governs and that their intent was to make habeas 
broadly available to state prisoners. Thus, the broad wording of 
the statute should be given complete effect and, when issues 
arise which are not directly governed by the statutory lan- 
guage, those issues should be resolved generously in favor of 
the remedy. Thus, proponents of the de nouo litigation vision 
have a response to the charge that is sometimes leveled at 
them that they are disingenuous because they approve of the 
petitioner-favorable innovations of the Warren Court habeas 
trilogy, while disapproving of the judicial innovations in the 
opposite direction by the Burger and Rehnquist Courtd8 The 
response is simply that the Warren Court innovations were 
within the spirit of the Congressional intent, while the innova- 
tions of the conservative courts fly directly in the face of that 
intent!' 
3. The practical issue-the effects of habeas litigation 
Unsurprisingly, de novo litigation visionaries focus on the 
benefits of habeas litigation: that prisoners whose constitutional 
rights have been violated have them vindicated (although be- 
latedly) in federal court, and subsidiarily, that habeas cases 
provide more fodder for constitutional criminal procedure litiga- 
tion. To proponents of this vision, the costs of habeas litigation 
form no legitimate part of the discussion for two reasons. First, 
Congress has authorized the broad-ranging habeas remedy and 
it is up to Congress to  assess the costs and benefits, and to 
amend or repeal the statute if it feels the costs outweigh the 
48. See, eg., Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 212 (1989) (O'Co~or,  J., 
concurring). 
The dissent's charges of "judicial activism" and its assertion that "Con- 
gress has determinedn that collateral review of claims like those at  issue 
in this case outweighs any interests in bringing a final resolution to the 
criminal process ring quite hollow indeed in the context of the federal 
habeas statute. The scope of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction has under- 
gone a substantial judicial expansion, and a return to what "Congress 
intended" would reduce the scope of habeas jurisdiction far beyond the 
extension of Stone o. Powell to Miranda claims. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
49. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 106-07 (1977) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) ("[Lliberal post-trial federal review is the redress that Congress ulti- 
mately chose to allow and the consequences of a state procedural default should be 
evaluated in conformance with this policy choice."). 
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benefits.50 Second, de novo litigation visionaries believe that 
Congress has been right in not repealing the statute because, 
since constitutional rights are so important that they cannot be 
balanced against countervailing interests, the regime that the 
1867 Congress authorized is precisely the right one. 
B. Vision Two: The Appellate Review Vision 
This second vision of habeas holds that the writ should be 
routinely available to permit federal review of an appellate 
nature regarding claimed constitutional violations alleged to 
have occurred in state proceedings. In essence, the federal 
habeas court is conceived of as a higher court than any state 
court as to federal constitutional issues. Thus, a state petition- 
er who invokes federal habeas should be treated, to the extent 
possible, just like any other litigant who brings a claim from a 
lower court to a higher one. 
Before we proceed, there are two conceptual hurdles that 
must be surmounted before the vision of habeas as a federal 
appellate review mechanism makes sense. First, habeas does 
not look like an appeal: the appellate process normally involves 
a pleading at the trial level, with that same pleading being the 
basis for action as the case progresses through the appellate 
process. Habeas, by contrast, is commenced by filing a civil ac- 
tion in federal district court distinct from the criminal pleading 
in the state court that originally led t o  the con~iction.~' Habe- 
as is usually considered to be quintessentially a "collateral 
attack" mechanism, an apotheosis of direct appellate review. 
Appellate review visionaries argue, though, that while habeas 
may not look like an appeal, Congress intended that it should 
work like an appeal.52 
50. Chemerinsky, supra note 16, a t  781 (raising a hypothetical argument for 
judicial deference to congressional intent: "If subsequent developments render this 
premise [that state courts are to be distrusted] outdated, then i t  would be for 
Congress to change its directive by modifying the underlying statute."); Saltzburg, 
supm note 4, a t  383 ("Unless and until Congress narrows the statute, federal 
courts have a duty to identify and protect persons who bring sound claims that 
they are in custody in violation of the Constitution."). 
51. See, e.g., Murray v. Giarratano, 492 US. 1, 8 (1989) ("Postmnviction relief 
is . . . not part of the criminal proceeding itself, and it is in fact considered to be 
civil in nature." (quoting Pe~sy lvan ia  v. Finley, 481 US. 551, 556-57 (1987)); 
Riddle v. Dyche, 262 US. 333, 335-36 (1923) (The writ of habeas corpus is not a 
proceeding in the original criminal prosecution but an independent civil suit."). 
52. See Liebman, supra note 5, at 2096 (arguing that "[wlhen direct federal 
appellate review of federal constitutional claims has not been meaninfilly avail- 
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The second conceptual problem with viewing habeas as an 
appeal is the long-standing idea, prevalent in the law of state 
post-conviction remedies that habeas is "not a substitute for 
appeal," which indicates that not only is it not an appeal, it is 
something different and narrower in scope." Appellate review 
visionaries contend that this dogma, however apropos it may be 
as to state post-conviction remedies, simply does not correctly 
describe the role Congress has envisioned for habeas ever since 
the beginning of the republic.54 
able," habeas corpus has been selected by Congress to fill the breach). For a more 
detailed discussion of Liebman's thesis, see infia notes 58-64 and accompanying 
text. 
53. See, e.g., Summerville v. Warden, State Prison, 641 A.2d 1356, 1372 
(Conn. 1994); State ex rel. Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Mo. 1993) (en 
banc); Ellis v. McMackin, 602 N.E.2d 611, 612 (Ohio 1992); Petrilli v. Leapley, 491 
N.W.2d 79, 81-82 (S.D. 1992); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 519 (Utah 1994), 
cert. denied, 1994 U.S. Lexis 7624; State a rel. Phillips v. Legursky, 420 S.E.2d 
743, 744 (W. Va. 1992). The idea that habeas is not a substitute for appeal has a 
checkered history in the Supreme Court. In S u d  v. Large, a federal habeas case 
involving a non-constitutional claim of error, the Court stated "[Tlhe writ of habeas 
corpus will not be allowed to do service for an appeal." Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 
174, 178 (1947). Six years later in Brown v. ALlen, Justice Frankfurter called the 
not-a-substitute-for-appeal doctrine a "jejune abstraction." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 
443, 558 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). At the tail-end of the Warren Court 
era in Kaufrnan v. United States, the Court rejected the not-a-substitute-for-appeal 
doctrine and distinguished S u d  as involving a non-constitutional claim of error. 
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 223 & n.7 (1969). But in an opinion in 
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 682-83, (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in 
the judgment in two of the consolidated cases, and dissenting in the third), Justice 
Harlan laid the groundwork for a conservative reversal, stating, "[hlabeas corpus 
always has been a collateral remedy, providing an avenue for upsetting judgments 
that have become otherwise final. I t  is not designed as a substitute for direct re- 
view." This conservative reversal partially arrived in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 
305 (19891, where Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy cited Justice 
Harlan's position from Mackey with approval. Justice Thomas's opinion in Wright 
v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2490 (1992) shows him to be a believer in the Harlan 
position as well. When one adds Justice Stevens who, although not characterizable 
as a conservative regarding habeas corpus, does believe that habeas is different 
and narrower than direct appeal, there is currently a clear majority on the Court 
who believe that habeas should not operate as a substitute for appeal and should 
instead perform a narrower function. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 
n.5 (1979) ("It hardly bears repeating that habeas corpus is not intended as a 
substitute for appeal . . . . Instead, it is designed to guard against extreme mal- 
functions in the state criminal justice systems.") (citation omitted). 
On the other hand, de novo litigation visionaries believe habeas is not synon- 
ymous with appeal because habeas is b d e r .  See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 
3 11 (1963) ("The whole history of the w r i t i t s  unique development-refutes a con- 
struction of the federal courts' habeas corpus powers that would assimilate their 
task to that of courts of appellate review."). 
54. See, Liebman, supra note 5, at  384. 
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Appellate review visionaries are staunch friends of habeas, 
b u t  t h e i r  vision i s ,  a s  we will see ,  much  l e s s  
petitioner-favorable in several key respects than the vision of 
the de novo litigation visionaries because appellate review 
visionaries have greater regard for procedural barriers in habe- 
as if those barriers would also exist on direct review. The pri- 
mary exponents of this vision are academics, particularly Pro- 
fessors James L i e b m a ~ ~ ~ ~  and Barry FriedmadB 
1. The three general issues of constitutional interpretation 
As t o  constitutional criminal procedure doctrine, appellate 
rev iew v i s iona r i e s  o f t en  a r e ,  b u t  need  no t  be ,  
rights-expansionists. Regarding balanceability of rights, appel- 
late review visionaries are more willing to balance than are de 
novo litigation visionaries-in particular, appellate review 
visionaries' logic compels them to put the state's interests in 
state procedural rules on the opposite side of the scale, because 
those rules are respected by the Supreme Court on direct re- 
view as long as the rules are not mere subterfuges designed to 
insulate federal constitutional claims from meaningful re- 
view.57 As to equality of rights, the appellate review 
- visionaries' logic dictates that whatever position they take as to 
direct review, they should also take as to habeas-if all rights 
are equally weighty on direct review, they should be equally 
weighty in habeas; if they are not treated equally on direct 
review, they should not be treated equally in habeas. 
2. The four theoretical issues specific to habeas 
a. Function. Appellate review visionaries believe that 
habeas fulfills some of the same functions as the de novo litiga- 
tion visionaries believe, but not all, and not all to the same 
extent. A function-by-fundion comparison is in order. First, de 
novo litigation visionaries believe so strongly in the vindication 
of individual constitutional rights that they are willing to ig- 
nore procedural barriers to reach the merits of those claims; 
appellate review visionaries believe in vindication of rights, but 
55. Id. 
56. Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV. 247 (1988). 
57. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447-48 (1965) (holding that a state 
procedural rule may not be adequate to bar Supreme Court direct review if the 
rule does not further a legitimate state interest). 
7351 VISIONS OF HABEAS 755 
not so strongly as to be willing to so freely ignore procedural 
barriers that would exist on direct review. Second, appellate 
reviewers also believe that habeas deters state courts from too 
narrowly construing the substance of federal rights. But while 
de novo litigation visionaries view habeas as a means to force 
states to reform their procedures in defendant-favorable ways, 
appellate review visionaries put little stock in this as a func- 
tion as long as state procedures are mere subterfuges to avoid 
vindicating federal rights. As to habeas' effect of allowing fed- 
eral district courts to litigate constitutional issues with regular- 
ity, to stay involved in the constitutional dialogue, and to pro- 
mote uniformity of federal law, appellate reviewers would con- 
cur in these goals. They would then contend that their vision 
also permits a great deal of federal district court involvement, 
and that while some petitioners will be barred from raising 
claims that de novo litigators would permit, in the end the 
appellate review vision will reach most of the same issues in 
other cases . 
b. History. The history supporting this vision of habeas 
is found in a recent law review article by Professor James 
Liebman.58 Liebman's thesis is that ever since 1789, Congress 
has, by some combination of statutes concerning writs of error, 
habeas corpus, and certiorari (and, to a lesser extent, removal), 
sought to assure that state prisoners have one opportunity to 
litigate federal constitutional claims in federal court. Liebman 
carefully traces the histories of the successive schemes of feder- 
al jurisdiction, and makes a plausible case for this historical 
interpretati~n.~' Congress's substitution, in a series of stat- 
utes enacted from 1914 to 1925, of discretionary writ of certio- 
rari jurisdiction in the Supreme Court for mandatory writ of 
error jurisdiction is particularly important in Liebman's 
eyes:60 after that, a state convict no longer had the writ of er- 
ror right to have the case reviewed by the Supreme Court, but 
only the possibility of review (which became more evanescent 
as the Supreme Court's docket swelled with each succeeding 
decade)." Accordingly, in the modern era, the primary means 
58. Liebman, supra note 5. 
59. Id. at 2057, 2035 ("Federal habeas corpus is not a substitute for general 
writ of error or other direct appeals as of right. Since 1789, however, it has pro- 
vided statutorily specified classes of prisoners with a limited and substitute federal 
writ of error or appeal as of right."). 
60. See id. at 2075, 2083. 
61. Id. at 2084 ("In the state-prisoner context, with direct Supreme Court re- 
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by which a convict could have the one shot a t  federal review 
was via habeas, which had stood ready since 1867 to perform 
that task. Liebman thus argues for parity: the same standards 
(to the extent practicable, given the inherent differences in the 
mechanisms) that would apply to a petitioner if the Supreme 
Court were to take the case on certiorari review should apply 
to the federal district court that takes the case in habeas. For 
example, if the Supreme Court would hold a claim to have been 
unreviewable because it was not properly preserved, the habeas 
court should do likewise.62 
c. Federalism. Appellate review visionaries agree with 
de novo litigation visionaries that Congress unequivocally 
showed in enacting the 1867 Act that it distrusted state judi- 
ciaries, and that Congress's intent has never been retract- 
ed-indeed, appellate reviewers trace this distrust all the way 
back to 1789.63 Further, both appellate review visionaries and 
de novo litigation visionaries agree that it is within Congress's 
power to enable a single federal habeas judge to overrule a 
state court decision on a matter of federal constitutional 
law-even a decision rendered by a unanimous state supreme 
court. Accordingly, neither de novo litigation visionaries nor 
appellate review visionaries care if state authorities are some- 
how offended or hindered by the exercise of habeas jurisdic- 
tion-state authorities feel that way because they persist in 
failing to appreciate the basic constitutional principle of federal 
supremacy. Appellate review visionaries, though, unlike de 
novo litigation visionaries, embed habeas within the entire 
scheme of federal jurisdiction. This makes appellate review 
visionaries concerned about parity of direct review and habeas, 
a concern not shared by de novo litigation visionaries. 
d. Congressional versus Supreme Court authority. For 
appellate review visionaries, the relevant context for determin- 
ing congressional intent is not limited to the habeas statute, 
but encompasses the federal jurisdictional statutes as a whole, 
of which the habeas statutes form only part of the grand de- 
sign. Appellate review visionaries thus believe that any inter- 
stices in the habeas statute should be filled by the Supreme 
view on the merits as of right having gone the way of the snow leopard-but a 
few sightings each year-the bulk of the review responsibility would fall to the 
iower federal courts (and, at times, the Supreme Court) on habeas corpus."). 
62. Id. at 2007, 2096. 
63. See id. at 2057-2060. 
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Court consistent with Congress's understanding of habeas as a 
federal appellate review mechanism that substitutes for Su- 
preme Court direct review in the vast bulk of cases that  do not 
evoke Supreme Court certiorari review. Accordingly, appellate 
review visionaries take the Warren Court to task for decisions 
that destroyed direct reviewhabeas parity by making the stan- 
dards in habeas more petitioner-favorable than the standards 
the petitioner would have encountered had the Supreme Court 
taken the case via direct review.64 Appellate review visionar- 
ies similarly take later conservative Courts to task for destroy- 
ing parity in the opposite way.65 
3. The practical issue-the effects of habeas litigation 
Since appellate review visionaries see habeas as a litiga- 
tion opportunity that should be routinely available for properly 
preserved claims of error, they are not concerned that there 
may be too many first-time habeas petitions filed containing 
such claims. On direct review, counsel is supposed to assert 
any remotely arguable ground that was properly preserved, so 
parity demands no less in habeas? This means that appellate 
review visionaries have little sympathy for pleas by prosecutors 
or federal judges that habeas as  to such claims overworks 
them. In all this they arrive a t  the same result as the de novo 
litigation visionaries. But appellate review visionaries are con- 
cerned about two issues that don't bother de nouo litigation 
visionaries: petitions containing procedurally defaulted claims 
that could not be considered on direct review; and multiple 
petitions, since on direct review an appellant generally gets 
only one consolidated appeal for all issues that could be raised. 
C. Vision Three: The Rights-Selectiv ist Vision 
The rights-selectivist vision has as its touchstone the idea 
that some constitutional criminal procedural rights are more 
64. See id. at  2094-95. 
65. See Friedman, supm note 56, at 286-88 (arguing that Stone v. Powell, 
428 U.S. 465 (1976), which held that Fourth Amendment claims which the peti- 
tioner has the opportunity t~ hlly and fairly litigate in state court cannot be re- 
viewed on habeas, is inconsistent with the appellate review vision). 
66. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (holding that a 
court-appointed lawyer who finds no meritorious claim for appeal may request 
permission to withdraw, but the lawyer must file with that request "a brief refer- 
ring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal"). 
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important than others, and that the important ones are enti- 
tled to favored treatment in habeas corpus, while the unfavored 
ones are not. A doctrinaire version of this vision would be that 
only the important rights are even cognizable in habeas corpus. 
A less doctrinaire version of the vision would hold that the 
favored rights are not the only ones cognizable in habeas, but 
they are entitled t o  preferential treatment, e.g., forgiving a 
procedural default when no similar forgiveness would be ex- 
tended to an unfavored right. I will focus on the doctrinaire 
version, because it most clearly illustrates the characteristics of 
the vision. The rights-selectivist vision operates identically to  
the de novo litigation vision as to the rights the selectivists 
deem favored, but differs dramatically as to the rights the 
selectivists deem unfavored. Rights-selectivists share little 
common ground with the appellate review vision, since the 
rights-selectivists' key criterion is the substance of the claim 
involved, while the appellate review visionaries' key criterion is 
procedural parity between Supreme Court direct review and 
habeas litigation. 
One key question for rights-selectivists is which rights 
should be the favored ones? (The other key question is why 
only the favored ones should be able to  be vindicated in habeas, 
which I will discuss just below under the heading of "History.") 
There are three distinct answers suggested in habeas law t o  
the question of which rights should be the favored ones: (1) 
rights that are fundamental to  the fairness of the criminal 
proceedingt7 (2 )  rights that relate directly to the accuracy of 
the guilt /innocence determination;" and (3) rights that reflect 
structural error as opposed to trial error?' Although no one 
67. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993) (explaining 
that habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy against convictions that violate 
fundamental fairness); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 312-13 (1989) (establishing an 
exception to the bar on procedurally defaulted claims based partially on the idea of 
fundamental fairness); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 543-44 (1982) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that habeas corpus is designed to provide relief from errors 
that rendered the proceedings findamentally unfair). 
68. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. at 1729-30 (O9Comor, J., dis- 
senting) (arguing that a petitioner-favorable, "harmless-error" standard correctly 
promotes accuracy and determination of guilt or innocence); Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U.S. 307, 323 (1979) (holding that an i n s ~ ~ c i e n c y  of the evidence claim is 
cognizable in habeas because it is central to the issue of guilt or innocence); Stone 
v. Powell, 428 US. 465, 489-90 (1976) (arguing that illegally seized evidence is 
usually reliable and probative on the issue of guilt or innocence). 
69. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. at  1717 (holding that structural error 
on habeas is governed by a more petitioner-favorable "harmless-error" standard 
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has attempted to define exhausitively which rights fall within 
these categories, it seems that the second would be a subset of 
the first: while it is easy to think of rights that are fundamen- 
tal to the fairness of the proceeding, but that are not related to 
the accuracy of the guilt/imocence determination-for example, 
the right not to be placed twice in jeopardy, the right not to be 
indicted by a grand jury chosen in a racially discriminatory 
manner-it is hard (perhaps impossible) to think of rights that 
are related to the accuracy of the guiltlinnocence determination 
but that are not fundamental. Thus, fundamental fairness 
rights-selectivists are selective, while accuracy of the 
guilt/innocence determination rights-selectivists are even more 
selective. The proposed distinction between structural error and 
trial error is impossible to classify in terms of its relative 
breadth. Despite these differences, I will treat all these 
sub-visions together under the rubric of rights-selectivism, 
because the visions operate identically except for the scope of 
the rights which each recognizes. The primary exponent of 
rights-selectivism is Justice Stevens.'' 
than is a claim of trial error). 
70. Justice Stevens voted with the majority in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 
(1976). The majority held that one of the reasons that Fourth Amendment claims, 
which a petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in state court, were 
not cognizable in habeas was because the exclusionary rule does not constitute a 
personal constitutional right. Id. a t  486. Stevens also joined the majority opinion in 
the second, early important Burger Court habeas precedent, Wainwright v. Sykes, 
433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977), that tightened up the standards permitting a federal 
court to consider a claim that the petitioner procedurally defaulted in state court. 
Stevens also wrote a separate concurrence in which the first hints of his 
rights-selectivist position emerged: he argued that if a claim of error is grave 
enough even an express personal waiver may be excused. Id. a t  94-95 (Stevens, J., 
concurring). He joined with the majority in Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 559-64 
(1979), which held that a claim of discrimination in grand jury selection is cogniza- 
ble in habeas, in part because the right is substantially more compelling than the 
one in Stone. Stevens' fullest explication of his rights-selectivist position came in 
his dissenting opinion in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 538 (1982). Since then, 
Justice Stevens has consistently adhered to the rights-selectivist rationale. See, eg. ,  
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1720-22 (1993) (joining in opinion holding 
that a less petitioner-favorable standard of harmless error should apply on habeas 
as on direct, because habeas is an extraordinary remedy against violations of h n -  
damental fairness); Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1752-53 (1993) (joining 
opinion holding that Stone should not be expanded to encompass claims of Mirada 
right violations because the warnings protect a fundamental trial right); Sawyer v. 
Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2530 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that fun- 
damental fairness encompasses more than accuracy of the guilt i ~ o c e n c e  determi- 
nation); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 770-72 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that habeas should encompass all claims of fundamental constitutional 
violations); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 320-23 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
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I .  The three general issues of constitutional interpretation 
Recall that the three general issues of constitutional inter- 
pretation are the expansiveness with which rights should be 
construed, their balanceability against other interests, and 
their comparative equality. For rights-selectivists, we need to  
start with the third of these, because the key to the whole 
vision is that rights-selectivists do not view all constitutional 
rights as being equally important. Thus, the expansiveness 
issue fades into the background, since no matter how many 
rights are recognized or how broadly each right is construed, 
the key question becomes whether it is one of the favored 
rights entitled to vindication in habeas. As to balanceability, 
rights-selectivists view the favored rights as nonbalanceable, 
while the unimportant rights are balanced right out of habeas 
jurisdiction. 
2. The four theoretical issues specific to habeas 
a. Function. For rights-selectivists, the function of habe- 
as as an extraordinary writ is t o  vindicate favored rights. As to  
those favored rights, rights-selectivists believe in all the goals 
in which de novo litigation visionaries believe: vindicating con- 
stitutional rights of individual petitioners, deterring state 
courts from under-construing the substance of federal rights, 
pressuring states to make their systems more procedurally 
favorable to  claimants, keeping the lower federal courts in 
practice with respect to those rights and involved in the consti- 
tutional rights dialogue, and promoting uniformity in federal 
law. But as to the rights deemed unfavored, rights-selectivists 
do not believe that habeas has a hc t ion  t o  serve.'l 
the judgment) (arguing that the second exception to retroactivity should encompass 
claims of fundamental unfairness); Kirnrnelrnan v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377-78 
(1986) (joining majority opinion finding that Stone should not be extended to 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on failure to  raise Fourth Amend- 
ment claims, in part because the right to counsel is fundamental); Murray v. Car- 
rier, 477 U.S. 478, 498-99 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the charac- 
ter of the claim should be central to the habeas inquiry and that a Brady right is 
hndamental); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 541 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the "historic ofken of habeas corpus is to remedy violations of hnda- 
mental fairness). 
71. Even though Justice Stevens is the best example of a rights-selectivist, I 
do not mean to suggest that he holds the doctrinaire version of the position that 
would completely exclude fiom the ambit of habeas any right that was deemed not 
to be favored. Rather, Justice Stevens adheres to the less doctrinaire position that 
all rights (except Fourth Amendment ones where the petitioner had a full and fair 
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b. History. Although Justice Stevens, the primary propo- 
nent of the rights-selectivist vision, has never constructed a 
history of the writ to support his position,72 it is possible to 
generate a plausible history of at least the fundamental fair- 
ness version of this vision. One would begin with standard doc- 
trine from the early 1800s that the writ was only available t o  
remedy executive or legislative detentions, or judicial 
detentions where the court lacked j~risdiction,~~ and argue 
that what these detentions have in common is that they result 
from the most hndamental sorts of errors. One would then 
contend that this narrow scope of habeas review prevailed a t  
the time Congress enacted the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, and 
must have approximated what Congress had in mind for state 
prisoners. Then, as to the important but muddled period from 
1867 through 1953, One would note that while the Supreme 
Court expanded the concept of "jurisdiction" to the point that it 
became a judicial fi~tion,'~ these expansions always came 
opportunity to litigate in state court) should be cognizable, but the favored ones 
are entitled to preferential treatment. 
72. Justice Stevens' one partial effort to provide a history for his vision is 
found in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 548 n.18 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
There, Justice Stevens argues that when Congress recodified the habeas statute in 
1948 there were relatively few constitutional rules of criminal procedure, and 
"those that did exist generally were not applicable to the States, and the scope of 
habeas corpus relief was narrow." Id. Case law of the time period indicates that 
constitutional rules applicable against the states were limited to those that consti- 
tuted affronts to fundamental fairness. Thus, Justice Stevens concludes, consistent 
with the intent of the 1948 Congress, which should still control to limit habeas to 
claims involving fundamental unfairness: 
This Court has long since rejected these restrictive notions of the 
constitutional protections that are available to state criminal defendants. 
Nevertheless, the point remains that the law today is very different from 
what it was when the current habeas corpus statute was enacted in 1948. 
The statute was amended in 1966, but the amendments merely added to, 
and did not modify, the existing statutory language. Respected scholars 
may argue forcefully to the contrary, but in my opinion a limitation of 
habeas corpus relief to instances of fundamental unfairness is consistent 
with the intent of the Congress that enacted 5 2254 in 1948. 
Id. 
73. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
74. The first expansion came in Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 176 
(1873) (holding that habeas jurisdiction will lie to hear a claim of allegedly illegal 
sentence). The next expansion came in Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376-77 
(1879) (allowing habeas attack on the constitutionality of the statute creating the 
offense). The fiction of "jurisdiction" was finally dispensed with by the Court in 
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942) ("[Tlhe use of the writ in federal 
courts to test the constitutional validity of a conviction of crime is not restricted to 
those cases where the judgment of conviction is void for want of jurisdiction for 
762 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 11994 
when rights that were clearly "fundamental" were alleged t o  
have been violated, such as the right to be free of a 
mob-dominated trial.75 Then, one would argue that Brown v. 
Allen76 did not radically expand the scope of the writ when it 
held that all constitutional violations were cognizable in habeas 
because, as of that time, there were relatively few federal crim- 
inal procedure constitutional rights and all of them were "fun- 
damental." The final step in this historical reconstruction, 
which is also the most controversial one, is the assertion that 
the Warren Court was so protective of rights that it recognized 
not only rights that were fundamental, but also rights that 
were important enough to  be rights, yet not important enough 
to  be funda~nental.~~ This is not actually a historical assertion, 
the trial court to render it."). 
75. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 92 (1923); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U.S. 458, 468-67 (1938) (holding that a claimed denial of counsel can be raised 
on habeas); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112-15 (1935) (holding that a con- 
viction procured through testimony known by the state authorities to be perjured 
constitutes a violation of due process that will support habeas jurisdiction). 
76. 344 U.S. 443 (1953); see supra note 36. 
77. Although he was not primarily a rights-selectivist, Judge Friendly set 
forth this tenet of rights-selectivism quite well: 
What I do challenge is the assumption that simply because a claim 
can be characterized as "constitutional," it should necessarily constitute a 
basis for collateral attack when there has been fair opportunity to litigate 
i t  a t  trial and on appeal. Whatever may have been true when the Bill of 
Rights was read to protect a state criminal defendant only if the state 
had acted in a manner "repugnant to the conscience of mankind," [quoting 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937), overruled in part by 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)l the rule prevailing when Brown 
v. Allen was decided, the "constitutional" label no longer assists in ap- 
praising how far society should go in permitting relitigation of criminal 
convictions. I t  carries a connotation of outrage-the mob-dominated jury, 
the confession extorted by the rack, the defendant deprived of coun- 
sel-which is wholly misplaced when, for example, the claim is a pardon- 
able but allegedly mistaken belief that probable cause existed for an ar- 
rest or that a statement by a person not available for cross-examination 
came within an exception to the hearsay rule. 
Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal 
Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 156-57 (1970). 
Justice Stevens made the same point: 
I recognize the apparent incongruity in suggesting that there is a 
class of constitutional error-not constitutionally harmless-that does not 
render a criminal proceeding hndamentally unfair. It may be argued, 
with considerable force, that a rule of procedure that is not necessary to 
ensure fundamental fairness is not worthy of constitutional status. The 
fact that such a category of constitutional error exists, however, is demon- 
strated by the jurisprudence of this Court concerning the retroactive ap- 
plication of newly recognized constitutional rights. In ruling that a consti- 
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but a normative one based upon one's perceptions of the whole 
panoply of rights recognized by the Warren Court, and in some 
cases added to by the later, more conservative Co~r t . '~  
Even if one is convinced that some constitutional rights are 
significantly more important than others, one must still ask 
whether the historical vision generated provides a convincing 
rationale explaining why habeas should lie only to remedy 
violations of favored rights, given that the habeas statute itself 
does not discriminate among constitutional violations. Perhaps 
proponents of this vision can attempt to buttress their subjec- 
tive post-Warren Court history by arguing that habeas has long 
been considered t o  be an "extraordinary" writ, which connotes 
that it is available only to remedy extraordinarily important 
const i tu t ional   violation^.'^ Even here ,  though ,  
tutional principle is not to be applied retroactively, the Court implicitly 
suggests that the right is not necessary to ensure the integrity of the 
underlying judgment; the Court certainly would not allow claims of such 
magnitude to remain unremedied. . . . 
[Tlhese decisions demonstrate that the Court's constitutional jurispru- 
dence has expanded beyond the concept of ensuring fundamental fairness 
to the accused. My point here is simply that this expansion need not, and 
should not, be applied to collateral attacks on final judgments. 
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 543 n.8 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted). 
78. The greatest expansion of constitutional criminal procedure rights by the 
post-Warren Court is surely that relating to the death penalty. Since the decision 
in Furman v. Georgia, 408 US. 238 (1972) (per curiam) striking down the Georgia 
death penalty sentencing scheme, the Court's death penalty jurisprudence has 
mushroomed. One of the most important cases for generating habeas issues is 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 US. 586, 604 (1978) ("[Tlhe Eighth and Fourteenth Amend- 
ments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be 
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's 
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant 
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."). 
79. There is little doubt that the writ of habeas corpus is one of the writs 
that were in earlier days deemed the "prerogative writs" and that more recently 
have been called the "extraordinary writs." See supra note 13 and accompanying 
text. The question is what the term "extraordinary" means. The idea that the writ 
is "extraordinary" in the sense that it should be used sparingly has perhaps its 
earliest voice in a dissent by Justice Reed: 
Respect for the theory and practice of our dual system of government 
requires that federal courts intervene by habeas corpus in state criminal 
prosecutions only in exceptional circumstances. . . . [Dlue regard for a 
state's system of justice admonishes federal courts to be chary of allowing 
the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus where the accused, without ex- 
cuse, has not exhausted the remedies offered by the State to redress 
violations of federal constitutional rights. 
Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 691-92 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting). Fifteen years 
later, Justice Stewart, speaking for himself and three other dissenters in Townsend 
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rights-selectivists run into a problem, because an older under- 
standing of what makes the writ "extraordinary" is that it is 
able to cut through all procedural forms and go directly to the 
substance of the constitutional claim at issue, not that it is 
limited to protecting only extraordinarily important rights." 
The version of the selectivist vision that favors those rights 
related to the accuracy of the guilt/imocence determination 
fares worse in terms of the writ's history than does the funda- 
mental rights version. To demonstrate this, one need only note 
that the most firmly grounded historical basis for habeas relief 
from a judicial detention-that the convicting court lacked 
jurisdiction8'-does not fall into the category of rights that 
relate to  the accuracy of the guilt/innocence determination. 
Thus, this version of the rights-selectivist vision is demonstra- 
bly anti-historical. As to  the structural/trial defect vision, it 
seems equally difficult t o  make a plausible historical case. 
v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 327 (1963) sounded the same note: "[Habeas corpus] is es- 
sentially an extraordinary writ, designed to do justice in extraordinary and often 
unpredictable situations." Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting). The idea that the writ is 
extraordinary in this sense was first enunciated in a majority opinion in Hensley 
v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973). "Since habeas corpus is an extraordinary 
remedy whose operation is to a large extent uninhibited by traditional rules of fi- 
nality and federalism, its use has been limited to cases of special urgency, leaving 
more conventional remedies for cases in which restraints on liberty are neither 
severe nor immediate." Id. at  351. The idea found voice again through Justice 
Powell in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 257-58 (1973) (Powell, J., con- 
curring) ("This accommodation [of finality concerns with expansions of the role of 
the writ] can best be achieved, with due regard to all of the values implicated, by 
recourse to the central reason for habeas corpus: the affording of means, through 
an extraordinary writ, of redressing an unjust incarceration."). By 1983 the conser- 
vatives were clearly in control of the Court and a majority held that "[flederal 
courts are not forums in which to 'relitigate state trials.'" Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 
U.S. 880, 887 (1983). The majority reiterated, in two recent cases, that the writ is 
"extraordinary" in this sense. See McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2568, 2574 (1994) 
(citing Barefoot for the proposition that "the Great Writ is an extraordinary remedy 
that should not be employed to 'relitigate state trials'"); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 
S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993) (Yn keeping with this distinction [between the primary 
nature of the state proceedings and the secondary and limited nature of the habe- 
as proceedings], the writ of habeas corpus has historically been regarded as an 
extraordinary remedy, 'a bulwark against convictions that violate "fbndamental 
fairness."'") (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982) (quoting Wainwright 
v. Sykes, 433 US. 72, 97 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring))). 
80. Justice Holmes expressed this conception when he stated, "that habeas 
corpus cuts through all forms and goes to the very tissue of the structure. I t  
comes in from the outside, not in subordination to the proceedings, and although 
every form may have been preserved opens the inquiry whether they have been 
more than an empty shell." Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting). 
81. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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c. Federalism. As should be clear from the foregoing 
discussion, rights-selectivists are not at all solicitous of claimed 
state interests when the error involved is of the favored vari- 
ety, but are very solicitous of the state's interests when the 
right at issue is not of the favored variety. 
d .  Congressional versus Supreme Court authori- 
ty. Rights-selectivists juxtapose the narrow scope of habeas 
that must have existed in Congress's mind when it enacted the 
1867 Act with the broad expanse of constitutional rights that 
exists in the post-Warren Court era. This is the basis for an 
argument that because the legal landscape has so significantly 
changed, the legislative intent of the originating Congress is 
not particularly enlightening as to  the current proper scope of 
the writ. Thus, according to rights-selectivists, the Court 
should fill interstices in the habeas statutes to  further the 
basic underlying policy of the 1867 Congress, which, they ar- 
gue, was to  assure a federal forum for the vindication of impor- 
tant federal constitutional rights. While this category of impor- 
tant rights is certainly significantly larger than it was in 
1867-when the category seemingly only included the right not 
t o  be tried by a court acting outside its jurisdiction-the catego- 
ry does not include all of the rights discovered during the due 
process revolution that began in the 1960s. 
3. The practical issue-the effects of habeas litigation 
When the right involved is one of the favored ones, 
rights-selectivists show little sympathy for the claimed costs of 
habeas litigation. If the right is not of the favored kind, howev- 
er, rights-selectivists view its inclusion within habeas jurisdic- 
tion as cluttering the federal docket and distracting district 
courts from their real mission of vindicating favored rights in 
habeas cases. In light of the importance of death pen.alty cases 
in habeas jurisprudence, rights-selectivists, if Justice Stevens is 
representative, tend to view the rights pertaining to the sen- 
tencing phase in death penalty cases as within the category of 
favored rights,82 either under the theory that they are funda- 
82. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2531-36 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (arguing for a broader definition of "actual innocence" of a death sen- 
tence than the majority's view); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 758, 7621 
(1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (joining the stinging dissent by Justice Blackmun 
to the Court's handling of issues in a death penalty case); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 
U.S. 467, 516-18 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (joining a dissenting opinion de- 
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mental, or under the theory that the accuracy of the "death 
guilty"/"death innocent" determination is the functional equiva- 
lent of the accuracy of the guiltJinnocence determination as to  
the conviction. 
D. Vision Four: The Innocence-Selectivist Vision 
We have just seen one way of limiting the writ's availabili- 
ty based on permitting only certain types of constitutional 
claims t o  be litigated. Another way to  limit the writ's availabili- 
ty is to permit only certain litigants to pursue the remedy. This 
is the approach of the proponents of the fourth vision, who 
believe that only petitioners who can allege that they are actu- 
ally innocents3 should be allowed to pursue habeas to  vindi- 
cate constitutional violations. 
As with the rights-selectivist vision, there is a doctrinaire 
position and a less doctrinaire one. The doctrinaire position 
contends that only persons who have a claim of actual inno- 
cence should even be permitted t o  pursue habeas, while the 
ploring a petitioner-unfavorable standard for abusive petitions); Butler v. McKellar, 
494 U.S. 407, 417 (1990) ( B r e ~ a n ,  J., dissenting) (joining a stinging dissent re- 
garding the Court's handling of retroactivity in a death penalty case); Smith v. 
Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 545 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that, as on 
direct review, in habeas "death is a different kind of punishment from any other 
which may be imposed in this country"). 
83. A key question, of course, is what exactly does the term " i~ocent"  mean? 
At least three meanings are possible. The first casts an affirmative burden on the 
petitioner to show that he or she did not commit the crime. One assumes that 
such proof would usually consist either of compelling evidence that some other 
specific person committed the crime, or that the petitioner could not have commit- 
ted the crime, e.g., petitioner's DNA markers are inconsistent with blood that was 
concededly left a t  the scene by the accused killer. The second, much more 
petitioner-favorable definition, would require the petitioner to show that if every- 
thing had gone according to the constitutional rules, the trier of fad might have 
entertained a reasonable doubt about the petitioner's guilt. Judge Friendly suggest- 
ed a third definition that is not as tough on petitioners as the fwst, but tougher 
than the second: 
[Tlhe petitioner for collateral attack must show a fair probability that, 
in light of all the evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally 
admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence 
tenably claimed t o  have been wrongly excluded or to have become avail- 
able only after the trial, the trier of the facts would have entertained a 
reasonable doubt of his guilt. 
Friendly, supra note 77, a t  160. The Court has adopted verbatim Judge Friendly's 
formulation, at  least as to successive petitions. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 
454 n.17 (1986). See generally Vivian Berger, Herrera v. Collins: The Gateway of 
Innocence for Death-Sentenced Prisoners Leads Nowhere, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
943, 978-86 (1994) (discussing possible definitions of "innocent"). 
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less doctrinaire position asserts that all persons with constitu- 
tional claims should be allowed to pursue habeas, but those 
who can supplement with a claim of actual innocence should be 
preferred when it comes to excusing procedural defaults, allow- 
ing multiple petitions, etc. As with the rights-selectivist vision, 
I will explicate the more doctrinaire version of this vision. 
Most of the recent conservative Justices have been at least 
partially innocence-selectivists, with Justice Powell probably 
being the leader.84 Judge Henry Friendly also championed 
this idea in a law review articleOs5 
1. The three general issues of constitutional interpretation 
The three issues, expansiveness, balanceability, and equali- 
ty, virtually fade into the background as to  this vision because 
the key to the vision hinges not on the legal attributes of the 
rights involved, but upon the factual innocence of the petition- 
er. 
2. The four theoretical issues specifk to habeas 
a. Function. Innocence-selectivists have a very narrow 
vision of the writ's function: it exists solely to vindicate the con- 
stitutional rights of petitioners who are factually innocent of 
the crime. The narrowness of this vision of function is apparent 
when it is contrasted with the broad vision of functions held by 
de nouo litigation visionaries that habeas should be available to 
vindicate the constitutional rights of all constitutionally 
wronged petitioners. Innocence-selectivists do not believe in 
any of the functions of habeas that are grounded in the federal 
nature of our system. Since so few petitioners will be able to 
allege the necessary claim of innocence, there will not be a 
great enough number of habeas cases to deter state courts from 
construing the substance of federal rights too narrowly, force 
states to reform their post-conviction processes to the benefit of 
petitioners, keep federal courts involved in constitutional crimi- 
84. Justice Powell first expounded his innocence-selectivist vision in 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 265-66 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). He 
wrote innocence as a significant factor into the majority decision in Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976) and wrote the opinion in Kuhlrna~ v. Wil- 
son, 477 U.S. 436, 452-54 (1986) which requires a colorable showing of innocence 
before a habeas court can consider a successive petition. 
85. See Friendly, supra note 77. 
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nal procedure adjudication on a broad scale, or promote the 
uniformity of federal law. 
b. History. There was no history supporting this vision 
until 1968, when Justice Black suggested that only petitioners 
who have a colorable claim of innocence should be entitled to  
pursue habeas relief? Judge Henry Friendly picked up on 
this suggestion in what turned out to  be an influential law 
review article published in 1970 entitled Is Innocence Irrele- 
 ant?.^' Friendly answered this question with a resounding 
no: a "colorable showing" of innocence should be a prerequisite 
to  a habeas petition." It is important to note that Friendly 
put forth this idea as a proposal for legislative change, not as a 
prescription for how courts could change the law, let alone as a 
description of existing law." Justice Black's and Judge 
Friendly's suggestion caught the fancy of Justice Powell, and 
formed the basis for his concurring opinion in a 1973 case?' 
Innocence as a factor in habeas law made the leap t o  a majori- 
ty opinion in Stone u. Powellg1 in 1976, and since then has put 
in regular  appearance^.^^ Thus, innocence in habeas law has a 
history of sorts, though a very short one. 
c. Federalism. The upshot of the innocence-selectivist 
vision is that state criminal processes will be almost completely 
free of federal court intenrention, since it is a very small per- 
86. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 242 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) 
("In [habeas corpus] collateral attacks . . . I would always require that the convict- 
ed defendant raise the kind of constitutional claim that casts some shadow of a 
doubt on his guilt."). 
87. Friendly, supra note 77. 
88. Id. at  160. 
89. Id. at 143 (arguing that the requirement that the petitioner supplement 
the constitutional claim with a colorable claim of innocence "ought to be the law 
and . . . that legislation can and should make it so") (emphasis added). 
90. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 US. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J., concur- 
ring). 
91. 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976). 
92. See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1767-68 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that innocence is the most sig- 
nificant countervailing consideration to finality); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 
1710, 1729 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[ilf there is a unifying 
theme to this Court's habeas jurisprudence, i t  is that the ultimate equity [of actual 
innocence] on the prisoner's side . . . is sufficient by itself to permit plenary re- 
view") (citing Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1757); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 
(1986) (creating an actual innocence exception to the "cause" and "prejudice" re- 
quirement); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 451-54 (1986) (establishing the 
requirement of a colorable showing of innocence before a federal court can enter- 
tain a successive petition). 
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centage of petitioners who can, as a practical matter, allege 
both a constitutional violation and a colorable claim of factual 
innocence. As to that very smdl  percentage, federal interven- 
tion is appropriate. 
d. Congressional versus Supreme Court authori- 
ty. Innocence-selectivists who believe that this vision can be 
effectuated by the Supreme Court necessarily believe that the 
Court has broad-ranging power to judicially rework the mean- 
ing of the habeas statute, since there is no plausible argument 
that the 1867 Congress (or any subsequent one) intended the 
habeas statutes to be limited in their application to petitioners 
who have an arguable claim of factual innocence. 
3. The practical issue-the effects of habeas litigation 
Innocence-selectivists focus on the costs of habeas litiga- 
tion, and have a great deal of sympathy for both state authori- 
ties, who must combat seemingly endless post-conviction litiga- 
tion proceedings by convicts seemingly having little better to do 
to pass the time, and overworked federal courts that are flood- 
ed with petitions that are mostly pro se, sloppy, meritless, and, 
most importantly, do not state colorable claims of factual inno- 
cence. Indeed, it was the flood tide of post-Warren Court habe- 
as petitions that evoked Judge Friendly's article in the first 
p l ace .g3  T h e  o n l y  c o u n t e r v a i l i n g  b e n e f i t  t h a t  
innocence-selectivists view as capable of outweighing these 
costs is the benefit of releasing a person who actually did not 
commit the crime for which that person was convicted. 
E. Vision Five: The One-Fair-Chance Vision 
The two preceding visions showed two different ways of 
limiting the scope of habeas: by limiting it to certain types of 
claims, or by limiting it to certain petitioners. Yet a third way 
of limiting habeas is by only permiting litigants whose cases 
are in a certain procedural posture to pursue it. This is the 
route taken by proponents of this fifth vision, who see habeas 
as an appropriate remedy only when the petitioner did not 
have one-fair-chance to litigate the constitutional claim in state 
court. A basic premise of this vision is stated by its originator 
and foremost academic champion the late Professor Paul Bator. 
"[Ilf a job can be well done once, it should not be done 
93. Friendly, supra note 77, at 143-44. 
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twice."g4 Most, if not all, of the recent conservative Justices 
have been strongly influenced by the one-fair-chance vision, 
with Justices Scalia and Thomas seeming to be most thorough- 
ly ~onvinced.'~ 
1. The three general issues of constitutional interpretation 
While the one-fair-chance vision does not dictate that its 
proponents be "conservative" with respect to these issues of 
constitutional interpretation, as a practical matter most propo- 
nents of the one-fair-chance vision are conservatives who are 
non-expansivist as to interpretation of rights, believe that other 
interests can be balanced against rights, and do not believe 
that all rights are equally important. It is probable that the 
coincidence between the one-fair-chance vision and the conser- 
vative nature of its proponents lies in the fact that this vision 
views state courts as the primary adjudicators of issues that 
arise in state criminal prosecutions, with the federal courts 
serving only a secondary and backstopping role.96 This is the 
position that accords with the conservative belief in a broad 
sphere of state authority. 
2. The four theoretical issues specific to habeas 
a. Function. Compared with the functions of habeas 
espoused by the de novo litigation vision, the functions envi- 
sioned by one-fair-chance visionaries are quite limited. The 
one-fair-chance vision does believe in the vindication of individ- 
ual rights, but only when the petitioner did not have a chance 
to have those rights vindicated during the state proceeding. As 
a practical matter, since all states have many procedural oppor- 
tunities for defendants to raise constitutional issues, it is rare 
that a defendant will not have had one-fair-chance to litigate 
the constitutional claim.g7 Since this will be a relatively rare 
94. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for 
State Prisoners, 76 HAW.  L. REV. 441, 451 (1963). 
95. Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1768 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) ("Prior opportunity to litigate an issue should be an 
important equitable consideration in any habeas case, and should ordinarily pre- 
clude the court from reaching the merits of a claim, unless it goes to the fairness 
of the trial process or to the accuracy of the ultimate result."). 
96. Yackle, Misadventures, supm note 15, a t  389-91 (explaining that Bator's 
thesis relies on the proposition that state courts are the primary adjudicators of 
criminal cases). 
97. All states provide mechanisms for presenting federal constitutional issues, 
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circumstance, one-fair-chance visionaries do not believe that 
habeas serves to deter state courts from too narrowly constru- 
ing the substance of federal rights. Indeed, one of the most 
significant aspects of the one-fair-chance vision is that it exer- 
cises no control whatsoever over state court interpretations of 
federal constitutional criminal procedure law: As long as the 
state has provided a N 1  and fair opportunity to litigate the 
matter, the state court judgment should stand even if it ap- 
pears to  be patently wrong. One function on which the 
one-fair-chance proponent can agree with the de novo litigation 
proponent is that habeas should have a tendency to  force state 
courts to provide procedural opportunities for petitioners to 
have claims resolved at the state level (as discussed above, 
states have developed such procedures, probably more because 
of the spectre of direct review of their decisions than the more 
remote spectre of collateral habeas corpus review). Finally, 
one-fair-chance visionaries do not see any special benefit in 
keeping federal district courts involved in litigation of federal 
constitutional issues. In the view of these visionaries, the state 
and federal courts are fungible when it comes to making feder- 
al constitutional criminal procedure doctrine, and state courts 
are as likely to promote uniformity as are federal ones. 
b. History. Professor Bator provided this vision's history 
in his famous 1963 law review article.g8 Bator argued that 
prior to the 1867 Act it was quite clear that the only kind of 
defect that could be remedied in habeas corpus, when the in- 
carceration was the result of judicially authorized detention, 
was failure of jurisdi~tion.~~ He then argued that Congress 
probably did not have more expansive visions of habeas in 
mind when it enacted the Act of 1867.1°0 Bator then plunged 
both pretrial and during the trial. "[Florty-seven states . . . provide the criminal 
defendant with the right to appeal a t  least once without obtaining prior court 
approval. The remaining states furnish discretionary procedures that are tanta- 
mount to an appeal as of right." Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional 
Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39 UCLA L. REV. 503, 513-14 (1992). Further, all 
states now provide post-conviction remedies in addition to appeal. See YACKLE, 
POSTCONVIC!TION, supra note 15, $ 13. 
98. Bator, supra note 94, at  463-499. 
99. Id. at 466 (quoting Ex parte Watkins, 28 US. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830)). 
100. Id. at 475. Bater states that: 
I t  would, then, require rather overwhelming evidence to show that it 
was the purpose of the legislature to tear habeas corpus entirely out of 
the context of its historical meaning and scope and convert it into an 
ordinary writ of error with respect to all federal questions in all criminal 
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into the murky waters of the period from 1867 to 1953, subdi- 
viding it into segments, and examining first the era from 1867 
to  1915.1°' During this period the Supreme Court judicially 
stretched the definition of "jurisdiction" to encompass attacks 
on illegal sentenceslo2 and statutes alleged to be unconstitu- 
tional.lo3 Then, in 1915, the Court decided Frank 
Mangum,lo4 a case that is "crucial" to Bator's analysis. lo5 
that case, according to  Bator, 
[flor the first time the Court explicitly added a crucial weapon 
to the arsenal of the habeas corpus court: if that court finds 
that a state tribunal has failed to supply "corrective process" 
with respect to the h l l  and fair litigation of federal questions, 
whether or not "jurisdictional," in a state criminal proceeding, 
a court on habeas may appropriately inquire into the merits 
in order to determine whether the detention is law-f!ul.106 
According to Bator, the Court in Frank divined the true mis- 
sion of federal habeas corpus: to examine the merits of consti- 
tutional claims where the petitioner did not have an opportuni- 
ty to litigate those claims fairly in state court.'" Bator pro- 
ceeds t o  attempt to harmonize subsequent cases with this prop- 
osition from Frank, and concludes that as of 1953 the power of 
federal habeas courts extended only to claims of lack of juris- 
diction, illegal sentences, unconstitutionality of statutes, and 
claims as to  which the state had failed t o  provide one fair op- 
portunity for litigation.'" Thus, to  Bator, the 1953 decision in 
cases. 
The strikingly sparse legislative history does not seem to me to fur- 
nish such evidence. 
Id. 
101. Id. at 463-99. 
102. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 176-77 (1873), discussed in Bator, 
supm note 94 at 467-74. 
103. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1879); see Bator, supra note 94, 
a t  468-74. 
104. 237 U.S. 309 (1915). 
105. Bator, supra note 94, at 484. See generally id. at 484-93. 
106. Id. at 486438. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at  488-96. The most difficult case for Bator to harmonize is Moore v. 
Dempsey, in which one of the dissenters accused the majority of overruling Frank. 
See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 93-95 (1923) (McReynolds, J., dissenting). Both 
Moore and Frank involved claims that the defendants' trials in the state court had 
been overtaken by mob domination. The Court in Frank had held that the state 
court verdict would be permitted to stand because the state appellate court, upon 
full investigation, had determined that the trial was not mob-dominated. Frank v. 
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Brown u. Allen1o9 constituted a radical expansion of federal 
Mangum, 237 U.S. a t  335-36. In Moore, the state appellate court apparently had 
made no findings with respect to the mob domination claim, and the Supreme 
Court held that in that situation the federal habeas court must litigate the claim 
de novo. As to Moore, Bator says: 
Though the opinion is admittedly far from clear, all Moore v. Dempsey 
may be saying, then, is that a conclusory and out-of-hand rejection by a 
state of a claim of violation of federal right, without any process of inqui- 
ry being afforded a t  all, c a ~ o t  insulate the merits of the question from 
the habeas corpus court: if the state's findings are to "count," they must 
be reasoned findings rationally reached through fair procedures. So 
viewed, the case is entirely consistent with Frank. 
Bator, supra note 94, at  489. 
Bator then deals with Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935), which 
held "that a conviction procured through testimony known by the state authorities 
to be perjured, results in a [violation] of due process." Bator, supra note 94, a t  
490. According to Bator, the holding of the case is that "the state is 'required' 
under Fmnk and Moore to afford corrective process, and in its absence, federal 
habeas will be available." Bator, supra note 94, at 491. Bator then turns to a trio 
of cases, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938) (holding that a claim of deni- 
al of counsel can be heard in habeas), Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 
(1941) and Waley v. Johnston, 316 US. 101, 104-5 (1942) (both permitting litiga- 
tion in habeas of the claim that the defendant was forced to plead guilty). See. 
Bator, supra note 94, a t  493-96. According to Bator, these cases are consistent 
with the one-fairchance vision because denial of right to counsel, or a coerced 
guilty plea, deprives the defendant of the one-fairchance to contest the charges. 
Bator, supra note 94, a t  493-95. Finally, Bator finds language in three state pris- 
oner habeas cases supporting the proposition that the federal court should hear the 
claim in habeas only if the state courts did not give the petitioner a fair opportu- 
nity to litigate the claim. See Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 117-18 (1944); House 
v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 46-48 (1945); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 766-67 (1945); 
Bator, supra note 94, at  495-99. 
Bator acknowledges, however, that the case law of the era does not unambigu- 
ously support his position: 
I do not mean to give a picture of the law of this time which is neat- 
er than it actually was. The Court did not, after Frank, give any rounded 
consideration to the reaches and purposes of the habeas jurisdiction. Most 
of the cases of the period are explicitly concerned not with the problem of 
relitigation of federal questions already canvassed in state courts, but 
with the complications created by the exhaustion doctrine and with the 
vexing question whether a prisoner must seek direct Supreme Court re- 
view of a state judgment as a condition of the right to seek habeas car- 
pus. . . . And there are some opinions which could be taken to intimate 
that the writ automatically reaches the merits of all federal constitutional 
questions. Furthermore, there can be no doubt that, by 1952, the integrity 
and continuing authority of the doctrine of Frank v. Mangum had been 
endangered, as it were, on several occasions. 
Bator, supra note 94, at 496-98 (citations omitted). The cases Bator cites, which he 
believes could be taken to stand for the proposition that the writ reaches the mer- 
its of all federal constitutional questions, are Darr v. Burford, 339 US. 200 (1950), 
overrzded in part by Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 
672 (1948); and Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104 (1951). See Bator, supra note 94, 
a t  497-98 n.155. 
109. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). 
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habeas power to encompass all claims of federal constitutional 
violation, even if those claims had been fully and fairly litigat- 
ed in state court.'1° To Bator the result in Brown was anoma- 
lous, both in terms of being inconsistent with the writ's history, 
and being contrary to the common sense proposition that if a 
job has been done once in  state court there is no good reason to 
do it again in federal court, given that state and federal courts 
are essentially fungible in determining the merits of federal 
constitutional issues. 'l 
Bator's article was published at an unpropitious moment: 
a t  the height of the Warren Court-activist era, just before the 
Warren Court's 1963 habeas trilogy." More than a decade 
later, however, when the conservatives on the Burger Court 
gained influence, Bator's thesis was resurrected and since has 
become a bedrock statement of both the writ's history and func- 
tion for several conservative  justice^."^ 
c. Federalism. The foregoing discussion makes clear the 
one-fair-chance vision's view of federalism: state courts and 
federal courts are fungible when it comes to adjudicating feder- 
al constitutional issues-after all, state court judges are equal- 
ly bound to uphold the Federal Constitution. As Bator put it, 
[tlhere is no intrinsic reason why the fact that a man is a 
federal judge should make him more competent, or conscien- 
tious, or learned with respect to the applicable federal law 
than his neighbor in the state courthouse. The federal judge 
is more "correct" under the present system only because our 
institutional arrangements make him authoritative.l14 
d. Congressional versus Supreme Court authori- 
ty. Proponents of the one-fair-chance vision necessarily be- 
lieves that there is great power in the Supreme Court to create 
the boundaries of federal habeas power. This is true inasmuch 
110. Bator, supra note 94, at 500. 
111. Id. at 502-06. 
112. The liberal majority in Fay took note of Bator's article and disagreed with 
the point it noted, finding the argument that Frank established a one-fair-chance 
principle that was left untouched by Moore "untenable." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 
421 11.30 (1963). 
113. Eighteen years later, looking back on his own article, Bator noted that it 
"had the strange history of being pronounced dead almost as soon as it was writ- 
ten, only to enjoy a mysterious recent resurrection." Paul M. Bator, The State 
Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 613 
(1981). 
114. Bator, supra note 94, at 509. 
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as the one-fair-chance principle that Bator purports to have 
found in Frank u. Mangum115 was clearly not part of the 
original legislative intent of the Congress that passed the 1867 
Act. This is also borne out by the fact that even as the 
one-fair-chance doctrine has grown in ascendancy in Supreme 
Court case law, at the same time Congress has repeatedly 
rejected proposed amendments to the habeas corpus statute 
that would essentially embody the one-fair-chance princi- 
ple. l6 
3. The practical issue-the effects of habeas litigation 
Proponents of the one-fair-chance vision see benefits from 
habeas jurisdiction only where the federal court is deciding an 
issue as to which the petitioner did not have a fair chance to 
litigate in state court. In that situation, one-fair-chance propo- 
nents acknowledge the benefit of vindicating the rights of the 
petitioner. But when a petitioner brings a claim that has al- 
ready been litigated unsuccessfully in state court, proponents of 
the one-fair-chance vision see no benefits to federal jurisdiction, 
only costs. The costs, of course, are the well known ones of 
burdening the prosecuting authorities and federal judges, as 
well as undermining the very notion that a criminal case can 
reach a final judgment of guilt."' No benefit can be derived 
from such proceedings, according to these visionaries, even if 
the petitioner is successful in federal court: there is no reason 
to  believe that the federal court's decision in the petitioner's 
favor is any more "correct" than the state court decision against 
115. 237 U.S. 309 (1915). See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. 
116. Liebman, supra note 5, at 2084 & n.526 (noting that at least 34 times 
between 1953 and 1992 Congress considered bills that would have limited habeas 
jurisdiction, many of which were based on the one-fair-chance principle). 
117. Bator, supra note 94, at 444-53. 
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the petitioner's claim."8 Thus, the relitigation results only in 
a different result, not a better one. 
F. Vision Six: The Inverse Correlation Vision 
The inverse correlation vision postulates that federal habe- 
as power should be broad when state courts are not properly 
enforcing the substance of federal constitutional rights, but 
should be narrow when state courts are doing a good job of 
enforcing those rights. Under this vision the federal habeas 
power is not static, but expands when it is needed to counteract 
state recalcitrance, and then contracts when state recalcitrance 
diminishes. Hints of this vision appear in academic litera- 
ture,llg and in the Court's habeas jurispr~dence,'~~ when 
Id. 
118. As Bator puts it: 
After all, there is no ultimate guarantee that any tribunal arrived a t  the 
correct result; the conclusions of a habeas corpus court, or of any number 
of habeas corpus courts, that the facts were X and that on X facts Y law 
applies are not infallible; if the existence uel m n  of mistake determines 
the lawfulness of the judgment, there can be no escape from a literally 
endless relitigation of the merits because the possibility of mistake always 
exists. . . . What seems so objectionable is second-guessing merely for the 
sake of second-guessing, in the service of the illusory notion that if we 
only try hard enough we will find the "truth." 
at  447, 451. 
119. See Friedman, supra note 10, at 818 ("If the habeas courts were indeed 
the Supreme Court's foots~ldiers [during the Warren Court era] in the due process 
revolution, then a change in the nature of that conscription logically should follow 
the Court's changing philosophy of criminal constitutional law and renewed trust of 
state courts."); Hughes, supra note 16, a t  328 ("The federal habeas revolution has 
been attacked and curbed and is now being turned around. Swings of the pendu- 
lum are a natural part of the rhythm of affairs and need not always be viewed 
with great alarm."); Max  rose^, The Great Wr iGA Refkction of Societal Change, 
44 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 364 (1983) (explaining that while the Warren Court habeas 
cases broadening the scope of the writ "may now seem extreme to some, but they 
may, nonetheless, have served a useful and important purpose when they were an- 
nounced. The new rules helped implement a widely heralded civil rights movement 
that had begun in the early 1950s to arouse the conscience of America."). Even 
Professor Bator acknowledged the seductiveness of the idea of expanding federal 
habeas jurisdiction when state courts are untrustworthy in enforcing federal rights. 
There is surely appeal in the notion, and perhaps it makes sense a t  a 
time when there still is a justified suspicion and distrust of statecourt 
rulings as to federal constitutional rights, to have a jurisdiction with a 
large and roving commission "to prevent a complete miscarriage of jus- 
tice . . . ." 
Bator, supra note 94, at 525 (citation omitted). Bator, however, was stalwart 
enough to resist this notion: 
Similarly, I resist the notion that sound remedial institutions can be built 
on the premise that state judges are not in sympathy with federal law. 
VISIONS OF HABEAS 
the Court discusses whether state court judges need to  be de- 
terred from too narrowly construing federal constitutional 
protections. 
1. The three general issues of constitutional interpretation 
The three issues of constitutional interpreta- 
tion--expansiveness, balanceability and equality-are not as 
important in this vision because the focus is on the trustworthi- 
ness of state courts rather than on the characteristics of rights. 
For example, a person could be a liberal expansivist as to  con- 
stitutional rights, yet still be satisfied with a limited role for 
habeas if that person were convinced that the state courts were 
enforcing constitutional rights effectively. As a practical matter, 
however, liberals generally tend to favor federal power and, 
thus, do not tend t o  be inverse correlationists. 
2. The four theoretical issues specific to habeas 
a. Function. Inverse correlation visionaries believe in 
the first three functions of habeas in which de novo litigation 
visionaries believe: vindicating individual rights, deterring 
state courts from too narrowly construing the substance of 
federal rights, and pressuring state courts into improved proce- 
dures for vindication of federal rights. The big difference be- 
tween de novo litigation visionaries and inverse correlation 
Again we must think in terms of tomorrow as well as today. Hopefully 
we will reach the day when the suspicion will no longer be justified that 
state judges-especially Southern state judges--evade their responsibilities 
by giving only the appearance of fairness in their rulings as to state 
defendants' federal rights. 
Id. at 524. 
120. In Fay, the majority never explicitly stated a distrust of state courts, but 
the whole thrust of the opinion indicates this belief. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 
(1963). The pendulum swung by the time of Stone, where the majority stated, W e  
are unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensi- 
tivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several 
States." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.35 (1976). Since then the pendulum 
has swung back and forth. Contrast, for example, two 1993 cases, Brecht v. 
Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (1993) (opining that state judges do not need 
deterring), with Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1755 (1993) (arguing that 
permitting the enforcement of Miranda claims through habeas will a d  as a benefi- 
cial deterrent to state courts). See also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306-07 
(1989) (acknowledging the need to deter state courts as a significant aspect of 
habeas); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 563 (1979) (holding that there is beneficial 
deterrent value from enforcing claims in habeas relating to the selection of a grand 
jury). 
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visionaries with respect to function is that the former believe 
the federal courts constitute a front line forum in the battle for 
constitutional rights, while the latter believe that federal courts 
provide a backup mechanism in case the front-line state courts 
fail t o  fulfill their obligations. Thus, inverse correlationists 
don't put much stock in the other three habeas functions urged 
by de nouo litigation visionaries: keeping federal courts in prac- 
tice, promoting state-federal dialogue, and seeking uniformity 
in federal law. 
b. History. Although I know of no existing attempt t o  
provide a history for the inverse correlation vision, a plausible 
one can be created. One would begin in the Reconstruction era 
and state the unassailable conclusion that the 1867 Act was 
promulgated for the very reason that state courts in the South 
were refusing to enforce federal constitutional obligations. One 
would then note that Congress signaled the Supreme Court, 
once Reconstruction fervor had died down, to judicially limit 
the wide scope of habeas corpus,121 which the Supreme Court 
promptly did when it established the exhaustion of state reme- 
dies requirement? We would then skip ahead to Frank u. 
MangumlB in 1915 as an indication that the federal courts 
would stand ready to  remedy egregious constitutional violations 
for which the state courts did not provide a remedy. The gradu- 
al expansion of the writ thereafter until the culmination in 
Brown u. Allenla could be explained as a result of the in- 
creasing recognition that state court criminal justice was in 
many ways primitive and in need of unifying federal oversight. 
The Warren Court met this need by federalizing criminal proce- 
dure law, and expanding habeas via its 1963 trilogy to empow- 
er federal district courts to  police this criminal procedure revo- 
lution. Our history would finish with an assertion that is ac- 
121. Professor Liebman synthesizes the history on this point. Liebman, supra 
note 5, at 2064-69. In 1868, Congress passed an a d  that withdrew the Supreme 
Court's jurisdiction under the 1867 habeas corpus statute. See Act of March 27, 
1868, ch. 34, 15 Stat. 44. In 1885 Congress restored the Court's appellate jurisdic- 
tion under the 1867 statute. See Ad of March 3, 1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat. 437. At 
the same time Congress invited the Supreme Court, in light of the restored right 
to appeal, to define "the true extent of the Act of 1867, and the true limits of the 
jurisdiction of the Federal courts and judges under it" so that Congress could de- 
termine "whether further legislation is necessary." H.R. REP. NO. 730, 48th Cong., 
1st Sess., at 6 (1885). 
122. Ex park Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1886). 
123. 237 US. 309, 329-30 (1915). 
124. 344 U.S. 443 (1953); see supra note 36. 
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knowledged even by most liberals: generally state courts have, 
for the last couple of decades, tried their best to  correctly apply 
constitutional criminal procedure doctrine as promulgated by 
the Supreme Court.125 Based on this perception, inverse 
correlationists contend that federal habeas today should be a 
rather limited remedy that exists to catch those relatively few 
instances in which the state courts have egregiously failed to 
perform their constitutional duties. 
c. Federalism. To an inverse correlation visionary, state 
courts have the capacity to  be just as effective in enforcing fed- 
eral constitutional rights as are federal courts. The key ques- 
tion for an inverse correlationist is whether the state courts at 
a given point in time have the inclination to hK1l that capaci- 
ty. If they do, then the federal habeas role is of a secondary 
nature. 
d. Congressional versus Supreme Court authori- 
ty. Proponents of the inverse correlation vision can argue that 
their vision most truly Wills the actual intent of the 1867 
Congress. This vision relies not on the explicit language of the 
statute-which is quite broad and gives no indication that the 
writ's scope should expand and contract in changing circum- 
stances-but rather on the underlying purpose of Congress that 
the federal courts stand ready to enforce constitutional rights 
when state courts were unwilling to do so. Proponents of this 
vision would point out that Congress has, for the most part, ac- 
quiesced to both the expansions of the writ by the Warren 
Court, and the subsequent contractions by more conservative 
courts.126 This could be taken as an indication that Congress 
125. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
126. See Jeffries & Stuntz, supra note 5, at  707 ("[V]irtually all ingredients of 
federal habeas law were a ~ o u n c e d  without statutory authority. At least since 
1886, federal habeas law has developed by judicial innovation, followed (sometimes) 
by legislative ratification."). The habeas statutes have been significantly revised 
only twice. The first significant amendments after 1867 occurred in 1948, but they 
altered the basic form and ftndion of federal habeas corpus very little. "Indeed, 
most of the new provisions only wrote the specifics of Supreme Court decisions 
into the statute book." YACKLE, POSI'CONVICTION, supra note 15, $ 19 a t  90. The 
second significant revision occurred in 1966. At least some of the 1966 amend- 
ments were prompted by the Warren Court's 1963 habeas trilogy and signified 
Congress's intent to tighten habeas jurisdiction. Probably the most significant of 
the 1966 revisions was the addition of 28 U.S.C. $ 2254(d), which granted a pre- 
sumption of correctness to properly arrived at  state court factual determinations. 
As Professor Weisselberg has demonstrated, this amendment had a dramatic effect 
on the percentage of state petitioners who received evidentiary hearings. 
Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 167-68. 
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has accepted and, indeed, ratifed the Court's role as expander 
and contractor of habeas doctrine in keeping with the relative 
willingness of state courts to enforce federal rights. 
3. The practical issue of the efects of habeas litigation 
Under the inverse correlation vision the costs and benefits 
of federal habeas litigation change over time. When state 
courts are unwilling to  enforce federal rights, then the benefits 
of habeas litigation far outweigh its costs. On the other hand, 
when state courts show themselves generally willing to enforce 
federal rights the costs of redundant and protracted litigation 
outweigh the benefits. 
G. Vision Seven: The Equitable Remedy Vision 
The vision of habeas as an equitable remedy argues that 
each habeas case is unique, and that few, if any, general princi- 
ples of habeas law are necessary to  justly decide habeas cases. 
Rather, the habeas court should look at several factors includ- 
ing, but not limited to, the importance of the right involved, the 
egregiousness of the claimed violation, the skill with which the 
petitioner was represented in the state courts, the penalty 
imposed on the petitioner (with particular concern for whether 
the sentence was death), the diligence of the petitioner's at- 
tempt to  assert the claim, and the inability of the petitioner to 
state a claim because the state authorities have somehow ob- 
structed the process. After considering these and other perti- 
nent factors, the federal habeas court should render a just 
decision. Thus, for example, with respect to  a procedurally 
defaulted claim, the habeas court should not apply a general 
rule that defaulted claims are barred, but instead should look 
at all factors to see whether justice requires that the federal 
court honor the procedural bar in the particular case before it. 
Justice Stevens is the best exemplar of this vision along with, 
as was pointed out earlier,ln being a rights-selectivist. In- 
127. Justice Stevens' rights-selectivist ideas are discussed supra, notes 66-68. 
The most prominent landmarks along the trail of Justice Stevens' equitable remedy 
vision include Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 US.  72, 95-96 (1977) (Stevens, J., concur- 
ring). 
[I]f the constitutional issue is sufficiently grave, even an express waiver 
by the defendant himself may sometimes be excused. Matters such as the 
competence of counsel, the procedural context in which the asserted waiv- 
er occurred, the character of the constitutional right at stake, and the 
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deed, the two visions are highly compatible because one of the 
significant factors equity considers is the nature of the right 
claimed to have been violated. 
1. The three general issues of constitutional interpretation 
A proponent of the equitable remedy vision need not es- 
pouse any particular position concerning expansiveness of in- 
terpretation of constitutional rights, but necessarily needs to 
espouse a particular position concerning their balanceability 
and equality. Clearly, such a visionary must believe rights to 
be balanceable, inasmuch as other factors which equity consid- 
ers can outweigh a right's vindication. Similarly, such a vision- 
ary believes that rights are unequal, with some rights more 
powerful and thus in need of vindication than are others. 
2. The four theoretical issues specific to habeas 
a. Function. To an equitable remedy visionary, the mis- 
sion of habeas corpus is to do justice. Thus, it focuses on the 
vindication of individual rights, and pays little heed t o  pro- 
posed systemic goals such as deterring state courts, spurring 
state systems to change their procedures, and keeping federal 
courts involved in the dialogue. The equitable remedy vision 
implicitly eschews uniformity of federal law as a goal, since 
justice may require, for example, on the facts of one case, that 
a procedural default be respected, while on different facts in 
another case an identical procedural default should be ignored. 
Further, different federal district judges will have different 
ideas of what is just on the facts of any given case. 
6. History. The idea that habeas is an equitable remedy 
has a relatively short history. The first connection between 
habeas and equity in Supreme Court jurisprudence occurred in 
an opinion by Justice Frankfurter in 1953? The habe- 
overall fairness of the entire proceeding, may be more significant than the 
language of the test the Court purports to apply. 
Id. (footnote omitted); see K u h l m a ~  v. Wilson, 477 US. 436, 476 (1986) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that a colorable claim of innocence is but one of the fac- 
tors, and not always an essential one, in determining whether the "ends of justice" 
require a federal habeas court to consider a successive petition); Murray v. Carrier, 
477 U.S. 478, 498-506 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing 
that several factors should go into determining whether the federal court should 
ignore a state procedural default). 
128. U.S. a rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 573 (1953) ( F r a f i r t e r ,  J., 
dissenting) ("I need hardly point out that in a court of equity causes are disposed 
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aslequity connection made its debut in a majority opinion in 
Fay v. Noia,lB and since then the idea that habeas is gov- 
erned by equitable principles has become a recurring motif in 
Supreme Court opinions.130 It is crucial to  note, though, that 
many of the references to "equitable principles7' in opinions by 
conservative Justices have a far different meaning than the 
idea of equity espoused by Justice Stevens. Justice Stevens' 
notion of equity in habeas is a case-by-case concept; the conser- 
vative Justices use the concept of "equitable principles" when 
they establish generic rules governing habeas, e.g., a procedur- 
al default cannot be excused unless very narrowly defined 
"cause and prejudice" is established.13' Such rules reflect pri- 
marily the one-fair-chance vision. With all due respect t o  the 
conservatives, the idea of generic equity is a contradiction in 
terms: while equity can support vague and general maxims, 
such as that the equitable claimant must not have "unclean 
hands," the idea of equity loses its essential meaning when a 
court establishes inflexible rules applying to all cases.ls2 
of on the facts as they appear at the time of the disposition, and that habeas 
I 
corpus is certainly to be governed by the rules of fairness enforced in equity."). But 
see 1 JAMES LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 3 
(1988) ("[H]istorically habeas corpus developed as 'a legal, not an equitable, reme- 
dy."). 
129. 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963) ("Furthermore, habeas corpus has traditionally 
been regarded as  governed by equitable principles."). 
130. See, eg., Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1766-67 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that equitable treatment per- 
vades the law of habeas); id. at 1757 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissent- 
ing in part) (making a similar argument); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 
1729 (1993) (O'Co~or,  J., dissenting) (stating that equitable principles have gov- 
erned habeas); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 484 (1991) (holding equitable 
principles govern abuse of the writ); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 447 (1986) 
(stating that equitable principles traditionally governed in habeas); Stone v. Powell, 
428 U.S. 465, 478 n.11 (1976) (noting the equitable nature of the writ). 
131. The following cases are the leading ones in development of the standard: 
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 US. 722, 750-51 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 
478, 485-89 (1986); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977). 
132. See Patchel, supra note 20, at  1034. 
Equitable doctrines involve the balancing of the respective interests of 
particular parties in a particular case. The "balancing" utilized by the 
Court to come up with limits on habeas review, however, is an entirely 
different kind of balancing. The Court "balances" the generic interests of a 
class of individual-habeas petitioners-against the generic interests of 
the states in order to define the limits on habeas review and formulate a 
rule that then is applied as a mandatory requirement in all cases. This 
type of "balancing of interests" is an argument of policy, not of principle. 
I t  does not involve consideration of, and decision regarding, rights of the 
parties before the Court, but rather a utilitarian compromise of individual 
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c. Federalism. To an equitable remedy visionary, federal 
courts need not be conceived as being better at dispensing jus- 
tice than state courts, but are conceived of as being freer to do 
so. For example, state appellate courts often feel obligated to 
enforce procedural defaults no matter how serious the claimed 
conditional violation, because they envision that the failure to 
consistently uphold procedural defaults could result in signifi- 
cant damage to the orderliness of the state system. A federal 
court can, if circumstances warrant, overlook the procedural 
default without doing any lasting harm to the state's interest 
in orderliness, since the state rule would still be that such 
defaults are enforceable on direct appeal. 
d. Congressional versus Supreme Court authority. There 
is no indication that the 1867 Congress thought of habeas as 
an equitable remedy. Instead, equitable remedy visionaries rely 
on a 1948 amendment to section 2243lS as the primary au- 
thority for the equitable nature of the writ: "The Court shall 
summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the 
matter as law and justice require."134 There is virtually no 
legislative history concerning what Congress meant by the 
term "and justice," but it is not implausible to equate "justice" 
with equity or equitable principles. 
3. The practical issue-the effects of habeas litigation 
Proponents of the equitable remedy vision, focusing on 
habeas issues on a case-by-case basis, are not overly interested 
in assessing systemic costs associated with habeas corpus. They 
do see the definte benefit of vindicating constitutional rights in 
those relatively few cases in which such vindication was not 
accomplished at the state level. 
H. Vision Eight: The Death-is-Diferent Vision 
The premise of this vision is that just as "death-is-differ- 
ent" from all other punishments as a matter of Eighth Amend- 
ment law,'" so death-is-different for purposes of the writ of 
rights in light of broader societal goals. 
Id. 
133. 28 U.S.C. 8 2243 (1988). 
134. Id. (emphasis added). 
135. The idea that "death-is-differentn was implicit in Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. 238 (1974) and became explicit shortly thereafter in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (explaining that Furmun had recognized that death was differ- 
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habeas corpus in the sense that the writ has an especially 
important function to  perform in cases where the petitioner is 
death-sentenced.136 This vision differs from the others we 
have discussed in that it is only a partial vision: it must adopt 
one of the other visions as to non-death penalty petitioners. 
The most common coupling is of the de novo litigation vision 
with the death-is-different vision, given that most liberal ad- 
herents of the de novo litigation vision are also death penalty 
opponents. 
1. The three general issues of constitutional interpretation 
A death-is-different visionary need not hold any particular 
viewpoint concerning how expansively the rights of death sen- 
tenced petitioners should be defined, but does necessarily be- 
lieve that those rights, given the life at stake in a death penal- 
ty case, should not be easily counterbalanced by any counter- 
vailing interest. This necessarily means that death-is-different 
visionaries view the rights of death-sentenced petitioners with 
greater weight than the claims of non-death sentenced petition- 
ers. 
ent). The Court has continued to adhere to this position. Harmelin v. Michigan, 
501 U.S. 957 958-59 (1991); Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 125-26 (1991); Beck 
v. Alabama, 447 US. 625, 637-38 (1980); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 
(1977); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). 
136. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2529-30 (1992) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the ever-shrinking power of federal 
courts to  review claims of error in state death penalty cases "undermines the very 
legitimacy of capital punishment itself"); Smith v. Murray, 477 US. 527, 523-25 
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority gives insufficient weight 
to the fact that the petitioner has been death sentenced); Murray v. Carrier, 477 
U.S. 478, 525-26 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that if inadvertence of 
counsel should constitute "cause" in a non-capital case a fortiori i t  should consti- 
tute cause in a capital case); Richard J. B o ~ i e ,  Preserving Justice in Capital Cas- 
es Whik Streamlining the Process of Collateral Review, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 99, 100 
(1991) (arguing that, at  least in capital cases, federal habeas jurisdiction should 
not throw barriers in front of the petitioners); Hoffmann, supra note 18, a t  147-50 
(arguing that the capital jurisprudence law is so complex, changing, and that na- 
tional standards are so important that difference should be given to the federal 
courts with their particular expertise to avoid constitutional error); cf Jeffries & 
Stuntz, supra note 5, at 720-21 (urging broad forgiveness of procedural defaults 
concerning the sentencing stage of capital proceedings, not necessarily because 
death-is-different, but because the decision whether to impose the death penalty is 
so rife with subjectivity and discretion that the concept of factual reliability loses 
its clarity and harshness). 
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2. The four theoretical issues specific to habeas 
a. Function. According to  death-is-different visionaries, 
a special function of habeas is to  assure that no state executes 
an inmate unless that state has scrupulously protected the 
death-sentenced petitioner's constitutional rights. 
b. History. The history of this vision is only slightly 
more than two decades old, because it was not until the 1970s 
that the Supreme Court began to  make signifcant Eighth 
Amendment law concerning the death penalty.13' Over the 
succeeding two decades, the Supreme Court made many pro- 
nouncements concerning the constitutional requirements of 
death sentencing procedures, resulting in one of the more com- 
plicated bodies of constitutional criminal procedure law? To 
death-is-different visionaries the combination of the ultimate 
nature of the sanction, the complicated nature of the governing 
law, and the suspicion that state authorities are particularly 
susceptible to political pressure in death penalty cases,13g 
makes a strong argument for assigning the federal courts a 
special watchdog function as to death penalty cases. 
c. Federalism. As was just pointed out, death-is-different 
visionaries believe that states are in particular need of federal 
oversight with respect to  the highly volatile cases that result in 
death sentences. Indeed, there is a clear historical resonance 
here with the Reconstruction era, since most of the states that 
have high death row populations and that most often carry out 
executions are in the Deep South. Further, there is statisti- 
cal140 as well as anecdotal evidence that racial factors still 
137. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 US. 153, 188-95 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 
US. 238 (1972). 
138. Hoffmann, supra note 18, at 147 (arguing that Eighth Amendment death 
penalty jurisprudence is "more elaborate and confusing than almost any other area 
of constitutional law"). 
139. Steven B. Bright, In Defense of Life: Enforcing the Bill of Rights on Be- 
half of Poor, Minority and Disadvantaged Persons Facing the Death Penalty, 57 
Mo. L. REV. 849, 864 (1992) (arguing that one of the reasons why state courts 
tolerate injustices in death penalty cases, such as shoddy representation and racial 
discrimination, is that "courts do not function well when they are caught up in the 
passions and politics of the moment. And no case involves the passions of the 
moment more than a death penalty case, particularly one involving an interracial 
crime."). 
140. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987) (discussing statistical 
data showing that defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times 
more likely to receive death sentences than defendants charged with killing blacks). 
786 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [ 1994 
loom large in determining who gets the death sentence and 
who doesn't.l4' 
d. Congressional versus Supreme Court authority. A 
death-is-different visionary necessarily believes that the Su- 
preme Court has significant power to structure habeas jurisdic- 
tion, since there is no indication in any of the habeas statutes, 
or in the congressional intent, that death penalty petitioners 
should be treated any different than other petitioners. 
3. The practical issue of the efects of habeas litigation 
Death-is-different visionaries believe that the potential 
benefits of habeas litigation for death penalty petitioners-the 
vindication of a constitutional right that saves a prisoner from 
being unconstitutionally executed-far outweigh any attendant 
costs. 
I. A Note About Adherence to Multiple Visions 
A word is in order about the possibility that a person 
might credibly adhere to  more than one vision. Some of the 
visions are obviously incompatible, such as the de novo litiga- 
tion vision and the one-fair-chance vision. Others could ratio- 
nally be combined, as Justice Stevens has done with the 
rights-selectivist and equitable remedy visions. Even some 
visions that do not at first glance appear to be compatible could 
rationally be combined by utilizing one as an exception to  an- 
other. For example, one could be primarily a one-fair-chance 
visionary, while at the same time believing that a petitioner 
with a colorable claim of factual innocence should have the 
one-fair-chance principles applied less rigorously than a peti- 
tioner who does not have such a claim of innocence. Similarly, 
one could be generally an inverse correlationist, yet find that 
certain states, or certain courts within states, are so hostile to 
federal constitutional rights that federal habeas cases involving 
decisions of those courts should be treated in line with the de 
nouo litigation vision.lq Numerous other combinations are 
also possible. 
141. See Bright, supra note 139, at 853-862. 
142. See Craig M. Bradley, Are State Courts Enforcing the Fourth Amendment? 
A Preliminary Study, 77 GEO. L.J. 251, 286 (1988) (concluding that most states are 
enforcing the Fourth Amendment, but that Georgia, and possibly Arizona and 
South Carolina, are not). 
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So far I have examined the eight visions in the abstract. It 
is now time to become more concrete and see how these visions 
unfold with respect to  the ten contexts in which they arise in 
habeas litigation: exhaustion of state remedies, the scope of 
cognizable claims, then-existing law claims, new-rule claims, 
mixed question claims, pure fact claims, procedurally defaulted 
claims, abuse of the writ, successive petitions, and the standard 
for obtaining relief.'" The task I will undertake with respect 
t o  each of these contexts is threefold. First, I will set forth the 
nub of the context, which includes an analysis of what is at 
stake, along with any governing statutes. Second, I will exam- 
ine how each vision would resolve the nub of the context. And 
third, I will analyze the case law to attempt to determine 
which vision or visions of habeas it reflects. 
A. Context One: Exhaustion of State Remedies 
1. The nub of the context 
As Reconstruction ardor waned, Congress invited the Su- 
preme Court to  judicially constrict the broad habeas jurisdic- 
tion of the 1867 Act.'" The Court responded in Ex parte 
R0ya11'~~ in 1886 by creating the "exhaustion of state reme- 
143. I have chosen these ten contexts because they encompass the key issues 
that are peculiar to habeas law and thus permit discussion of all the significant 
Supreme Court habeas cases. One might argue about the omission of the issue 
whether a claim of innocence, pure and simple, is cognizable in habeas. See 
Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 869-70 (1993) (wrestling with this issue with a 
majority of the Court concluding that such a claim is cognizable, at least in a 
death penalty case). This issue, however, concerns whether a right of innocence 
should be recognized as a right under constitutional criminal procedure law. This 
issue is not peculiar to the habeas context even though it seems more likely to 
arise on habeas than on direct review. I t  is not dficult to imagine such an issue 
arising on direct review, however. Imagine that the petitioner has been convicted 
and then shortly thereafter finds what the petitioner believes to be convincing 
evidence of innocence. The petitioner then files a motion for a new trial based on 
this newly discovered evidence, which is denied. The petitioner then appeals both 
the conviction and the denial of the new trial motion. The petitioner loses through 
the state appellate system. The petitioner could then seek certiorari in the United 
States Supreme Court and one of the claims would be that the petitioner's consti- 
tutional right not to be incarcerated when provable innocence was denied by the 
state court's failure to grant the new trial motion. For a discussion of whether the 
Court should recognize a constitutional right to innocence, see Steiker, supra note 
5, at 305 11.12. 
144. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
145. 117 U.S. 241 (1886). 
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dies" requirement. The Court reasoned that as a matter of 
comity between separate sovereigns, the state should have the 
first opportunity t o  remedy claims of error arising from a state 
criminal pr~ceeding."~ In 1948 Congress codified the exhaus- 
tion requirement.14' The Court proceeded, without a great 
deal of controversy, to work out the basic principles governing 
exhaustion.'" There is only one exhaustion-related issue that 
has proven to  be doctrinally controversial: whether a petitioner 
can proceed in habeas with a "mixed" petition, that is, one that 
contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Our discus- 
sion will focus on that issue. 
2. How each vision could respond to the nub of this context 
a. The de novo litigation vision. The de novo litigation 
vision is essentially inconsistent with the exhaustion require- 
ment: if it is important for a violated right t o  be vindicated, 
and vindicated sooner rather than later, and if the federal 
courts are superior at vindicating those rights, then it makes 
no sense to  force petitioners to attempt to vindicate those 
rights in the "inferior" state courts.'4g If de novo litigation vi- 
146. Id. at 253. 
147. 28 U.S.C. 8 2254(b), (c) (1988). This section provides: 
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in 
custody pursuant to  the judgment of a State court shall not be granted 
unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available 
in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available 
State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such 
process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner. 
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies 
available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if 
he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available 
procedure, the question presented. 
Id. 
148. See LIEBMAN, supm note 128, a t  45-52 (setting forth the fundamental 
rules of exhaustion of remedies, some of the more important of which are that 
"[elxhaustion does not require a petition for a writ of certiorari to the . . . Su- 
preme Court;" that "raising a claim on direct appeal--or in one complete round of 
state postconviction proceedings-exhausts it, even if other state remedies remain 
available;" that "[rlaising a claim on direct appeal exhausts it even if the claim 
was not presented a t  trial;" that "[a]ctually presenting the claim on direct appeal 
exhausts i t  whether or not the state courts explicitly ruled on it;" and that a peti- 
tioner is not required "to pursue state remedies that are inadequate or futile"). 
149. See Yackle, Misaduentures, supra note 15, at  363 ("[Tlhe states have es- 
tablished and now employ postconviction remedies that all too oRen frustrate the 
adjudication of federal claims. Accordingly, I contend that petitioners should be 
relieved of any responsibility to pursue those remedies before seeking federal habe- 
as relief."). 
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sionaries started with a clean slate, they would likely create a 
system in which a defendant who raised a constitutional claim 
would be removed to federal district court litigation, or, less 
radically, would permit a convicted petitioner with a constitu- 
tional claim to  appeal directly to  federal court, bypassing state 
appellate  procedure^.'^^ But de novo litigation visionaries are 
not writing on a clean slate: the statute clearly requires ex- 
haustion.lsl The statute does not, however, speak explicitly to 
mixed petitions: as to those, de novo litigation visionaries 
should argue vigorously for permitting federal habeas litigation 
as to the unexhausted claims as well as the exhausted ones, 
because the petitioner has paid the required obeisance t o  state 
procedures by submitting at least some of the claims to  state 
corrective processes. To force a petitioner to rerun the state 
gauntlet as to  unexhausted claims unjustifiably risks the con- 
tinued incarceration of a person whose constitutional rights 
have been violated. 
b. The appellate review vision. Appellate review vision- 
aries are quite happy with the exhaustion requirement because 
it makes a habeas petitioner follow normal appellate channels 
by raising the issue in the 'lower" courts-state courts-before 
raising the issue in the "higher" court-that is, the federal 
habeas court. Thus, as to a mixed petition, an appellate review 
visionary should staunchly advocate that the federal court not 
hear any unexhausted claim 
c. The rights-selectivist vision. A rights-selectivist is 
likely to  be neutral as to  the exhaustion requirement in gener- 
al. As to mixed petitions, though, a rights-selectivist should be 
more inclined to permit litigation of the unexhausted claim if 
the claim involves a right favored by the rights-selectivist. The 
possibility of a petitioner with a valid claim of a violation of a 
favored right languishing in prison, particularly on death row, 
while undergoing another round of state litigation, is not a 
comfortable one for a rights-selecti~ist.~~' 
150. See Yackle, Explaining, supra note 15, at 1028-40 (considering but ulti- 
mately rejecting removal as a desirable option). 
151. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (for applicable text, see supra note 147). 
152. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 545 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(arguing for flexible application of the exhaustion requirement and contending that 
if the already exhausted claims state good grounds for relief, then "postponing 
relief until another round of review in the state and federal judicial systems has 
been completed is truly outrageous"). 
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d .  T h e  i n n o c e n c e - s e l e c t i v i s t  v i s i o n .  T h e  
innocence-selectivist is likewise likely to be neutral with re- 
spect t o  the exhaustion requirement in general. As to  a mixed 
petition, the innocence-selectivist vision would suggest that the 
federal court should hear an unexhausted constitutional claim 
only if the petitioner also has a colorable claim of factual inno- 
cence. 
e. The one-fair-chance vision. A one-fair-chance visionary 
should applaud the exhaustion requirement since it forces peti- 
tioners to seek to have their claims vindicated in the forum 
favored by one-fair-chance visionaries: the state courts. As to 
mixed petitions, one-fair-chance visionaries should have no 
hesitancy in sending the petitioner back t o  state court to ex- 
haust the unexhausted claims. 
f. The inverse correlation vision. Inverse correlationists 
believe in the exhaustion requirement to  the extent that they 
believe the state courts are generally enforcing federal constitu- 
tional rights. Thus, at least during the past couple of decades, 
an inverse correlationist who is convinced of the good faith of 
state courts should be in favor of forcing a petitioner with an 
unexhausted claim to exhaust that claim in the state system. 
g. The equitable remedy vision. To the extent possible, 
an equitable remedy visionary would want to interpret the 
exhaustion statute in a flexible manner allowing consideration 
of the equities of the particular case. Since the statute could 
plausibly be interpreted to permit the litigation of a mixed peti- 
tion, an equitable remedy visionary would argue for that inter- 
pretation and then look at the equities of each mixed petition 
to  see whether it would be just to require the petitioner to 
resort to state court to exhaust the unexhausted claims. If, for 
example, the unexhausted claim is also a patently valid one 
(that is, if the petitioner exhausted it in state court and lost, 
but on proceeding to federal court will inevitably win), then it 
would be unjust t o  require the petitioner to  exhaust the 
claim. 153 
h. The death-is-different vision. We should start here by 
noting that while non-death sentenced petitioners, whose mo- 
tive is to end the litigation as soon as possible by getting out of 
prison, are likely to view as highly undesirable a second round 
153. This may well have been the situation in Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 
1, 3-5 (1981) where the Court in a per curium opinion required a petitioner in 
such a position to exhaust the claim in state court. 
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of state litigation over an unexhausted claim, death penalty 
petitioners will not view a second round of state litigation as 
necessarily bad. Certainly there are some death penalty peti- 
tioners who have real hope of getting their sentences over- 
turned in federal court, and who will view with dismay a see- 
ond round of state litigation with the death sentence hanging 
over their heads. Just as clearly, petitioners who do not have 
much hope of getting their sentences overturned, and who are 
simply trying to prolong their lives through litigation, may be 
more than happy to  undertake another round of litigation in 
state court. But focusing on the group that desires to have their 
claims expeditiously litigated in  federal court, a 
death-is-different visionary should contend that the federal 
court has broad power to hear unexhausted claims of death 
penalty petitioners. 
3. The case law analyzed 
The Court addressed the nub of this context in the 1982 
case of Rose v. Lundy,'" holding six-to-three1" that the 
policy against piecemeal litigation requires that a petitioner 
with a mixed petition either dismiss the petition and return to 
state court to  exhaust the unexhausted claim, or proceed only 
with the exhausted claims in federal court?' This result is 
consistent with the appellate review, one-fair-chance, and in- 
verse correlation visions. It is inconsistent with the de novo 
litigation vision, the rights-selectivist vision (since the opinion 
gives no indication that the resolution depends upon the nature 
of the unexhausted claim), the innocence-selectivist vision (the 
opinion also contains no indication that the case should be 
handled differently if the petitioner has a colorable claim of 
innocence), and the equitable remedy vision (since the require- 
ment of exhaustion of the unexhausted claim is an inflexible 
one). Since the petitioner in that case had not been sentenced 
t o  death, the case does not directly indicate whether it is con- 
sistent with the death-is-different vision, but there is no indica- 
tion in the opinion that resolution of the issue depends upon 
whether the petitioner has been sentenced to death. 
154. 455 US. 509 (1982). 
155. In the majority were Justices Burger, Brennan, Marshall, 07Connor, 
Powell, and Rehnquist. Justices Blackmun and White concurred in the judgment, 
Justice Stevens dissented. 
156. Ludy, 455 U.S. at 520-21. 
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A real oddity of Lundy is that two of the six adherents t o  
the majority opinion were Justices Brennan and Marshall, who 
were de novo litigation ~isionaries.'~' Given the inconsistency 
of this result with the de novo litigation vision, it is difficult t o  
understand why these Justices voted in favor of the total ex- 
haustion requirement. One would instead have expected them 
to join the opinion of Justices Blackmun and White, which 
would permit piecemeal litigation unless it rose to the level of 
abuse of the writ.158 
The dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens in Lundy bears 
comment because it constitutes his most full-blown exposition 
of the rights-selectivist portion of his combination 
rights-selectivist/equitable remedy vision. The essence of his 
position bears quotation: 
In my opinion claims of constitutional error are not fun- 
gible. There are a t  least four types. The one most frequently 
encountered is a claim that attaches a constitutional label to 
a set of facts that does not disclose a violation of any constitu- 
tional right. . . . The second class includes constitutional vio- 
lations that are not of sufficient import in a particular case to 
justify reversal even on direct appeal, when the evidence is 
still fresh and a fair retrial could be promptly conducted. A 
third category includes errors that are important enough to 
require reversal on direct appeal but do not reveal the kind of 
fundamental unfairness to the accused that will support a 
collateral attack on a final judgment. The fourth category 
includes those errors that are so fundamental that they infect 
the validity of the underlying judgment itself, or the integrity 
of the process by which that judgment was obtained. This 
category cannot be defined precisely; concepts of "fimdamental 
fairnessn are not frozen in time. . . . Errors of this kind justify 
collateral relief no matter how long a judgment may have 
been final and even though they may not have been preserved 
properly in the original trial. 
. . . .  
. . . The doctrine of nonretroactivity, the emerging "cause 
and prejudice" doctrine, and today's "total exhaustion" rule 
are examples of judicial lawmaking that might well have been 
avoided by confining the availability of habeas corpus relief to 
cases that truly involve fundamental ~n fa i rnes s . ' ~~  
157. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
158. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 528-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
159. Id. at 543-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations and footnotes omitted). 
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Stevens then states the rights-selectivist position in a nutshell: 
"The availability of habeas corpus relief should depend primari- 
ly on the character of the alleged constitutional violation and 
not on the procedural history underlying the claim."160 
B. Context Two: What Constitutional Claims 
Are Cognizable In Habeas 
1.  The nu6 of the context 
The nub of this context is whether all constitutional claims 
are cognizable in habeas. The governing statutes provide that a 
person who is "in custody in violation of the Constitution . . . of 
the United States"161 is entitled to the writ. They give no in- 
dication that anything less than all constitutional violations are 
cognizable in habeas. Yet this issue has provoked several sig- 
nificant Supreme Court opinions over the past two decades. 
2. How each vision could respond to the nub of this context 
a. The de novo litigation vision. This vision, of course, 
with its belief in expansive, nonbalanceable, and equal consti- 
tutional rights, believes that the governing statute should be 
taken at face value and that all claims of constitutional viola- 
tion should be cognizable in habeas. 
b. The appellate review vision. Appellate review vision- 
aries are aligned with de novo litigation visionaries in this 
context because the appellate reviewers' cardinal principle of 
parity demands it: on direct review, all constitutional claims 
are cognizable, so similarly all claims should be cognizable in 
habeas. 
c. The rights-selectiuist vision. The rights-selectivist 
visionary would argue that only the favored rights should be 
cognizable in habeas. This is the heart of the rights-selectivist 
position. Non-favored rights should not be cognizable in habeas 
because they simply clutter the habeas docket and distract 
courts from vindicating favored constitutional rights. 
d. The innocence-selectivist vision. The essence of the 
innocence-selectivist position is that the only constitutional 
claims that should be cognizable are those that are supple- 
mented with the colorable claim of factual innocence. Put suc- 
160. Id. at 547-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
161. 28 U.S.C. 54 2241(cX3), 2254(a) (1988). 
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cinctly, innocence-selectivists would contend that a petitioner 
who is clearly guilty of the crime is simply not held "in viola- 
tion of the Constitution . . . of the United States."lg2 
e. The one-fair-chance vision. In substance, the one-fair- 
chance vision provides that the only constitutional claims that 
should be cognizable are those which the petitioner did not 
have a full and fair opportunity to  litigate in state court. In 
terms of the statutory language, a one-fair-chance visionary 
must argue that a state court decision against the petitioner's 
constitutional claim means that the petitioner is not being held 
"in violation of the Constitution . . . of the United  state^."'^^ 
f .  The inverse correlation vision. An inverse 
correlationist has no plausible means of interpreting the stat- 
ute more narrowly than t o  encompass all constitutional claims. 
An inverse correlationist would likely implement the vision by 
indulging in strong presumptions that the way the case was 
handled in state court was constitutionally acceptable. 
g. The equitable remedy vision. The equitable remedy 
visionary would likewise have no basis for excluding any con- 
stitutional claim fkom the ambit of habeas. The equitable reme- 
dy visionary would implement the vision by looking at all fac- 
tors bearing on the justice of the incarceration. Under this 
vision, a petitioner might be able to  establish a constitutional 
violation, yet still not be able to show that the incarceration is 
so unjust as to be "in violation of the Constitution . . . of the 
United  state^."'^^ 
h. The death-is-different vision. The death-is-different 
visionary has an a fortiori argument: the statute makes all 
constitutional claims cognizable in habeas, and policy dictates 
that this be even more true with respect to  constitutional 
claims raised by death penalty petitioners. 
3. The case law analyzed 
a. Stone v. Powell.lBS Stone was the first major conser- 
vative counterattack against the Warren Court's habeas juris- 
prudence. Stone was a radical departure from anything that 
had come before, and the majority opinion has, if anything, 
become even more remarkable over time. The issue in Stone 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
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was whether a petitioner who had litigated and lost a Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure claim in state court could bring 
that claim in federal habeas. By a vote of six-to-three,'" the 
Court held that the Fourth Amendment claim as to which a 
petitioner had a full and fair opportunity for litigation in state 
court is not cognizable in habeas?' The underpiming of the 
decision was that, while the defendant has a "personal consti- 
tutional right" not to be subjected to an illegal search or sei- 
zure, the right to have that evidence excluded at trial is not a 
"personal constitutional right."lB8 Since the right is not a per- 
sonal constitutional .one, it may be counterbalanced by opposing 
interests?" The Court identified extensive costs from enforc- 
ing the exclusionary rule in habeas, including diverting atten- 
tion from the issue of guilt or innocence; the exclusion of reli- 
able evidence of guilt which leads to  freeing of the guilty; the 
disproportionality between the harm and the remedy; the en- 
couragement of scorn of the criminal justice system; and per- 
haps most importantly, the fact that the Court found very lit- 
tle, if any, additional deterrence to  police misconduct from 
enforcing the right years after the fact via federal habeas.'?' 
The fascinating aspect of Stone for purposes of this Article 
is the melange of different visions employed in the majority 
opinion. The opinion adopted the one-fair-chance history es- 
poused by Professor Bator,"' and the holding that a Fourth 
Amendment claim can only be litigated in federal habeas if the 
petitioner did not have a full and fair opportunity to  litigate it 
in state court is pure Bator as well. The holding that a Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule claim does not constitute a "per- 
sonal constitutional right" seems consistent with a fundamental 
rights-selectivist vision, while the assertion that suppression of 
evidence often frustrates the truth-seeking function smacks of 
the accuracy of the guilt/imocence rights-selectivist variant. 
The Court also adverted to the equitable nature of the writ, 
thereby invoking the equitable remedy vision.'" The majority 
further suggested that the primary function of habeas should 
166. In the majority were Justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, 
Stevens, and Stewart. Justices B r e ~ a n ,  Marshall, and White dissented. 
167. Stone, 428 U.S. at 481-82. 
168. Id. at 486. 
169. See id. at 488. 
170. Id. at 489-94. 
171. Id. at 475-77. 
172. Id. at 478 a l l .  
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be to "assure that no innocent person suffers an unconstitution- 
al loss of liberty," thereby invoking the innocence-selectivist 
vision. '" Finally, the opinion also stated: 
[Wle are unwilling to assume that there now exists a general 
lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the 
trial and appellate courts of the several States. . . . Moreover, 
the argument that federal judges are more expert in applying 
federal constitutional law is especially unpersuasive in the 
context of search-and-seizure claims, since they are dealt with 
on a daily basis by trial level judges in both systems.'" 
This assertion seems to  come directly from the inverse correla- 
tion vision. Thus, the opinion can be seen as precedent for five 
of the visions (or six, if one counts both of the rights-selectivist 
variants). On the other hand, the opinion clearly rejects the de 
novo litigation vision. It also rejects the appellate review vision 
because Fourth Amendment claims that have been litigated in 
state court are often reviewed by the Supreme Court on direct 
review. Thus, Stone destroys direct appealhabeas parity as to 
Fourth Amendment claims. The opinion does not speak directly 
to the death-is-different vision since, although both petitioners 
involved in the consolidated cases had been convicted of mur- 
der, there is no indication in the opinion that either had been 
sentenced t o  death. Still, there is nothing in the opinion t o  
indicate that the Court believed that death was different for 
habeas purposes. 
Because Stone embraced aspects of at least five different 
visions that were more restrictive than the de novo litigation 
vision dear to the heart of the Warren Court, there were any 
number of nightmare scenarios that de novo litigation visionar- 
ies might imagine subsequent to  Stone. Probably the most 
likely fear was that the conservative majority would be willing 
to  pursue an accuracy of the guilt/innocence rights-selectivist 
course that would result in the exclusion from the scope of 
habeas many constitutional rights not directly related to  guilt 
or innocence. Justice Breman articulated this concern in dis- 
sent: 
I am therefore justified in apprehending that the groundwork 
is being laid today for a drastic withdrawal of federal habeas 
173. Id. at 491 n.31. 
174. Id. at 494 11.35. 
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jurisdiction, if not for all grounds of alleged unconstitutional 
detention, then at least for claims-for example, of double 
jeopardy, entrapment, self-incrimination, Miranda violations, 
and use of invalid identification procedures-that this Court 
later decides are not "guilt related."175 
But, surprisingly, Justice Brennan's prediction has not been 
borne out. 
Despite a conservative majority ever since Stone was hand- 
ed down, one will see in reviewing the four Supreme Court 
decisions subsequent to Stone that it has never been expanded 
to exclude any other claim of constitutional violation from the 
scope of habeas. Stone remains a burr under the saddle of de 
novo litigators, however, both because it has never been over- 
ruled as to Fourth Amendment claims, and because the conser- 
vative majority has proceeded to  use other visions articulated 
in Stone, particularly the innocence-selectivist and 
one-fair-chance strands. 
b. Jackson v. Virginia.'" The fvst of two prosecution 
efforts in 1979 to expand Stone involved a petitioner who 
sought to argue on habeas that there was insufficient evidence 
presented at trial to warrant a verdict of guilty beyond a rea- 
sonable doubt. State authorities argued that because the peti- 
tioner already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 
sufficiency of evidence claim in state court, he should not be 
permitted to raise the same claim on habeas. The Court voted 
five-t~-three''~ not to extend Stone, for two primary reasons. 
First, the full and fair opportunity argument was contrary to 
Congressional intent.'" Thus, the majority seemingly reject- 
ed the one-fair-chance vision, but as we will see, this rejection 
had no staying power. Second, unlike the Fourth Amendment 
claim in Stone, the issue of the sufficiency of evidence was 
central to the petitioner's guilt or inn~cence."~ The holding 
that Stone was distinguishable because the issue in Jackson 
was central to guilt or innocence could be taken as an endorse- 
ment of the guilt-related rights-selectivist position, but since 
175. Id. at 517-18 (Bre~an,  J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
176. 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 
177. In the majority were Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, and 
White. Justices Burger, Rehnquist, and Stevens concurred in the judgment. Justice 
Powell did not take part in the case. 
178. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 323. 
179. Id. 
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three of the five members of this majority had dissented in 
Stone,lS0 this should more likely be viewed as simply an at- 
tempt to distinguish Stone even on its own terms, rather than 
to  embrace the rights-selectivist guilt related vision. 
c. Rose v. Mitchell.'" The second prosecutorial effort 
in 1979 to expand Stone involved whether a petitioner could 
raise in habeas the argument that the grand jury that had 
indicted him was selected in a racially discriminatory manner. 
Again, a five-person rnaj~rity''~ voted not to extend Stone. In 
doing so, however, the majority did not so much criticize 
Stone's rationale as distinguish it. The majority held that it 
doubted whether the petitioner could expect a full and fair 
hearing from the very state judiciary that was responsible for 
the claimed violation in the first place.'" This argument 
seems to reflect the one-fair-chance vision. The majority also 
held that the right at issue was not just a judicially created 
remedy, and was substantially more compelling than the one in 
Stone.lS4 Both of these smack of the rights-selectivist position. 
d. Kimmelman v. Morris~n. '~~ The next attempted ex- 
tension of Stone came in this 1986 case. There, the petitioner 
alleged that his counsel had been constitutionally ineffective 
under the Sixth Amendment for failing to  properly raise a 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary claim. State authorities ar- 
gued that since the Fourth Amendment claim itself could not 
support habeas litigation, and the petitioner had opportunity to 
raise the claim in state court, the petitioner's claim of ineffec- 
tive assistance of counsel could not support habeas jurisdiction 
either. AU nine members of the Court rejected this argument in 
an opinion that could be read to embrace three different visions 
of habeas. First, the Court said the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel is fundamental, in contradistinction to  the exclusionary 
rule in Stone,'" a position that seems fundamentally 
rights-selectivist in nature. Second, the Court noted that con- 
stitutional rights are accorded to  the innocent and guilty alike, 
180. Justices B r e ~ a n ,  Marshall, and White. 
181. 443 U.S. 545 (1979). 
182. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and White were in the 
majority. Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stewart concurred in the judgment. Jus- 
tices Stevens and White dissented in part. 
183. Rose, 443 U.S. at 561, 563. 
184. Id. at 563-64. 
185. 477 U.S. 365 (1986). 
186. Id. at 376-77. 
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which seems a rebuff of the innocence-selectivist position. Fi- 
nally, the Court noted that the Sixth Amendment claim could 
prevail on direct appeal and thus should be cognizable in habe- 
as, a position supportive of the appellate review vision.lg7 
Three conservative Justices concurring in the judgment 
alluded to  yet another vision of habeas, arguing that Stone 
should not be extended because the Sixth Amendment guaran- 
tees a fair opportunity to contest the charges, which does not 
exist when counsel is ineffective.lS8 This, of course, derives 
from the one-fair-chance vision 
e. Withrow v. William~.'~~ In this most recent effort to 
expand Stone, prosecuting authorities argued that a claim of 
defective Miranda warnings fell squarely within the Stone 
principle. This argument seemed to have the best chance of 
winning an extension of Stone of any of the cases thus far dis- 
cussed. Like the exclusionary rule, the Miranda warnings are 
prophylactic in nature and can easily be characterized as not 
personal constitutional rights. The state authorities' claim 
came close to prevailing, losing five-to-four.lgO The majority 
gave four reasons for rejecting the expansion of Stone, three of 
which can be connected with different visions of habeas. First, 
the Court noted that even though Miranda created a prophy- 
lactic rule, that rule still protects a defendant's Fifth Amend- 
ment privilege against self incrimination which is a "fundamen- 
tal trial right," whereas the right protected by the prophylactic 
exclusionary rule-the right not to be subjected to  an unconsti- 
tutional search or seizure-does not protect any fundamental 
trial right.lgl This argument seems fundamentally 
rights-selectivist in nature. Second, the Court said that unlike 
illegally seized evidence, the exclusion of which invariably 
makes more difficult the correct ascertainment of guilt, the 
Miranda warnings serve to  guard against the use, at trial, of 
unreliable statements obtained during in-custody interrogation, 
which might hinder the comect ascertainment of g ~ d t . ' ~ ~  This 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 393 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment; Burger & Rehnquist, 
JJ., joining). 
189. 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993). 
190. In the majority were Justices Blackmun, K e ~ e d y ,  Souter, Stevens, and 
White. Justices Rehnquist, 07Connor, Scalia, and Thomas concurred in part and 
dissented in part. 
191. Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1753. 
192. Id. 
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argument seems to be of the guilt/innocence determination 
rights-selectivist in nature. The third and primary reason given 
by the majority for not extending Stone t o  Miranda warnings 
was that such an extension would not decrease the habeas 
workloads of the federal courts, since almost all Miranda 
claims would simply be recast as FiRh Amendment involuntary 
confession claims.lg3 This argument is puzzling in terms of 
visions because it adverts to the practical effects of habeas lit- 
igation in the abstract, seemingly without connection to  any 
vision whatsoever. While the court considered this the most 
important of the criteria examined in deciding this case, it 
appears unlikely that the court really intended to elevate the 
examination of costs of habeas to federal court dockets to the 
status of a separate vision. 
The opinion of Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice 
Rehnquist, concurring in part and dissenting in part, is intrigu- 
ing because it encompasses a smorgasbord of visions compara- 
ble to that of the majority opinion in Stone. The opinion begins 
with the assertion that habeas is "significantly different" from, 
and narrower than, direct appeal, a rejection of the appellate 
review vision.lg4 Justice O'Connor then notes that habeas is 
governed by equitable principles, an invocation of the equitable 
remedy vision.lg5 The opinion argues that, as was the case in 
Stone, Miranda warnings impede the accuracy of the 
guilt/innocence determination,lg6 an invocation of the 
guilt-related rights-selectivist vision. Justice O'Connor contin- 
ues by asserting that since the police and the state courts have 
grown accustomed to  Miranda, and usually comply with it, "it 
is precisely because the rule is well accepted that there is little 
further benefit to enforcing it on habeas."1g7 This statement is 
the most explicit one to be found anywhere in habeas jurispru- 
dence of the inverse correlation vision. Justice O'Connor con- 
cludes by arguing that Miranda warnings do not implicate a 
"fundamental trial right," thereby invoking the fundamental 
rights-selectivist vision. '" 
193. Id. at 1754. 
194. Id. at 1757 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 1758-59. 
197. Id. at 1765. 
198. Id. at 1761. 
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Justice Scalia's opinion, joined by Justice Thomas, concur- 
ring in part and dissenting in part, is instructive because it 
clearly sets forth the visions upon which these two arch-conser- 
vatives rely. Justice Scalia begins by noting that habeas corpus 
is an extraordinary writ governed by equitable  principle^,'^^ 
thereby seemingly invoking the equitable remedy vision. Yet as 
Justice Scalia's voting in other cases indicates, his use of the 
term "equitable" refers to generic equity, which I have argued 
is not equitable at all, but rather an indirect means of pro- 
pounding the one-fair-chance vision.2w Indeed, Justice Scalia 
directly says that, in almost all cases, the most powerful equi- 
table consideration is whether petitioner has had a full and fair 
opportunity to  litigate the claim in state courts. "Prior opportu- 
nity to litigate an issue should be an important equitable con- 
sideration in any habeas case, and should ordinarily preclude 
the court from reaching the merits of a claim, unless it goes to 
the fairness of the trial process or t o  the accuracy of the ulti- 
mate result."201 The exception suggested by Justice Scalia as 
to errors that go to  the "fairness of the trial process" is unclear 
in its provenance while the second exception for claims relating 
"to the accuracy of the ultimate result" refers to petitioners 
with colorable claims of factual innocence, and thus reflects the 
innocence-selectivist vision. Justice Scalia leaves no doubt, 
however, that he views these exceptions as narrow ones. Thus, 
he and Justice Thomas can fairly be characterized as strong 
proponents of the one-fair-chance vision. 
4. Summary 
No context in habeas law more N l y  illustrates the profu- 
sion of visions that vie for supremacy in habeas doctrine: lan- 
guage in various majority opinions supports the appellate re- 
view, fundamental rights-selectivist, accuracy of the 
guiltlinnocence determination r ights-selectivist ,  
innocence-selectivist and one-fair-chance visions. One is tempt- 
ed to say that this jurisprudence manifests confusion as well, 
since the language appears not in any easily ascertainable 
progression. Still, the bottom line can be stated with clarity: all 
constitutional claims are within the scope of habeas, except for 
199. Id. at 1767 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
200. See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text. 
201. Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1768. 
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Fourth Amendment claims as to which the petitioner has had a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate in state courL202 
C. Context Three: Pure Law Claim Based on 
Then-Existing Law 
1. The nub of the context 
In this context the petitioner's claim is that the state court 
applied the wrong rule of decision t o  the petitioner's claim 
under the law that existed at the time the issue was decided. 
Claims of this sort are relatively infrequent, since state judges 
usually manage to correctly perform the relatively easy task of 
determining the correct constitutional rule to apply to an issue. 
2. How each vision could respond to the nub of this context 
a. The de novo litigation vision. Obviously, visionaries of 
this stripe believe in de novo review of all issues, including 
pure issues of then-existing law. 
b. The appellate review vision. Equally obvious, appel- 
late review visionaries believe in de novo review of pure issues 
of a then-existing law because that is the standard used on 
direct review and the parity principle requires no less in habe- 
as. 
c. The rights-selectivist vision. As to the favored rights 
that are cognizable in habeas, rights-selectivists would also be 
in favor of de novo review of pure issues of an existing law 
since those rights are particularly worthy of vindication. 
d. The innocence-selectivist vision. Similarly, as to the 
relatively few cases that make the cut because the petitioner is 
able t o  allege a colorable claim of factual innocence in addition 
to the claim of constitutional violation, innocence-selectivists 
would argue for de novo review of the pure issues of then-exist- 
ing law, because those issues are particularly worthy of vindi- 
cation when the petitioner may be innocent. 
e. The one-fair-chance vision. One of the key characteris- 
tics of the one-fair-chance vision that distinguishes it from the 
202. I have chosen not to include a discussion of the Court's latest decision 
concerning the cognizability of claims in habeas, Reed v. Farley, because it involved 
a statutory claim (breach of the speedy trial provision of the Interstate Agreement 
on Detainers), not a constitutional one. Reed v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 2291 (1994). The 
Court, while ruling that the claim was not cognizable, eschewed reliance on Stone, 
and argued that analysis of statutory violations was quite different. Id. at 2296-97. 
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four visions thus far discussed, is that its proponents do not 
believe in de nouo review of pure issues of then-existing law if 
the petitioner had a full and fair chance to litigate the issue in 
state court. Adherents of this vision would tolerate the possibil- 
ity that a state court could use the wrong constitutional rule 
under then existing law, and still have its judgment insulated 
from federal habeas review as long as the defendant was af- 
forded a fair procedural opportunity to litigate the issue. A 
one-fair-chance visionary would likely contend that the possibil- 
ity of this happening is remote since trial courts are usually 
smart enough to  figure out the correct rule to use, and if they 
aren't, state appellate courts are almost certain to correct their 
decisions. 
f. The inverse correlation vision. This vision reposes a lot 
of trust in state courts-at least at this point in history-but 
does allow for correction of the occasional case in which the 
state commits a serious blunder. Certainly the application of 
the wrong constitutional rule under then existing law would 
fall into the category of blunders that an inverse correlationist 
would wish to remedy via habeas. 
g. The equitable remedy vision. The equitable remedy 
visionary would certainly opt for de novo review of pure law 
claims of error based on then existing law, although such a 
visionary might ultimately conclude that other factors in the 
case would render it unjust to award relief. 
h. The death-is-diferent vision. Certainly as to claims 
raised by death penalty petitioners, visionaries of this stripe 
believe in de novo review of pure law claims based on then 
existing law. 
3. The case law analyzed 
The power and obligation of the habeas court to review de 
novo pure law claims based on then existing law has been an 
accepted part of habeas law at least since Brown v. Allen:203 
"State adjudication of questions of law cannot, under the habe- 
as corpus statute, be accepted as binding. It is precisely these 
questions that the federal judge is commanded to de~ide."~" 
This is consistent with every vision except the one-fair-chance 
203. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). 
204. Id. at 506; see also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 318 (1963) ("[Tlhe 
district judge . . . may not defer to [a state court's] findings of law."). 
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vision, and is particularly supportive of the de novo litigation 
and appellate review visions. Given the remarkable success of 
the one-fair-chance vision in other contexts, it is perhaps sur- 
prising that not even the most conservative of Justices, who 
tend to be predominantly adherents of the one fair chance 
vision, have yet had the temerity to suggest that pure law 
claims based on then existing law should be accorded anything 
less than de novo federal reviewe205 Nor did Professor Bator 
suggest as much?O6 even though his vision, carried to its logi- 
cal conclusion, would deny de novo review (indeed any review 
at all) to such issues if the petitioner had a full and fair oppor- 
tunity to litigate them in state court. 
D. Context Four: Pure Law Claims Based on New Rules 
1. The nub of the context 
A pure law claim based on a new rule asserts that while 
the state court ruled against the defendant's claim using the 
correct constitutional rule under the law that existed as of the 
time of the state court adjudication, the Supreme Court subse- 
quently established a new, more defendant-favorable rule 
which should be applied retroactively to the petitioner's claim, 
and that will result in a finding of a constitutional violation. 
Retroactive application of constitutional criminal procedure 
rules became a major issue for both direct review and habeas 
purposes when the Warren Court began identifying new rights 
with regularity.207 Subsequent conservative courts have not 
205. The closest they have come was Justice Thomas, Rehnquist and Scalia's 
recognition of the argument that "mixed questions" of law and fact should be ac- 
corded "deferential review" by the habeas court. Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 
2491 (1992). 
206. Bator, supra note 94. 
207. Prior to the Warren Court's constitutional criminal procedure revolution 
all decisions regarding the rights of criminal defendants were retroactive. Steiker, 
supm note 5, at 354 ("Prior to the mid-1960s, the Court simply did not inquire 
into retroactivity of decisions regarding the rights of criminal defendants; all such 
decisions were retroactive."); Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 15, at 2382. 
There was a time when the Supreme Court followed the common law 
practice and assumed that current understandings of the law would apply 
to any pending case, irrespective of the means by which the case came 
before the bar. Yet in the 19608, when the Court began interpreting the 
Constitution in innovative ways, there was pressure to apply its new pre- 
cedents only to fbture cases and thus to deny their retroactive effect on 
judgments already in place. 
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been nearly as active in creating new constitutional rules of 
criminal procedure favorable to criminal defendants, except 
with respect to the death penalty, where the expansion of 
defendants' rights picked up steam after the Warren Court 
era.2os Thus, while pure law claims based on new rules do not 
arise across the board as frequently as they did in the Warren 
Court era, such claims are not rarities, particularly in death 
penalty cases. The nub of this context, then, is whether habeas 
petitioners should be entitled to  the benefit of new constitution- 
al rules that went into effect after their convictions became 
final. 
2. How each vision could respond to the nub of this context 
a. The de novo litigation vision. A de novo litigation 
visionary, being a rights expansionist, should argue that all 
defendants who have been constitutionally wronged should be 
entitled to a remedy even if the wrong was not recognized until 
the petitioner's case was already finalized. But even some of 
the most liberal members of the Warren Court were not com- 
fortable with the idea of retroactively applying all of the cases 
expanding criminal procedure constitutional rights, given that 
such retroactive application would likely have freed a large 
percentage of the prison population.209 Still, de novo litigation 
Id. See a h  Friedman, supra note 10, at  804 (Friedman states that "[plrior to 
Brown v. Allen [344 US. 443 (1953)l the retroactivity problem was not acute. . . . 
[because] [clollateral attack was generally unavailable, so retroactivity presented a 
problem only on direct review. Moreover, due process as applied to the states had 
a relatively limited meaning and therefore, simply put, there were not many rights 
to which retroactivity could apply, at  least with regard to state prisoners."); 
Hoffmann, supra note 19, at 175-76 (arguing that before the mid-1960s "[flederal 
habeas, in short, was rarely available to state prisoners. And, of course, until the 
1960s and the rise of the incorporation doctrine, the Court simply did not have 
much constitutional law to apply to state criminal proceedings"). 
208. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
209. Justices Black and Douglas argued for virtually complete retroactivity. 
The other liberals, Justices Warren, B r e ~ a n ,  Fortas, Goldberg, and Marshall were 
willing to hold major constitutional rulings to be non-retroactive. For example, in 
DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 634-35 (1968), the Court held that the right to 
a jury trial in serious cases established in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 
(1968), and the right to a jury trial in serious criminal contempt cases as  estab- 
lished in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 208 (1968), were not to be applied ret- 
roactively. Justices Warren, Brennan, Fortas and Marshall joined the decision. Jus- 
tices Douglas and Black dissented. De Stefano v. Woods, 392 US. at 635 (Douglas, 
J., dissenting). In Stovall v. Denno, 388 US. 293, 297 (1967), the Court held the 
right to the exclusion of evidence of tainted identifications in the absence of coun- 
sel, established in Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), and United States v. 
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visionaries are likely to be as favorable or more favorable than 
any other visionaries to the liberal retroactive application of 
new constitutional rules. 
b. The appellate review vision. In this context appellate 
review visionaries radically part company from de novo litiga- 
tion visionaries. To an appellate review visionary the principle 
of parity dictates that if the defendant would not have been 
entitled to the benefit of the rule had the Supreme Court cho- 
sen to take the defendant's case on certiorari from the 
defendant's direct appeal, then the habeas petitioner should not 
be entitled to benefit from the new rule because that would 
make habeas review more favorable to the petitioner than 
direct reviewO2l0 
c. The rights-selectivist vision. As to favored rights, a 
rights-selectivist would be in favor of relatively liberal retro- 
active application of new constitutional rules. 
d .  T h e  i n n o c e n c e - s e l e c t i v i s t  v i s i o n .  T h e  
innocence-selectivist must argue that retroactivity should be 
judged on a case-by-case basis: a petitioner who can allege a 
colorable claim of innocence should get the benefit of a new 
constitutional rule, but retroactive effect shodd not have any 
precedential value to petitioners who cannot allege the color- 
able claim of innocence. 
e. The one-fair-chance vision. The one-fair-chance vision- 
ary should be adamantly opposed to retroactive application of 
new constitutional rules: if the petitioner had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the claim, and had the correct constitu- 
tional rule applied at the time, that is all to which the petition- 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), not to be retroactive. This decision was joined by Jus- 
tices Brennan and Warren, while Justice Douglas dissented. Gilbert v. California, 
388 U.S. at 302 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Black also dissented. Id. at 303 
(Black, J., dissenting). In Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 721 (1966), the 
Court held that the right to warnings established in the case of Miranda v. Arizo- 
na, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) was not to be applied retroactively. Justices Warren, 
B r e ~ a n  and Fortas joined this decision. Justices Black and Douglas dissented. 
Miranda, 384 US. a t  736 (Black, J., dissenting). In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 
618, 636-37 (1965), the Court held that the rule in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US. 643 
(1961) (stating that illegally seized evidence is required to be excluded at  trial), 
was not to be applied retroactively. Justices Warren, Brennan and Goldberg joined 
this decision. Again, Justices Black and Douglas dissented. Walker, 381 U.S. a t  640 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
210. Liebman, supra note 5, a t  2095-96 ("Teugue's nometroactivity doctrine re- 
stores parity [between direct appeal and habeas] by ensuring that the sum total of 
the law that the prisoner can draw upon in seeking release on habeas corpus is 
the same as would have been available on direct appeal in the Supreme Court."). 
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er was entitled. There is no such thing as absolute truth, and 
thus no reason to believe that the Supreme Court was any 
wiser when it promulgated the new rule than it was when it 
promulgated the old one. 
f. The inverse correlation vision. Inverse correlationists 
should also vigorously oppose the retroactive application of new 
rules for the benefit of habeas petitioners. The key question for 
inverse correlationists is whether the state courts are fai tWly 
upholding federal constitutional rights, and this is certainly the 
case if the state court has correctly applied the federal constitu- 
tional rule as it existed at the time the state court rendered a 
decision. 
g. The equitable remedy vision. An equitable remedy 
visionary would examine several factors in determining wheth- 
er a new rule should be retroactively applied including: the 
importance of the right created by the new rule, the damage of 
the violation to the petitioner in that particular case, and the 
damage to the state interests by applying the new rule retroac- 
tively. 
h. The death-is-different vision. Death-is-different vision- 
aries would argue for wide-ranging retroactive application of 
new rules t o  the benefit of death penalty petitioners because it 
would be wrong to execute a defendant who was the victim of 
constitutional violation, even if that violation becomes manifest 
after the defendant's conviction has already become final.211 
3. The case law analyzed 
The Warren Court opted for a solution to the retroactivity 
problem that was applicable equally to direct review and habe- 
as. In Linkletter v. Walker,212 the Court stated that the retro- 
active application of a new constitutional rule must depend 
upon "weigh[ing] the merits and demerits in each case"213 
based upon the prior history and purpose of the new rule, the 
reliance placed by state authorities on previous doctrine, and 
the effect on the administration of justice of retroactively apply- 
211. Hughes, supra note 16, at 333 ("In a constitutional system, putting to 
death a person whose conviction or sentence rests upon a non-harmless constitu- 
tional error should be viewed with as much abhorrence as executing a person who 
is 'factually' innocent."). 
212. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
213. Id. at 629. 
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ing the new ruleO2l4 As t o  direct review, the Court banished 
the Linkletter test in 1982:15 and five years later substituted 
yet another rule, both times seeking more predictability and 
uniformity in retroactivity doctrineO2l6 But as of 1989, 
Linkletter still governed retroactivity in habeas. Linkletter's 
sway was ended that year, though, by Teague v. and 
a new body of retroactivity case law quickly developed.'18 
Through Teague and its progeny, the Court delivered a triple 
214. Id. at 636. 
215. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 562 (1982). The Court held that 
subject to three exceptions a decision of the Court is to be applied retroactively to 
all convictions that were not yet final a t  the time the decision was rendered. Id. 
The frrst two exceptions: (1) when a decision did nothing more than apply settled 
precedent to different factual situations, and (2) when the new ruling was that a 
trial court lacked authority to convict the defendant in the first place-were always 
to be applied retroactively. Id. at 549-50. The third exception, where the new rule 
was a "clear break" with past precedent, was not to be applied retroactively even 
on direct review if the new rule explicitly overruled a past precedent or disap- 
proved a practice the Court had arguably sanctioned in prior cases or overturned a 
long standing practice that lower courts had uniformly approved. Id. at 551. 
216. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (abolishing the "clear 
break" exception of Johnson and holding that a new constitutional rule should be 
applied retroactively to all cases not yet h a l  or pending on direct review a t  the 
time the decision was rendered). 
217. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
218. See. Caspari v. Bohlen, 114 S. Ct. 948, 954-57 (1994) (stating application 
of the Double Jeopardy Clause to a noncapital sentencing proceeding would extend 
the rule of Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981), and would constitute a 
new rule that could not be applied retroactively); Gilmore v. Taylor, 113 S. Ct. 
2112, 2118-19 (1993) (holding that as a new rule, rule of Falconer v. Lane, 905 
F.2d 1129 (1990), which requires an instruction that the jury cannot return a mur- 
der conviction if it finds the defendant possessed a mitigating mental state, cannot 
be applied retroactively); Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 898-903 (1993) (hold- 
ing petitioner's contention, which was that the three special issues the Texas cap- 
ital sentencing procedures require the jury to answer prevented the jury from ade- 
quately considering certain mitigating evidence, would, if accepted, require an- 
nouncement of a new rule that would not be entitled to retroactive application); 
Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 232-45 (1990) (holding that rule of Caldwell v. 
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), that i t  is unconstitutional to pronounce a death 
sentence based on a jury's false belief that the determination of the appropriate- 
ness of a capital sentence rests elsewhere, is entitled to retroactive effect); Butler 
v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 411-16 (1990) (stating that the holding of Arizona v. 
Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988), which was that the Fifth Amendment bars police- 
initiated interrogation following a suspect's request for counsel in the context of a 
separate investigation, was a new rule that would not be applied retroactively); 
Same v. Parks, 494 US. 484, 489-93 (1990) (contention that a jury is required to 
be permitted to base its decision in a death penalty case on sympathy would an- 
nounce a new rule that would not be retroactive); Perry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 
318-19 (1989) (holding that absence of an instruction informing the jury it could 
consider and give weight to defendant's mitigating evidence did not announce a 
new rule and thus did not call into question the doctrine of retroactivity). 
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whammy to  "new rule" claimants. First, the question whether a 
proposed new rule should be retroactively applied is a thresh- 
old one to  be considered before the merits of the claim and, if 
the decision would not be applied retroactively to all persons 
whose right to  direct appeal has expired, then the habeas court 
may not consider the merits of the Second, the only 
"new rule" decisions that can be given retroactive effect for the 
benefit of all persons whose right to direct appeal has expired 
are those that fall into one of two very narrow categories: (a) 
those that place primary conduct beyond the power of the law- 
making authority to proscribe, or (b) those "without which the 
likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously dimin- 
i ~ h e d . " ~ ~ ~  The rationale for permitting these two exceptions 
was the need to deter state courts from too narrowly construing 
federal rights."' And third, a rule is "new" if the result "was 
not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's 
conviction became final."222 
To see how Teague works in practice, we need to  start with 
the third precept frst: the very expansive definition of when a 
rule is "new." The typical situation raising the retroactivity 
issue is the situation in which there was no directly controlling 
Supreme Court precedent on the point at the time the state 
court made its constitutional ruling. Then, after the defendant's 
conviction became final, the Supreme Court announced a rule 
on that issue that is more defendant-favorable than the rule 
219. Teague, 489 U.S. at 300. 
220. Id. at 311-13 (plurality opinion). 
221. See id. at 305-06. 
222. Id. at 301. "In general, however, a case announces a new rule when it 
breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Gov- 
ernment." Id. The definition of a new rule was arguably made even more restric- 
tive in Butler v. McKeUar, 494 U.S. 407, 413 (1990) ("The 'new rule' principle 
therefore validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents 
made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later deci- 
sions."). Even some people who could hardly be classified as liberals with respect 
to habeas believe that the Court has defined "new rule" too restrictively. See, e.g., 
Joseph L. Hoffman, Retroactivity and the Great Writ: How Congress Should Re- 
spond to Teague v. Lane, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 183, 211. 
The suggestion in Teague, Penry, and especially Butler, is that the cur- 
rent Court expects extremely little of state courts. All that state courts 
need do, in order to avoid reversal on habeas, is to obey the most obvious 
federal constitutional precedents. Surely, however, the Court can and 
should expect more from state courts than simply the ability to read 
headnotes and follow clear, binding federal precedents. 
Id. 
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that was applied by the state court. The defendant then be- 
comes a habeas petitioner, urging that the trial court's error of 
law, viewed retrospectively, warrants habeas relief. Clearly 
such a petitioner prefers to try to characterize the argument as 
a pure law claim based on then-ezisting law.'= The petitioner 
will attempt to do this by claiming that the later announced 
Supreme Court rule should have been anticipated by the state 
court based on then-existing precedent. If the petitioner can 
succeed in this attempt, then the petitioner avoids the whole 
"new rule" quagmire, because the rule was not a "new" one a t  
all. Teague's expansive definition of "new rule" almost invari- 
ably defeats the petitioner's efforts to shoehorn the case into 
the then-existing law context, because only if there were a 
Supreme Court case virtually on point contrary to the state 
court's handling of the issue would the claim fit into the 
then-existing law c a t e g ~ r y . ~ ~  Once the case is forced into the 
new rule context, the other two holdings of Teague go to work. 
Not only will most such claims fail because they do not fall 
within the two narrow exceptions for when a rule can be ap- 
plied retroactively, but most such claims will not even be decid- 
ed on the merits since retroactive effect is a threshold issue. If 
the new rule would not be entitled to full retroactive effect, 
then the habeas court cannot even consider the merits of the 
proposed rule. 
The regime established by Teague and its progeny is con- 
sistent with the appellate review and one-fair-chance visions. 
The two exceptions for when a rule is entitled to retroactive 
effect even on collateral review are consistent with a 
rights-selectivist vision, albeit one with a narrow definition of 
what constitute the favored rights. Teague and its progeny are 
no t  at a l l  support ive of t h e  de  novo l i t igat ion,  
innocence-selectivist, or death-is-different visions. Surprisingly, 
Teague rebuffs the inverse correlation vision in its assumption 
that state judges need deterring. 
223. See supra part 1II.C. 
224. Teague, 489 US. at 333 ( B r e ~ a n ,  J., dissenting) ("Few decisions on ap- 
peal or collateral review are 'dictated' by what came before. Most such cases in- 
volve a question of law that is at least debatable, permitting a rational judge to 
resolve the case in more than one way."). 
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E. Context Five: Mixed Question Claims 
1. The nu6 of the context 
In the gray area between pure law claims and pure fact 
claims lies what are referred to either as "mixed questions of 
law and fact" or "law application" ~1airns.z~~ To understand 
this context we need to first examine the governing law with 
respect to pure fact questions, and then move on to mixed ques- 
tions. 
A key question in habeas law is what power the federal 
habeas court should have to determine issues of fact on which 
constitutional claims depend. Prior to  1963, the law on this 
point could be summed up in two precepts: (1) contested issues 
of fact that were raised but not decided in the state courts 
required that the federal court hold an evidentiary hearing;226 
and (2) as to contested issues of fact on which there were state 
court findings, the district court had discretion either to rely on 
the state court fact-finding or to conduct its own evidentiary 
hearing.227 The Warren Court found these two principles not 
to  be precise enough to guide district courts in the way the 
Court wanted those courts to  behave. The Court therefore 
handed down one of its 1963 trilogy of cases, Townsend v. 
Sain,2a specimg six circumstances in which a district court 
was obligated t o  hold an evidentiary hearing,2zg and reiterat- 
225. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985). For example, if the question is 
whether a defendant's confession was voluntary, the definition of "voluntary" is a 
matter of pure law, while the question whether the defendant's allegation that he 
or she was denied food and sleep for twenty-four hours is true is a pure question 
of fact. If the defendant's allegation of fad is found to be true, then the question 
whether the confession meets the legal definition of "voluntary" is a matter of 
applying the law to the facts and falls into the category of a mixed question of 
law and fad. This example illustrates the grayness of the line between pure ques- 
tions of fact and mixed questions, since it is not semantically or logically unreason- 
able to contend that the question whether the particular defendant's confession was 
"voluntary" under the circumstances is a pure question of fact. Nonetheless, in 
Miller v.  Fenton the Supreme Court held that determining whether a confession 
was voluntary was a mixed question of law and fad. For discussions of the topic 
of mixed questions and law application questions see 1 LIEBMAN, supra note 128, 
at  275-83; Liebman, supru note 5, at 2000-01 & 11.12; and Henry P. Monaghan, 
Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 234-38 (1985). 
226. Walker v. Johnson, 312 U.S. 275, 284-86 (1941). 
227. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458-61 (1953). 
228. 372 U.S. 293 (1963). 
229. In Townsend the Court stated: 
[A] federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to a habeas appli- 
cant under the following circumstances: If (1) the merits of the factual 
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ed that habeas courts always have the power to hold evidentia- 
ry hearings and make new findings of fact, even if not obligated 
to do so.230 In response to Townsend, Congress enacted sub- 
section (d) of section 2254 in 1966.Z3' That statutory provision 
Id. 
dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual deter- 
mination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the 
fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to 
afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of new- 
ly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately devel- 
oped a t  the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the 
state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact 
hearing. 
at 313. 
230. Id. at 312. 
231. 28 U.S.C. 9 2254 (1988) states in part: 
(d) In  any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a 
writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of 
a State court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual 
issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to 
which the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer or agent 
thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or 
other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be cor- 
rect, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise appear, or 
the respondent shall a d m i t  
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the 
State court hearing; 
(2) that the fad-finding procedure employed by the State court was 
not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; 
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed a t  the 
State court hearing; 
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or 
over the person of the applicant in the State court proceeding; 
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in de- 
privation of his constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to 
represent him in the State court proceeding, 
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate 
hearing in the State court proceeding; or 
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in 
the State court proceeding; 
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding 
in which the determination of such factual issue was made, perti- 
nent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
such factual determination, is produced as provided for hereinafter, 
and the Federal court on a consideration of such part of the record 
as a whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly 
supported by the record: 
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, 
when due proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the 
existence of one or more of the circumstances respectively set forth in 
paragraphs numbered (1) to (7), inclusive, is shown by the applicant, 
otherwise appears, or is admitted by the respondent, or unless the court 
concludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph numbered (8) that the 
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does not directly affect Townsend inasmuch as that case contin- 
ues to govern the question as to when a habeas court is obli- 
gated to, or has the discretion to, hold an evidentiary hearing. 
The statute instead kicks in at the point at which the court has 
decided to hold an evidentiary hearing, and says that state 
court findings of fact that are not defective in any one of eight 
ways are entitled to a presumption of correctness that can only 
be overcome by "convincing evidence" offered by the petitioner 
that the factual determination was erroneous.232 While sec- 
tion 2254(d) does not overrule Townsend, its presumption of 
correctness was clearly intended to  decrease the frequency with 
which petitioners could succeed at such hearings and to have 
an indirect effect on the willingness of habeas judges to exer- 
cise their discretion to permit such hearings.233 
The resolution of pure fact claims is one of the areas of 
habeas law that is most closely governed by case law and stat- 
ute. The upshot is that habeas petitioners will find it difficult 
to obtain an evidentiary hearing, and if successful in doing so, 
will find it hard to overcome a properly-arrived-at state court 
factual determination-the federal court exercises deferential, 
not de novo review. This brings us to the nub of the context 
regarding mixed issues: are they entitled to de novo review like 
then-existing pure law claims, or are they governed by 
Townsend and section 2254(d)? 
2. How each vision would respond to the nub of this context 
a. The de novo litigation vision. De novo litigation vi- 
sionaries, true to their name, argue for de novo review of mixed 
questions. Further, they will bend over backwards to character- 
record in the State court proceeding, considered as a whole, does not 
fairly support such factual determination, the burden shall rest upon the 
applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determina- 
tion by the State court was erroneous. 
232. See Weisselberg, supra note 6, a t  152-53. 
Townsend and section 2254(d), however, govern separate successive stages 
in a habeas corpus case: the six criteria of Townsend determine whether 
a petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, while the eight factors 
enumerated in section 2254(d) determine whether the state court's fmd- 
ings must be presumed correct if such a hearing is held. 
Id. 
233. Id. at 166-68 (citing statistics showing that the frequency of evidentiary 
hearings "plummeted" after the 1966 amendment). 
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ize a claim on the border between pure fact and mixed question 
as a mixed question, thereby evoking federal de novo review. 
b. The appellate review vision. In keeping with the car- 
dinal principle of parity, appellate review visionaries would 
argue that the same standards for determining what is a "pure 
fact" issue and what is a "mixed question" issue should be 
applied in habeas as on direct review. 
c. The rights-selectiuist vision. A rights-selectivist vi- 
sionary would incline toward classifying factual issues relating 
to favored rights as within the mixed question category so as to 
evoke de novo review. 
d .  The innocence-selectivist vision. An innocence- 
selectivist would be inclined to nudge determinations into the 
"mixed question" category whenever it appeared that the peti- 
tioner had a colorable claim of factual innocence so as to garner 
de novo federal review. 
e. The one-fair-chance vision. A one-fair-chance visionary 
would attempt to cast wide the net of "pure fact" determina- 
tions so as to minimize de novo review: to these visionaries if a 
job has been done well once there is no reason to do it twice. 
f. The inverse correlation vision. These visionaries, be- 
lieving as they do that in the present day state courts are gen- 
erally trustworthy with respect to litigation of federal constitu- 
tional issues, would follow one-fair-chance visionaries in cast- 
ing wide the net of "pure fact" determinations. 
g. The equitable remdy vision. The equitable remedy 
visionary likely would put little stock in the distinction be- 
tween "pure fact" and "mixed question" determinations and, 
instead, would look to see how important the determination 
was in the context of the case and how well, and fully, it had 
been dealt with in state court. The better and more M l  the 
treatment in state court, the less likely an  equitable remedy 
visionary would be to want to grant a federal evidentiary hear- 
ing. 
h. The death-is-different vision. Death-is-different vision- 
aries would be more likely to categorize debatable issues in 
death penalty cases as ones of "pure fact" so that the petitioner 
could be afforded de novo federal review. 
3. The case law analyzed 
The Supreme Court understandably has had difficulty 
drawing a clear line between issues of "pure fact" and "mixed 
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The most well-known and oft-cited case on the is- 
sue is Miller v. Fenton:" wherein the Supreme Court decid- 
ed, in an eight-to-one2% decision, that whether a confession is 
voluntary is a mixed question entitled to de novo review.237 
There are two aspects of the Court's opinion that are of interest 
to us from a visionary perspective. The first is that the Court 
saw an unbroken line of precedent, both in direct appeal and 
habeas cases, for treating the voluntariness of the confession as 
a "mixed question."238 This implies acceptance of the appel- 
late review vision, since it indicates that de novo review on 
direct appeal should likewise evoke de novo review in habeas. 
Second, the Court noted that often the characterization of a 
determination turns upon whether the lower court was in a 
better position to make that determination, such as if it hinges 
on demeanor or credibility.239 Since the state court judge will 
generally be in no better position to make the determination of 
"voluntariness" than will the federal court judge, de novo re- 
view is appropriate.*O This is an implicit rejection of the 
one-fair-chance vision, and probably the inverse correlation 
vision as well: both would argue that one should strain to cate- 
gorize a fully and fairly litigated issue as one of "pure fact" in 
order t o  evoke the presumption of correctness, and thus, if not 
avoid the relitigation, at least have some assurance that the 
relitigation will not reach a different result. Yet in some cases 
less well-known than Miller v. Fenton, the conservative Court 
has tended to push debatably categorizable issues into the 
category of "pure fact."241 Thus, perhaps the one-fair-chance 
234. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985) ("In the $ 2254(d) context, 
as elsewhere, the appropriate methodology for distinguishing questions of fact from 
questions of law has been, to say the least, elusive."). 
235. 474 U.S. 104 (1985). 
236. In the majority were Justices Burger, Blackmun, B r e ~ a n ,  Marshall, 
O'Comor, Powell, Stevens, and White. Only Justice Rehnquist dissented. 
237. Miller, 474 U.S. at  112. 
238. Id. at 109. 
239. Id. at 114-17. 
240. Id. at 117. 
241. Yackle, Hugioscope, supra note 15, at  2380. Yackle argues that the Court 
has categorized debatable issues as pure fact, particularly in two cases, Wainwright 
v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 429 (1985) (holding that the partiality or bias of jurors is a 
pure question of fad), and Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 117 (1983) (holding 
that the competency of a defendant to stand trial is a pure question of fact). 
Yackle then states, "Since this Court is inclined to think that most issues should 
be decided in state court, it strains to characterize state decisions as findings of 
fad, rather than applications of law to fad, and thus invokes the statutory pre- 
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and inverse correlation visions are at work in this context, 
after all. Nothing in this context seems supportive of the 
rights-selectivist, innocence-selectivist, equitable remedy, or 
death-is-hfferent visions. 
F. Context Six: Pure Questions of Fact 
1. The nub of the context 
As was noted in the discussion of mixed question 
claims,242 once an issue is characterized as one of pure fact, 
the habeas court's handling of it is closely controlled by 
Townsend v. SainZd3 and section 2254(d)? The key thresh- 
old question under both the case and the statute is whether the 
state fact-finding is flawed in any one of the enumerated ways. 
The one controversial issue in this context, then, is how the 
habeas court should handle the situation where one of the state 
factfinding defects exists, but that defect is petitioner's fault for 
failing to properly present the issue at the state level. This is 
the issue on which our discussion in this context will focus. 
2. How each vision could respond to the nub of this context 
a. The de novo litigation vision. De novo litigation vi- 
sionaries desire the habeas petitioner to have a fresh start in 
federal court and, thus, are not at all bothered by the prospect 
of a petitioner relitigating an issue that the petitioner litigated 
badly in state court. 
b. The appellate review vision. Appellate review vision- 
aries, on the other hand, believe that a habeas court which is 
in most respects acting in an appellate capacity, should not 
provide a forum for permitting petitioners to bolster the record 
regarding a factual issue which the petitioner failed to properly 
present in the 'lower" court. There may be some wiggle room 
for an appellate review visionaries here, though, given that 
they recognize that a habeas court, unlike a normal appellate 
court, does have the power and the tools necessary t o  make 
findings of fact. Thus, it could be argued that even for an ap- 
sumption in favor of the result reached in state court." Yackle, Hagioscope, supra 
note 15, at 2380. 
242. See supra part 1II.E. 
243. 372 U.S. 293 (1963). 
244. 28 U.S.C. $ 2254(d) (1988). 
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pellate reviewer, the very nature of the habeas court militates 
against a strict view that facts cannot be relitigated. 
c. The rights-selectivist vision. A rights-selectivist would 
favor permitting relitigation of a factual issue pertaining to a 
favored right that was badly presented by the petitioner in the 
state courts. 
d .  The innocence-selectivist vision. The innocence- 
selectivist would favor the relitigation of a badly-litigated factu- 
al issue when the petitioner was able to supplement the consti- 
tutional claim with a claim of colorable factual innocence. 
e. The one-fair-chance vision. The one-fair-chance vision- 
ary, of course, would be adamantly opposed to permitting 
relitigation of a badly-litigated issue, since the petitioner by 
definition had the one-fair-chance to litigate that issue in the 
state courts. 
f. The inverse correlation vision. This vision would be 
more favorable to permitting such relitigation when the state 
courts appear generally hostile to federally-protected rights. 
g. The equitable remedy vision. The equitable remedy 
visionary would look at how important such a factual issue is 
in the context of the case, how much control the petitioner 
personally had over the litigation of that issue, and then exam- 
ine other factors in the case t o  arrive at an equitable resolution 
to  the question whether the litigation should be permitted. 
h. The death-is-different vision. Death-is-different vision- 
aries would, of course, argue for broadly permitting relitigation 
of factual issues when the petitioner is laboring under a death 
sentence. 
3. The case law analyzed 
The Supreme Court decided this issue in Keeney v.  
~ a r n a y o - ~ e y e s ~ ~ ~  in 1992. In a fi~e-to-four~~' decision the 
Court held that a petitioner who has badly litigated a factual 
question in state court cannot relitigate that question in federal 
court unless the petitioner can show "cause" for the failure to 
properly litigate, and "prejudice" from the failure to properly 
litigate.'" The majority was convinced that the cause and 
245. 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992). 
246. In the majority were Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and 
White. Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, and Stevens joined with Justice 07Connor's 
dissenting opinion. 
247. Keeney, 112 S. Ct. at 1719. 
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prejudice standard would "appropriately accommodate concerns 
of finality, comity, judicial economy and channeling the resolu- 
tion of claims into the most appropriate The major- 
ity also saw the exhaustion requirement as a reason for reach- 
ing this result because a petitioner's merely having stated the 
claim in state court, but then failing to properly litigate it, does 
not accord the state system its one-fair-chance to resolve the 
claim properly.249 
The majority's decision is consistent with the appellate 
review vision, the one-fair-chance vision and an inverse corre- 
lation vision that believes that state courts are currently doing 
a good job of enforcing federal constitutional rights. Implicitly, 
the majority decision is also consistent with a very narrow 
innocence-selectivist vision, since there is an exception to the 
requirement of "cause and prejudice" for a petitioner who can 
put forward a colorable claim of factual innocence.250 The 
majority's decision is inconsistent with the de novo litigation 
vision, the rights-selectivist vision (since there is no indication 
that  permitting relitigation depends upon the nature of the 
r igh t  a t  issue), t he  equitable remedy vision ( the  
"cause-and-prejudice" standard is an across-the-board rule, not 
one that is applied on a case-by-case basis), and the 
death-is-different vision (there is no indication that a death 
sentenced petitioner should be permitted broader opportunities 
to relitigate). 
Tamayo-Reyes is an interesting case because two Justices 
who normally vote conservatively in habeas cases, Justices 
O'Connor and Kennedy, joined more liberal Justices Blackmun 
and Stevens in dissent."' The linchpin of Justice OYConnor's 
dissent is that "[hlabeas corpus is not an appellate proceeding, 
but rather an original civil action in a federal From 
this, Justice O'Connor reasoned that a trial level court in an  
original civil action has broad powers to determine factual 
issues and should use those powers to arrive a t  the best deci- 
sion possible.25s To Justice O'Connor, once the petitioner has 
presented a properly preserved claim to the federal court that 
248. Id. 
249. Id. at 1720. 
250. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 493-96 (1986). 
251. Keeney, 112 S. Ct. at 1721 (O'Co~or, J., dissenting). 
252. Id. at 1722. 
253. See id. at 1725. 
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the state courts were given the opportunity to  litigate, federal- 
ism concerns diminish.254 Justice O'Comor also argued that 
Congress implicitly adopted the holding of Townsend v. 
Sain255 when it enacted section 2254(d), and thus the liberal 
Townsend standards for granting a hearing continued t o  gov- 
ern.256 Surprisingly for Justices O'Comor and Kennedy, this 
dissent in large part embraces the de novo litigation vision. It 
also constitutes an explicit rejection, at least in part, of the 
appellate review vision. 
G. Context Seven: The Squandered State Court 
Opportunity-Procedurally Defaulted Claims 
1. The nub of the context 
This context deals with the situation in which the habeas 
petitioner has squandered the opportunity to litigate an issue 
in the state system. In habeas law this squandering goes by the 
name "procedural default" and most ofien occurs when a defen- 
dant fails to  properly raise an issue at the trial level. It can 
also occur at later stages of the state proceeding, however, for 
instance failing to appeal a properly preserved or fail- 
ing to appeal at all.258 This context looms large in Supreme 
Court habeas jurisprudence and has provoked more significant 
opinions than any other habeas topic over the last two decades. 
2. How each vision could respond to the nub of this context 
a. The de novo litigation vision. De novo litigation vi- 
sionaries, in favor of giving petitioners a fresh start in federal 
court, would ignore procedural defaults unless it can be shown 
that the default constituted a knowledgeable waiver that was 
the result of the defendant's personal choice. Even in that cir- 
cumstance a de novo litigator would want the habeas court to 
have the power to ignore the waiver if the reasons for doing so 
were compelling. 
. The appellate review vision. Appellate review vision- 
aries would be very intolerant of petitioners who try t o  bring 
2 54. Id. 
255. 372 U.S. 293, 310-18 (1963). 
256. See fieney, 112 S. Ct. at 1724 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
257. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 482-83 (1986). 
258. See, eg., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 727-28 (1991). 
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procedurally defaulted claims because those claims generally 
cannot be pursued on direct review. 
c. The rights-selectivist vision. The rights-selectivist 
would be forgiving of defaults that relate t o  the favored rights. 
d .  The innocence-selectivist vision. An innocence- 
selectivist would be inclined t o  forgive procedural defaults 
when the petitioner is able to  supplement the constitutional 
claim with a claim of innocence. 
e. The one-fair-chance vision. One-fair-chance visionaries 
are inalterably opposed t o  permitting litigation of an issue in 
federal court if the petitioner had failed to  take advantage of a 
fair chance t o  litigate the issue in state court. 
f. The inverse correlation version. Inverse correlationists, 
at this point in time being satisfied with state court handling of 
federal constitutional issues, would not be tolerant of 
procedurally-defaulted claims. 
g. The equitable remedy vision. A proponent of the equi- 
table remedy vision would examine how important the claim is 
in the context of the case and how responsible the petitioner 
was for having defaulted it, then consider other factors in arriv- 
ing at  an equitable decision whether t o  enforce the procedural 
default. 
h. The death-is-diferent vision. Death-is-different vision- 
aries favor federal courts broadly ignoring state procedural 
defaults. 
3. The case law analyzed 
The first time the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of 
procedural default in the habeas context was in 1953 in 
Daniels u. a lesser-known companion case t o  Brown 
v. Allen.260 In Daniels, without much discussion, the Court 
held that a claim procedurally defaulted in state court should 
not be reviewed by the habeas The de novo litigation 
visionaries of the Warren Court could not, of course, live with 
this result and a decade later overruled it in the most famous 
of the Warren Court era habeas decisions, Fay v. N ~ i a . ~ ~ '  In 
the Noia majority opinion, Justice Brennan penned the 
quintessential de novo litigation visionary sentence: 
259. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). 
260. Id. 
261. Id. at 482-87. 
262. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
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"[C]onventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot 
be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal 
constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied 
without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial re- 
The Court held that the federal habeas court must 
hear a procedurally defaulted claim unless the state can show 
that the petitioner "knowingly and deliberately bypassed" the 
state court remedy.264 Further, the federal habeas court may 
hear a claim even where the petitioner "deliberately bypassed" 
the state remedy.265 
Just as the Warren Court liberals could not live with the 
rule in Daniels, so the later conservative Court could not live 
with the de novo litigation position adopted by Noia. The Bur- 
ger Court delivered a blow to  Noia in 1977 in Wainright v. 
S y k e ~ . ~ ~ ~  In the majority opinion Justice Rehnquist argued 
that since the adequate and independent state ground rule 
would prevent the Supreme Court on direct review from decid- 
ing the merits of a constitutional claim that the state had val- 
idly held to be procedurally barred under state law, it would be 
similarly improper for a federal habeas court to consider an 
issue that had been procedurally defaulted by the petitioner in 
state court, since the state court's upholding of the procedural 
bar would be an analog of an adequate and independent state 
ground.267 Justice Rehnquist also stressed the legitimate 
state interest in enforcing the contemporaneous objection 
and noted the possibility of defense counsel sandbag- 
ging by intentionally failing to litigate a constitutional claim so 
as t o  build in error reversible at the federal He also 
noted that federal courts' litigation of procedurally defaulted 
claims would "detract from the perception of the trial . . . in 
state court as a decisive and portentous e~ent."~" 
The majority decision in Sykes is consistent with the appel- 
late review, one-fair-chance, and inverse correlation visions. 
The decision did leave open one narrow door for federal review 
of a procedurally defaulted claim: if the petitioner can show 
263. Id. at 424. 
264. Id. at 438. 
265. Id. 
266. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
267. Id. at 87. 
268. Id. at 88-89. 
269. Id. at 89. 
270. Id. at 90. 
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"cause" and "prejudice" for the default, then federal review 
should be a~ailable?~' The opinion, however, left the defini- 
tions of "cause" and "prejudice" and thus as of 1977 it 
was not possible to tell whether the Court would, via the 
"cause and prejudice" exception, partially endorse one of the 
selectivist visions. 
In concurring, Justice Stevens gave an early indication of 
his rights-selectivist/equitable remedy vision: 
[Ilf the constitutional issue is sufficiently grave, even an 
express waiver by the defendant himself may sometimes be 
excused. Matters such as the competence of counsel, the pro- 
cedural context in which the asserted waiver occurred, the 
character of the constitutional right at stake, and the overall 
fairness of the entire proceeding, may be more significant 
than the language of the test the Court purports to apply.273 
Justice White, concurring in the judgment, would have stuck 
with the Noia "deliberate bypass" standard, but would have 
tightened Noia by not requiring that the defendant have been 
personally involved in a waiver in order for the waiver to be 
enf~rceable.'~~ Justices Brennan and Marshall, in dissent, 
championed ~ o i a . ~ ? ~  The heart of the dissent, which turned 
out to be prescient, is that "the ordinary procedural default is 
born of the inadvertence, negligence, inexperience, or incompe- 
tence of trial counsel."276 Indeed, all subsequent significant 
Supreme Court decisions regarding procedural default have in- 
volved situations in which the petitioner claims that the proce- 
dural default occurred due to arguably substandard perfor- 
mance by counsel. 
The procedural default principle of Sykes has been proven 
by later cases to  be as powerful and lasting as its "cause and 
prejudice" exception has been proved t o  be narrow. In Engle u. 
Isaac:" in 1982, the Court declined to limit Sykes t o  issues 
that did not affect the truth finding function of the trial, thus 
rejecting an accuracy based rights-selectivist exception to the 
general rule.278 In Murray v. Carrier,'" in 1986, the Court 
271. Id. at 87. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. at 95-96 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
274. Id. at 98-99 (White, J., dissenting). 
275. Id. at 107 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
276. Id. at 104 ( B r e ~ a n ,  J., dissenting). 
277. 456 U S .  107 (1982). 
278. Id. at 129. 
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reaffirmed that the "cause" requirement must be met by a peti- 
tioner even where the claim calls into question the reliability of 
the guilt determinati~n.~" But the more significant aspect of 
Carrier is that the Court explicitly held that substandard per- 
formance by counsel that causes the procedural default only 
constitutes "cause" if it was the result of constitutionally in- 
effective assistance of counsel.281 Further, while not defining 
"prejudice," the Court held that the showing must be "greater 
than that necessary under 'the more vague inquiry suggested 
by the words "plain error.""'282 Finally, the Court held that 
there was an exception to the "cause and prejudice" exception: 
a defendant who has procedurally defaulted the claim and 
cannot show "cause" or "prejudice" can nonetheless have the 
claim considered on the merits if that petitioner can allege a 
colorable claim of actual innocence.283 
The issue whether death-is-different for habeas purposes 
was explicitly raised in Smith v. Murray," a companion case 
to Murray v. Carrier.285 Smith had no claim that he was actu- 
ally innocent of having committed the homicide for which he 
was convicted, but argued that he was actually innocent of the 
death sentence in that he likely would not have been sentenced 
to death had not his attorney failed to object at sentencing 
hearing to the admission of privileged statements that Smith 
had made to a court appointed psychiatrist.286 A majority of 
the Court held that the actual innocence exception to the 
"cause and prejudice" requirement for procedural default en- 
compassed not only factual innocence of the act itself, but also 
actual innocence of the death penalty.287 By this holding the 
Court at least partially embraced the death-is-different vision, 
since the Court could logically have limited the actual inno- 
cence exception to  actual innocence of the underlying act. The 
Court tempered this recognition of the death-is-different vision, 
however, by stating: "[Wle reject the suggestion that the princi- 
ples of Wainright v. Sykes apply differently depending on the 
279. 477 U.S. 478 (1986). 
280. Id. at 495. 
281. Id. at 492. 
282. Id. at 493-94 (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982)). 
283. Id. at 496. 
284. 477 U.S. 527 (1986). 
285. 477 U.S. 478 (1986). 
286. Smith, 477 U.S. at 528-32. 
287. Id. at 537. 
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nature of the penalty a State imposes for the violation of its 
criminal 
In Carrier, the claim of attorney error was that the attor- 
ney had left out a claim from an otherwise timely appeal. The 
Court left open the question whether Noia's "deliberate bypass" 
standard should continue to govern when counsel completely 
defaulted the appeal.28g The Court addressed this issue in 
1991 in Coleman u. Thompsonzgo and concluded that no dif- 
ferent standard should apply: "[Flederal habeas review of the 
[ procedurally defaulted] claims is barred unless the prisoner 
can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a 
result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate 
that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice."291 The majority clearly rejected the 
idea that the "cause-and-prejudice" standard itself, rather than 
the actual innocence exception to it, should be interpreted dif- 
ferently and more leniently when the petitioner is death sen- 
tenced. Coleman was the final nail in the coffin of Noia. 
The most recent important decision in the procedural de- 
fault line of cases is Sawyer u. W h i t l e ~ ~ ~ '  in 1992. There, the 
Court revisited the issue first raised Smith v. Murrayzg3 of 
what constitutes "actual innocence" of the death penalty so as 
to permit the habeas court to consider on the merits a 
procedurally-defaulted claim. A six-person conservative majori- 
tyZs4 held that such a showing requires the petitioner to al- 
lege a claim that he or she was completely ineligible for the 
death penalty under the governing criteria, not merely that the 
constitutional error may have resulted in the imposition of a 
death sentence that would not otherwise have been imposed on 
a petitioner who was in fact eligible.2g5 
The current state of the law in the procedural default con- 
text is that it is consistent with the appellate review, 
one-fair-chance, and inverse correlation visions, but with a 
narrow innocence-selectivist component and a partial 
288. Id. at 538. 
289. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 492. 
290. 501 U.S. 722 (1991). 
291. Id. at 750-51. 
292. 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992). 
293. 477 U.S. 527 (1986). 
294. In the majority were Justices Rehnquist, K e ~ e d y ,  Scalia, Souter, Thomas, 
and White. Justices Blaclunun, O'Connor, and Scalia concurred in the judgment. 
295. Sauyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2522-23. 
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death-is-different component. The law is inconsistent with the 
de novo litigation vision, except in the narrow circumstances in 
which the petitioner can show "cause" and "prejudice." The 
rights-selectivist and equitable remedy visions have no support 
in this context's current law. 
H. Context Eight: "Abuse of the Writ" 
1.  The nub of the context 
A habeas corpus petitioner sometimes will file additional 
petitions after the first one is denied. If a subsequent petition 
contains a claim that was not alleged in an earlier petition, the 
question becomes, in habeas vernacular, whether the petitioner 
has "abused the writ" by not having included the later claim in 
the earlier petition. The governing statute is section 2244(b) as 
amended in 1966. It states that a subsequent application for 
the writ that contains a claim not included in an earlier peti- 
tion 
need not be entertained by a court of the United States or a 
justice or judge of the United States unless the application 
alleges and is predicated on a factual or other ground not 
adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier application for the 
writ, and unless the court, justice, or judge is satisfied that 
the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately 
withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the 
The statute strongly suggests that the court should not enter- 
tain the new claim if the petitioner deliberately withheld it 
from an earlier petition.297 The key question for a statutory 
interpretation is whether the final phrase "or otherwise abuse 
the writ" expands the abuse of the writ doctrine to encompass 
claims that were not deliberately withheld. 
2. How each vision could respond to the nub of this context 
a. The de novo litigation vision. De novo litigation vi- 
sionaries would attempt to construe the phrase "or otherwise 
abused the writ7' as encompassing very little, if any, more than 
296. 28 U.S.C. $ 2244(b) (1988). 
297. Because the statute says that the court "need not" consider the claim, not 
that it "cannot," there is still discretion even, to hear a claim that was earlier 
withheld. 
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grounds that were deliberately withheld, because such visionar- 
ies wish constitutional claims to be aired, however belatedly. 
b. The appellate review vision. Appellate review vision- 
aries would tend to construe the statutory language broadly as  
encompassing a large realm of behaviors beyond deliberately 
withholding a claim, since appellate review visionaries contend 
that  each petitioner generally gets one, and only one, appeal. In  
the habeas context the petitioner's "one appeal" is the initial 
habeas petition. 
c. The rights-selectivist vision. A rights-selectivist would 
tend to construe the statutory language more favorably to peti- 
tioners who were presenting claims involving favored constitu- 
tional rights. 
d .  The innocence-selectivist vision. The innocence- 
selectivist would attempt to construe the statutory language 
more favorably to petitioners who also present a colorable claim 
of innocence. 
e. The one-fair-chance vision. One-fair-chance visionaries 
don't even believe in initial habeas petitions if the petitioner 
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that claim in state 
courts. Further, they are no more favorable to petitioners who 
had that fair chance but did not raise the claim. Thus, a fortio- 
ri, one-fair-chance visionaries are unalterably opposed to the 
idea that a petitioner can make additional federal habeas fd- 
ings after the initial one. Thus, one-fair-chance visionaries 
would construe the statutory language "or otherwise abuse the 
writ" very expansively to encompass many behaviors beyond 
deliberate withholding. 
f. The inverse correlation vision. This vision has no ap- 
plicability to this context because it speaks only to what effect 
an  earlier state proceeding should have on a federal habeas 
court, not what effect an earlier federal proceeding should have 
on a later federal proceeding. 
g. The equitable remedy vision. As always, proponents of 
this vision would argue for a flexible definition of "abused the 
writ" that would permit the habeas court to consider a variety 
of factors in making that determination. 
h. The death-is-different vision. A death-is-different 
visionary would go out of the way to find that a death penalty 
petitioner had not "otherwise abused the writ." 
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3. The case law analyzed 
In the last of the Warren Court's 1963 habeas trilogy, 
Sanders v. United States,298 the Court held that the habeas 
court has a duty to hear a claim that was not presented in an 
earlier habeas petition unless the petitioner had deliberately 
withheld the claim in the earlier petition.299 Further, even if 
the claim had been deliberately withheld, the habeas court had 
the discretion to entertain the claim if the ends of justice so 
required.300 Three years later Congress enacted section 
2244(b), which was not explicitly inconsistent with Sanders, 
but which also was accompanied by legislative history indicat- 
ing that the purpose of the amendment was to "introduc[e] a 
greater degree of finality" in habeas.301 Neither the statute 
nor the legislative history, however, clarifies whether the "or 
otherwise abused the writ" language was designed to cut back 
on the Sanders holding. 
The Supreme Court construed the "or otherwise abused the 
writ language" in McCleskey v. ZantSo2 in 1991. ~us t i ce  Ken- 
nedy stated for the majority that "the doctrine of abuse of the 
writ refers to a complex and evolving body of equitable princi- 
ples informed and controlled by historical usage, statutory 
developments, and judicial decisions."303 The Court then de- 
cided that "[albuse of the writ is not confined to instances of 
deliberate abandonment."304 The doctrine instead encompass- 
es all claims not presented in an  earlier habeas petition unless 
the petitioner can show "cause" and "prejudice" for failing to 
raise the claim in the earlier proceeding or can show a probable 
claim of actual innocence of the crime.305 The Court imported 
the holdings from the procedural default cases to the abuse of 
the writ context, because both contexts "imply a background 
norm of procedural regularity binding on the pet i t i~ner ."~~ 
The holding in McCleskey is consistent with the appellate 
review and one-fair-chance visions. Further, it creates a narrow 
exception that reflects an innocence-selectivist vision. I t  is 
298. 373 U.S. 1 (1963). 
299. Id. at 17-18. 
300. Id. at 18-19. 
301. S. REP. NO. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966). 
302. 499 US. 467 (1991). 
303. Id. at 489. 
304. Id. 
305. Id. at 493. 
306. Id. at 490. 
828 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994 
flatly inconsistent with the de novo litigation, equitable reme- 
dy, and death-is-different visions (McCleskey was in fact 
death-sentenced), and impliedly inconsistent with the 
rights-selectivist vision, since there is no indication in the opin- 
ion that it matters what the right is that is involved in the 
newly asserted claim. 
I. Context Nine: Successive Petitions 
1. The nub of the context 
The preceding context involved the situation in which the 
petitioner asserts in a subsequent petition a claim that was not 
asserted in an earlier petition. The current context, by contrast, 
involves a situation in which the petitioner raises the same 
claim in a later petition that was raised and rejected in an 
earlier petition. This context is governed in a backhanded sort 
of fashion by section 2244(b)?O7 which states that a habeas 
court "need not" entertain a "subsequent application for a writ" 
unless the subsequent application contains a newly asserted 
ground that is not an abuse of the writ. The phrase "need not" 
entertain implies that the court may entertain a subsequent 
petition raising the same ground, and the question becomes 
when a habeas court should exercise its power to do so.308 
2. How each vision could respond to the nub of this context 
a. The de novo litigation vision. As always, de novo 
litigation visionaries favoring adjudication of constitutional 
claims on the merits, virtually whenever and however they are 
raised, would argue that the statute should be interpreted so as 
to  require the habeas court to consider the successive petition if 
there is any reason to think that the result might be different. 
b. The appellate review vision. Appellate review vision- 
aries are not fans of permitting habeas petitions beyond the 
initial one and, thus, would argue that the statutory language 
should be construed so as to minimize the number of successive 
petitions that habeas courts are required (or even permitted) to 
consider. 
c. The rights-selectivist vision. The statutory language is 
nebulous enough to allow rights-selectivists to argue that the 
307. See supra notes 284-85 and accompanying text. 
308. See Kuhlmam v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 449-52 (1986). 
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habeas courts should be more inclined to consider a successive 
petition when it involves a claim relating to a favored right. 
d. The innocence-selectivist vision. The statute leaves 
plenty of room for an innocence-selectivist t o  claim that the cir- 
cumstance in which a habeas court "need" consider a successive 
petition is one in which the petitioner alleges an accompanying 
colorable claim of innocence that was not alleged earlier. 
e. The one-fair-chance vision. Obviously, one-fair-chance 
visionaries do not believe in permitting successive petitions 
and, thus, would argue that the statutory language should be 
construed so as to virtually never permit a habeas court to con- 
sider a successive petition. 
f. The inverse correlation vision. As was the case with 
respect t o  the abuse of the writ context, the inverse correlation 
vision does not address this context, which does not involve 
statelfederal relations, but federallfederal relations. 
g. The equitable remedy vision. Equitable remedy vision- 
aries would look first t o  see if anything had changed between 
the decision on the earlier petition and the successive petition. 
If it had, then they would argue for reweighing the equities of 
the case. If nothing had changed it would be hard to see what 
equity would exist in reconsidering the claim. 
h. The death-is-different vision. A death-is-different 
visionary would urge that the statute be interpreted to permit 
reexamination of a claim raised by a death-sentenced petitioner 
if there were any conceivable reason to believe that the result 
might be different. 
3. The case law analyzed 
The 1948 predecessor of section 2244(b)309 addressed only 
the issue of successive petitions, while the current version of 
the statute includes successive petitions and those claimed to 
constitute an abuse of the writ. As to successive petitions, the 
statute stated that a habeas court, "shall [not] be required to 
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus,yy310 alleg- 
ing a claim already decided adversely to the petitioner in an 
earlier petition if the court "is satisfied that the ends of justice 
will not be served by such inquiry." The key question under 
this statute is when the "ends of justice" would be served by 
309. 28 U.S.C. 8 2244(b) (1948) (amended 1966). 
310. Id. 
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adjudicating a successive petition. The Warren Court answered 
this question in Sanders3" in a manner mostly, but not en- 
tirely, favorable to habeas petitioners. According to the Court, 
the "ends of justice" required reexamination if the prior eviden- 
tiary hearing had not been full and fair, or if there had been an 
"intervening change in the law" favorable to the petitioner, or 
"some other justification for having failed to raise a crucial 
point or argument in the prior applicati~n."~'~ The Court not- 
ed that these two grounds did not exhaust the "ends of justice" 
inquiry because the test "cannot be too finely particular- 
i ~ e d . " ~ ' ~  Unfavorably to habeas petitioners, however, the 
Court held that the burden is on the petitioner to show that 
the ends of justice would be served by the re l i t igat i~n.~ '~ 
In 1966 Congress amended section 2244 to its present 
form, deleting the "ends of justice" inquiry.315 The amended 
statute does not on its face provide any more guidance concern- 
ing when successive petitions should be permitted, although 
the history of the amendment seems to indicate that it was 
part of a Congressional plan to make habeas a t  least somewhat 
less easily available to  petitioner^.^'^ This is certainly the 
way the conservative majority saw the congressional intent 
when it handed down its key successive petition case, 
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, in 1 9 ~ 6 . ~ "  The heart of the opinion was 
joined by only four members of the Court, but as the Court 
added more conservative members it became clear that those 
key portions were accepted by a clear majority of the 
For the plurality, Justice Powell-always the most 
outspoken innocence-selectivist on the Court-balanced the 
interests of subsequent petitioners against countervailing state 
interests and concluded that only petitioners who have a color- 
able claim of factual innocence have any legitimate interest 
that counterbalances the weighty interests of the state in final- 
ity and repo~e.~" This is the one instance in current habeas 
311. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 17 (1963). 
312. Id. 
3 13. Id. 
314. Id. 
315. See supra note 296 and accompanying text. 
316. Kuhlrnann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 450-51 (1986) (examining the history 
of the statute and coming to this conclusion). 
317. Id. at 436. 
318. The plurality opinion in Kuhlmann is clearly accepted as good law by the 
majority in McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 488-90 (1991). 
319. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 451-52, 454. 
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jurisprudence in which the innocence-selectivist vision provides 
the primary rationale for the result rather than simply provid- 
ing a rationale for an exception to the general rule. The deci- 
sion is also consistent with the appellate review and 
one-fair-chance visions, while it  is inconsistent with the de novo 
litigation, rights-selectivist, equitable remedy, and (probably) 
death-is-different visions. 
J. Context Ten: The Question of Harmless Error 
1. The nub of the context 
A prisoner cannot get relief from a conviction either by 
reversal on direct appeal or by issuance of a writ of habeas 
corpus on collateral review, even for error of constitutional 
magnitude, unless that error was harmful.320 On direct re- 
view the law is favorable to petitioners who have established 
constitutional error: the burden is on the state to prove that 
the error was harmless, and the level of the burden is that the 
state must show harmlessness beyond a reasonable 
T h e  n u b  of t h i s  con tex t  is w h e t h e r  t h e  s a m e  
petitioner-favorable standard should apply to habeas. No feder- 
al habeas statute gives any guidance on this point. 
2. How each vision could respond to the nub of this context 
a. The de novo litigation vision. In their heart of hearts, 
de novo litigation visionaries are likely to disapprove of the 
whole concept of harmless error: If error was of constitutional 
magnitude, then it by definition was h a r m f ~ 1 . ~ ~ ~  But given 
that the law recognizes the doctrine of harmless error, de novo 
l i t igat ion visionaries would a rgue  t h a t  t h e  same 
320. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). There are, though, some 
constitutional errors that are so basic that they defy harmless error analysis and 
require automatic reversal. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 289-90 (1991) 
(White, J., dissenting as to part 111 only) (collecting authorities). 
321. Chapman, 386 U.S. at  24. 
322. Perhaps surprisingly, Justices Warren, Brennan, Douglas and Fortas 
joined the majority in Chapman. I t  was left for Justice Stewart, hardly a liberal in 
matters of constitutional criminal procedure or habeas corpus, to argue that the 
Court had never before recognized constitutional error as harmless and that the er- 
ror found in Chapman was not the sort for which a harmless error doctrine should 
be adopted in any event. Chapman, 386 at 42-45 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice 
Stewart, however, noted that he would not rule out the doctrine of harmless error 
in all circumstances. Id. at  44 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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petitioner-favorable rule that applies on direct review should 
apply in habeas. 
b. The appellate review vision. Under their cardinal prin- 
ciple of parity, appellate review visionaries would strenuously 
contend that the same standard for harmless error should 
govern on direct review and in habeas. 
c. The rights-selectivists vision. Rights-selectivists would 
argue that as to the favored rights that make the cut, they 
should be treated no less favorably than the same rights are 
treated via direct review. 
d. The innocence-selectivist vision. Innocence-selectivists 
would argue that as to the favored petitioners who have alleged 
a colorable claim of innocence, the same petitioner-favorable 
standards should apply in habeas as on direct review. 
e. The one-fair-chance vision. One-fair-chance visionaries 
should hold a bifurcated position regarding this context. On the 
one hand, these visionaries do not even believe habeas jurisdic- 
tions should extend to claims as to which the petition& had a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate in state court, and thus 
would argue for a much less petitioner-favorable standard of 
harmless error as  to those petitions where the petitioner liti- 
gated in state court and lost, and then litigated in federal court 
and won. But as to errors established by a petitioner on habeas 
who did not have the one fair opportunity to litigate the claim 
in state court, the one-fair-chance visionary should argue for 
the same harmless error standard that would be applicable on 
direct review. 
f. The inverse correlation vision. An inverse correlationist 
would not admit many cases through the federal habeas door, 
but as  to those that entered and prevailed, an  inverse 
correlationist should argue for the same petitioner-favorable 
standard as  on direct review. 
g. The equitable remedy vision. To an equitable remedy 
visionary the harmfulness of the error should simply be one 
factor in the equation on a case-by-case basis. Thus, such a 
visionary might argue for a range of different definitions of 
harmfulness to apply to different circumstances. 
h. The death-is-different vision. While a death-is-different 
visionary might be willing to admit that error a t  the guilt stage 
of a capital trial could be found to be harmless, such a vision- 
ary would certainly argue that the standard for harmfulness 
should be just as  petitioner-favorable in habeas as  on direct 
review. A death-is-different visionary would find it hard to 
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imagine that error occurring at the sentencing phase of a capi- 
tal trial could be harmless, and if writing on a blank slate, 
would likely simply banish the harmless error doctrine from 
the sentencing phase of capital cases. Given that the law does 
recognize that an error at capital sentencing can be harm- 
less,32s a death-is-different visionary would certainly contend 
for the same petitioner-favorable standard for harmless error in  
habeas as on direct review. 
3. The case law analyzed 
The Supreme Court dealt with the nub of this context in 
Brecht u. A b r a h ~ r n s o n ~ ~ ~  in 1993. The majority held in a 
f i v e - t o - f ~ u r ~ ~ ~  decision that, at least as to "trial error," the 
less petitioner-favorable test for harmless error fkom Kotteakos 
u. United States326 should apply: that the error "had substan- 
tial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's 
verdict."327 It  is unclear from the decision whether the prose- 
cution bears the burden of proving that the error is harmless 
under this test, or the defendant bears the burden of proving 
that  it was harmful. The reason for this uncertainty is that the 
majority opinion, in which Justice Stevens concurred and was 
the necessary fifth vote, states that the burden is on the peti- 
t i ~ n e r , ~ ~ ~  while in a separate concurring opinion Justice 
Stevens stated that the burden is on the prosecution.32g The 
majority opinion argued that a growing body of Supreme Court 
case law recognizes that habeas is different from, and less 
petitioner-favorable than, direct review.330 Unlike direct re- 
view, habeas has a limited role as an extraordinary remedy 
against violations of fundamental fairness.331 The costs to the 
state of a federal habeas court granting the writ because the 
323. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 754 (1990) (holding that a state 
appellate court can constitutionally uphold a death sentence that was "based in 
part on an invalid or improperly defined aggravating circumstance by either re- 
weighing the aggravating and mitigating evidence or by [engaging in] harmless 
error review"). 
324. 
325. 
Stevens 
326. 
327. 
328. 
329. 
330. 
331. 
113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993). 
In the majority were Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and 
Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Souter, and White dissented. 
328 U.S. 750 (1946). 
Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722 (quoting Kotteahs, 328 U.S. at 776). 
Id. 
Id. at 1723 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
Id. at 1719. 
Id. 
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state cannot prove that the error was harmless are heavy, 
while petitioners who get to this point do not fall into the cate- 
gory of persons who have been "grievously wronged."332 The 
C o u r t  a l so  d i smissed  t h e  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  t h e  
petitioner-favorable harmless error rule was necessary to  deter 
state court judges, stating "[albsent affirmative evidence that 
state-court judges are ignoring their oath, we discount 
petitioner's argument that courts will respond to our ruling by 
violating their Article VI duty to uphold the Constit~tion."~~~ 
The majority opinion is clear in its disaffirmation of the 
appellate review vision. The result is also inconsistent with the 
de nouo litigation, innocence-selectivist, equitable remedy, and 
death-is-different visions. The opinion is at least partially com- 
patible with a rights-selectivist vision, since it applies only t o  
"trial error'' claims whose affect on the jury may be quantita- 
tively assessed, but not to  defects such as deprivation of right 
to counsel, which "require[] automatic reversal of the conviction 
because they infect the entire trial process."3s4 It is unclear 
whether the category of "trial error" accords with either the 
fundamental version of the rights-selectivist position or the 
accuracy version of the rights-selectivist vision. The majority 
opinion is also consistent with one-half of the bifurcated vision 
that a one-fair-chance visionary should hold: in Brecht, the 
petitioner had litigated the issue at the state level and, thus, 
could be held to a higher standard in habeas. The opinion gives 
no indication whether the result would differ if the petitioner 
had not had the opportunity to litigate the issue in state court. 
The decision is also quite supportive of the inverse correlation 
vision in its assertion that, as far as the Court can tell, state 
judges are not in need of deterrence. 
Justice Stevens' vote with the majority here bears scrutiny. 
This is the only instance in recent memory in which Justice 
Stevens joined a majority opinion that reached a conservative 
It is certainly debatable whether Justice Stevens 
332. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1721. 
333. Id. (citing Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884)). 
334. Id. at 1717 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08 (1991), a 
direct review case in which the "trial error" category was created). 
335. Justice Stevens did concur in part and concur in the judgment in Teagut! 
v. Lane, and was conservative in that he would have adopted Justice Harlan's 
retroactivity analysis on habeas. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 319-20 (1989) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). He rejected, how- 
ever, the rest of the majority's retroactivity analysis. Id. at 320-23. 
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correctly followed the logic of his own chosen visions in reach- 
ing this result. While the decision is consistent in some re- 
spects with a rights-selectivist vision, the dichotomy between 
trial error and "structural error" does not seem to accord with 
the dividing line that Justice Stevens has consistently espoused 
between favored "fundamental" rights and unfavored 
non-fundamental rights.336 Nor does the result in Brecht ac- 
cord easily with the equitable remedy vision, since it establish- 
es a rule common to all claims of "trial right" error. On the 
other hand, in support of Justice Stevens, it could be argued 
that even equitable remedy visionaries must state generally 
applicable principles on some issues, one of which is the stan- 
dard for harmless error. Perhaps Justice Stevens' vote is gener- 
ally consistent with a broader premise underlying both his 
rights-selectivist and equitable remedy visions, that habeas is 
an extraordinary writ that does not serve the same purpose as 
direct appeal. 
In a dissent joined by Justices Blackmun and Souter, Jus- 
tices who generally vote conservatively in habeas cases, Justice 
White argued that there should be parity between the stan- 
dards for direct appeal and habeas, apparently invoking the 
appellate review vision.337 Yet a third conservative, Justice 
O'Connor, penned a lengthier dissent in which she invoked a 
potpourri of theories. She agreed with the majority that habeas 
review is different from, and less petitioner-favorable than, 
direct review but argued that under equitable principles the 
nature of the right involved is imp~rtant.~" She then argued 
for a distinction between rights critical to the reliability of the 
process and prophylactic rules.33g Continuing this theme, she 
argued that the Chapman harmless error standard promotes 
the accuracy of guilt/innocence determinations, while the 
Kotteakos standard does not offer "adequate assurances of reli- 
ability."340 She then suggested that logically the Kotteakos 
standard could apply to claims of error that do not involve the 
accuracy of the guilt determination process, but concluded that 
this would cause more confusion than it would be worth.341 
336. Set! supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
337. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1726-27 (1993) (White, J., dis- 
senting). 
338. Id. at 1728-29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
339. Id. at '1729 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
340. Id. at 1730 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
341. Id. at 1730-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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This whole disquisition is reflective of the accuracy of the 
rights-selectivist vision, a vision with which Justice O'Connor 
had not earlier affiliated herself in any significant degree. 
w. CONCLUSION: A SUMMARY OF THE STATUS OF THE VISIONS 
Thus far I have examined how each of the eight visions 
fares in each of the ten contexts peculiar to habeas law. I will 
now attempt to take a step back and summarize how powerful 
each of the visions is under current habeas doctrine. I will 
begin with those visions that seem to  have the least power and 
progress to the most powerful ones. 
There are two visions that clearly have little power in 
current habeas jurisprudence. The first is the equitable remedy 
vision, which claims only Justice Stevens as an adherent. Ad- 
mittedly, some of the more conservative Justices bandy the 
term "equity" about, but they are not really talking about equi- 
ty, but rather about generic interest balancing.342 Under cur- 
rent law, there is no license for a federal district judge to rule 
on issues in any of the contexts by considering the equity of the 
individual case. 
The second vision that has virtually no power in current 
habeas jurisdictions is the death-is-different vision. Its only 
inroad is to provide a rationale for ignoring a procedural de- 
fault of a defendant who is "actually innocent" of the death 
penalty. Given the narrowness with which the Court has de- 
fined "actual innocence" of the death penalty, it seems unlikely 
that this exception will be of much benefit to death-sentenced 
petitioners. In no other context is a federal court authorized to 
treat a death-sentenced petitioner any more favorably than a 
petitioner not sentenced to death. 
Moving up one notch, I would characterize the 
innocence-selectivist vision as having only somewhat more than 
minimal power in habeas jurisprudence. Despite the Court's 
many invocations of innocence as an important factor, in reality 
i~ocence  only operates as a narrow exception to save a peti- 
tioner who is somehow at fault, either by procedurally default- 
ing a claim, failing to properly present all facts supporting the 
claim, or filing a subsequent petition.343 The Court has never 
342. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
343. Berger, supra note 83, at 986 11.232 ("My informal survey covered 1987 
through the first nine months of 1992. Although I kept no exact tally, failures of 
claims of likely innocence clearly outnumbered successes by a large multiple."). 
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made innocence a guardian of habeas' front door: there is no 
requirement that in order for a claim to be cognizable the peti- 
tioner must accompany it with a colorable claim of innocence. 
The role of innocence as a factor is, instead, relegated to admit- 
ting only a handful of petitioners in through the back door 
despite their earlier, improvident litigation activities. 
Moving another step up the ladder, there are two visions 
that I would classify as exerting moderate power in habeas 
jurisprudence. The first is the rights-selectivist vision. Despite 
the fact that Justice Stevens seemingly has been unsuccessful 
in recruiting additional rights-selectivists among members of 
the Court, there are still three particular issues for which the 
rights-selectivist vision is perhaps more explanatory of current 
doctrine than any other-and at least two of these issues are 
significant ones. The first significant issue over which 
rights-selectivism has explanatory power is the exclusion of 
Fourth Amendment claims from the purview of habeas (as long 
as the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
those claims in state court). One of the prime bases of Stone v. 
Powell was that Fourth Amendment exclusionary claims did 
not constitute a "personal constitutional right," an argument 
that is rights-selectivist a t  its core. The second significant as- 
pect of habeas doctrine that may be explained by the 
rights-selectivist vision is the less petitioner-favorable harmless 
error rule that the Court established in Brecht v. Abrahamson 
for claims of "trial" error. While it is not clear what sorts of 
errors comprised the category of "trial" error, this is clearly a 
category that must be composed by valuing some rights over 
others. The third issue, which I think is less significant, which 
rights-selectivism explains, is the two Teague exceptions for 
when a new rule can be applied retroactively. These exceptions 
are so narrow, however, that they do not seem to be nearly as 
significant as the rights-selectivist aspects of Stone and Brecht. 
The second vision I would rank as having moderate power 
is, perhaps surprisingly, the de novo litigation vision. While its 
proponents have been understandably outraged by many of the 
conservative Court's attacks on the 1963 Warren Court habeas 
trilogy, there are four important areas where habeas doctrine is 
still consistent with the de nouo litigation vision. First, all 
constitutional claims are cognizable in habeas except Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary claims that the petitioner had a f d  
and fair opportunity to litigate in state court. While the Stone 
v. Powell principle is obviously hateful to de novo litigation 
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visionaries, the fact remains that the principle is an anomaly. 
All subsequent efforts to expand Stone to other rights have 
failed, even the attempted expansion to Miranda claims which, 
it seems t o  me, fall squarely within the rationale of Stone. Sec- 
ond, pure law claims based on then-existing law are entitled to 
de novo review, and not even the most conservative of Justices 
has suggested otherwise. Third, mixed question claims still 
evoke de novo review, and while some conservatives on the 
Court wish it were otherwise, they do not seem to have the 
votes to carry the day, although they may have sufficient clout 
to get debatable issues classified as pure fact rather than as 
mixed questions. Fourth, pursuant to Townsend v. Sain and 
section 2254(d), there will be de novo factfinding if the state 
proceeding was flawed in any of the enumerated ways. 
I now move with trepidation to trying to analyze the power 
of the appellate review vision. Prior to 1993, this vision seemed 
to have as much explanatory power as any in the lineup. There 
were then, and still are, many significant areas of habeas juris- 
prudence that can be explained by the appellate review vision, 
including the exhaustion rule regarding mixed petitions, de 
novo review of pure law claims based on then-existing law, de 
novo review of mixed questions, vigorous restrictions on retro- 
active application of new rules to benefit habeas petitioners, 
strict rules holding petitioners to the consequences of their 
procedural defaults, and narrow availability of review for sub- 
sequent petitions. Admittedly, there was one important way in 
which habeas was narrower than direct review that violated 
the parity principle, namely, Fourth Amendment claims that 
the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in state 
court. Further, the loopholes that permit the habeas court to 
ignore procedural defaults and entertain subsequent petitions if 
the petitioner can establish "cause and prejudice" are also in- 
consistent with the principle of parity because they make habe- 
as review broader than direct review. But despite these in- 
stances of lack of parity in both directions, as of 1993 a propo- 
nent of the appellate revision vision could contend that the 
vision provided a powerful explanatory principle. To my mind, 
though,  t h e  r e su l t  i n  Brech t  i n  1993 of a less  
petitioner-favorable standard of harmless error, a t  least as to 
claims of "trial error," significantly undermines the power of 
the appellate review vision. There now seems to be a majority 
of the Court that is willing to stand for the proposition that 
while habeas generally cannot be broader than direct review 
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(with the "cause" and "prejudice" exception), it can and should 
be narrower in significant ways, not all of which presumably 
have been spelled out as of yet. 
We are left, then, with what I believe to  be the two most 
powerful visions currently operating in habeas doctrine: the 
one-fair-chance and inverse correlation visions. These visions 
can account for many significant doctrines of habeas jurispru- 
dence: the rule of exhaustion with respect to mixed petitions; 
the principle of Stone u. Powell; the very stingy rules regarding 
retroactive effect of new rules in habeas; the perceived tenden- 
cy to  categorize debatable issues as ones of pure fact, rather 
than as mixed issues; the doctrine of Tamayo-Reyes that a peti- 
tioner is stuck with earlier, faulty litigation of an issue unless 
due t o  constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel; the strict 
enforcement of state procedural defaults; the strict limits on 
consideration of subsequent petitions; and the rule in Brecht 
establishing a less petitioner-favorable standard for harmless 
error in habeas than on direct review. But while these visions 
are the most powerful, they have not taken over habeas juris- 
prudence as completely as opponents of the Court's conserva- 
tives have suggested. I have already noted above four impor- 
tant ways in which the de novo litigation vision has power. 
Further, whenever the conservative Court has established a 
strict rule it has always accompanied that rule with exceptions 
that would not be approved of by a strict one-fair-chance vision- 
ary. The whole idea that there is an exception for "cause" and 
"prejudice" that will allow a petitioner to  avoid the effects of 
earlier substandard litigation is inconsistent with both these vi- 
sions, as are the two Teague exceptions permitting retroactive 
application of a new rule in habeas in narrow circumstances. 
Further, the narrow areas in which the innocence-selectivist 
vision has power also undercuts any claim of overweening pow- 
er of the one-fair-chance and inverse correlation visions. 
For further study: One thing that this Article has not done, 
due to  my desire to keep it to manageable proportions, is to  ex- 
amine whether the conservatives on the Court have been intel- 
lectually honest in deciding habeas cases. Their opponents have 
certainly contended vocally that the conservatives are on a 
mission to destroy habeas and will expediently adopt any vision 
that will serve that purpose as to the issue at hand. The charge 
is a serious one: not just that the conservative Justices are 
wrong as a matter of history and policy, but that they are so 
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result-oriented as to be intellectually dishonest.3M It is cer- 
tainly true that the conservatives have invoked many different 
visions and that the progression of visions employed over the 
years does not seem to be line&. I hope to scrutinize this claim 
of intellectual dishonesty in a follow-up 
344. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Pas De Dew: The Supreme Court and the Ha- 
beas Courts, 66 S.  CAL. L. REV. 2467, 2496 (1993) ("The Teague decision was pain- 
fully disingenuous. It was disingenuous to pretend the decision was about inequity 
in retroactivity law. . . . Rather, the Teague Court was adopting its own approach 
to serve its own purposes.") (footnotes omitted); Friedman airs his opinion in an 
earlier article also, claiming that: 
For anyone familiar with the climate surrounding the decision [in Teague] 
it is difficult to conclude that the Court's determination was the product 
of much more than unseemly impatience with a Congress that was con- 
sidering related issues, but evidently too slowly for the Court. Moreover, 
the result in the Teague cases plainly was the work of a Court anxious to 
speed the pace of executions. 
Friedman, supra note 10, at 800; Patchel, supra note 20 at  1045-46 ("[Tlhe Court's 
main concern in the cases developing the new habeas has not been to render a 
principled decision in the particular case, but rather to use each case as a vehicle 
for rewriting its jurisdictional statutes."); Weisberg, supra note 10, at  9 (speculating 
that some of the conservative habeas decisions can be explained by the fact "that 
the Court was simply frustrated with the inadequacy of the execution rate of 
America's death row inmates"); Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 15, a t  2331-32 ("The 
objection in 'conservative' circles is not so much that habeas petitions are heard by 
national tribunals that have better things to do, but that collateral litigation is 
undertaken at all, particularly in death penalty cases, and, accordingly, that crimi- 
nal defendants may effectively upset their convictions and sentences."). Yackle finds 
the current Supreme Court conservative majority to be a party to this agenda. Id. 
at  2333); Yackle, Misadventures, supm note 15, at  393: 
The Court's "conservatives" may simply be hostile to the claims that liti- 
gants wish to press in any court and thus squeeze from both ends at  
once-forcing petitioners out of federal court on the promise of state pro- 
cess while at  the same time signaling the state courts that most anything 
they do will suffice. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
345. Tentatively entitled Confusion, Evolution, or Mission?: The Conservative 
Court and Habeas Corpus (forthcoming). 
